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Abstract 
 
The power of technology as a threat to mankind has been a popular science-fiction 
theme for a very long time, from classics such as George Orwell’s 1984 to more recent 
endeavours such as the haunting TV series Black Mirror. Perhaps the reason for the 
popularity of this subject is that these stories act as a catalyst to explore the future 
possibilities of the relationship between humans and technology. Based on our current 
experience we project into the future expecting technological advances to escalate at an 
advanced rate.  
Most would argue that technology is neutral in the sense that it can be used for positive 
or negative purposes. Either way, is clear that the development of technology is quickly 
progressing and more than ever we are replacing human services with machines and 
apps.  
However, this thesis aims to bring back the human element in the discussion of online 
copyright infringement. There are three key instances in which the capacity of a human 
mind intersects with the development of copyright law. The first is the development of 
the copyright statutory law, the second is the interpretation of the copyright statutory law 
by the judges, and the third is the cognitive interaction with new technologies by all 
humans. This thesis therefore addresses copyright law at each of these stages. 
The use of the internet in copyright infringement is a seminal case study to demonstrate 
the disconnect between the technological and the human perspectives. This notion of 
the disconnect between technology and human perspectives translates into the ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ perspectives of the internet. The external perspective is the understanding 
of online activity from a purely technological point of view, whereas the internal 
perspective considers the cognitive understanding of the human experience in online 
activity. Each perspective determines a different and separate reality which results in a 
materially different decision when the law is applied to each reality as a set of facts. 
These concepts are developed into a Framework for analysis which is then applied to 
the law of online copyright infringement. The ‘Framework for Constructing Digital 
Perspectives’ is thus developed from the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ perspectives of the 
internet as a lens through which the investigation of online copyright infringement can be 
viewed.  
Applying this Framework, the thesis makes an analysis of section 17 and then section 
20 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA 1988); infringement by way 
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of reproduction and communication to the public. This includes a detailed analysis of the 
development of the statute, the wording of the law and a consideration of the application 
of these sections to the relevant case law.  
This thesis is an investigation into copyright infringement on the internet. It involves a 
specific and in-depth analysis of the laws relating to digital copyright infringement by way 
of copying and communication to the public online. The context of this study falls within 
the broader and universal phenomenon of human interaction with new technologies. 
Thus, the study involves traditional doctrinal analysis of the law together with the broader 
consideration of the human element in the application of copyright law online.  
This thesis considers the mapping of copyright law online and the tensions thereof, in 
particular from the perspective of the cognitive understanding in the human experience 
with new technologies.  
As such, a key theme throughout the thesis is the human element in the development of 
copyright and new technologies. The moral of the story is the reminder that you cannot 
forget, or worse exclude, the notion of the human either in the law-making process, in 
the application of the law or in the regulating of those who make use of copyright works 
online. It is people who make and enforce copyright law, people who create copyright 
works and people who use those works on the internet. As Tim Berners-Lee stated: 
“The…Web… it’s really a system of people. Yes, it is enabled by technology. So, as time 
went on, we stopped thinking about the internet as the collection of computers and we 
stop thinking about the Web as the collection of connected pages and now we think of 
the Web as humanity connected.”1 
 
In the high-tech society within which we currently dwell, it is easy to focus on and rely 
upon technology. However, this these argues that putting the human element back into 
copyright analysis can return reason where it has been lost in technological specifics. 
The emphasis of defining online copyright infringement leans towards the specific 
technological means by which the activity is undertaken. However, this does not provide 
a coherent or consistent copyright law.  
 
  
																																								 																				
1 Tim Berners-Lee On Speech on 14 September 2008, at the Newseum in Washington, D.C. 
(USA), at the announcement of the World Wide Web Foundation (14 September 2008, 
Washington, DC, USA) available: http://webfoundation.org/about/community/transcript-of-tim-
berners-lee-video/  
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Introduction 
 
This thesis undertakes an analysis of online copyright infringement in view of the human 
interaction with new technology. It highlights that there are three key instances in which 
the capacity of a human mind intersects with the development of copyright law. The first 
is the development of the copyright statutory law, the second is the interpretation of the 
copyright statutory law by the judges, and the third is the cognitive interaction with new 
technologies by all humans. 
 
These key points of human intervention in copyright law are juxtaposed with the growing 
disconnect between the technological and the human perspective. These diverse 
approaches to understanding new technology can be explained as the ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ perspectives of the internet. Thus, these perspectives are developed into a 
framework for analysing online copyright infringement. 
 
 
 
The Internal and External Perspectives 
	
This thesis investigates online copyright infringement through the lens of Professor Orin 
Kerr’s2 ‘internal’ and ‘external’ perspectives of the internet.3 The external perspective is 
the technological approach which considers the technical functioning of the computer or 
access device and the online network. These are the facts of the physical reality, 
considering the mechanical operation of the hardware and software that makes up the 
internet as a network.4  
On the other hand, the internal perspective takes into consideration the cognitive 
understanding of the human experience online. This could also be explained as the 
virtual reality perspective that derives from the understanding of the internet as 
equivalent to the physical world.5 The internal and external perspectives are explained 
in detail in Chapter 1 and are analysed further in chapter 2.  
																																								 																				
2 Kerr O. S., The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal, 
pp. 357-405. 
3 Ibid., pp. 357-405. 
4 Ibid., p. 357. 
5 Ibid., p. 359. 
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Kerr demonstrated that these are two distinct,6 yet both viable,7 ways of interpreting the 
facts of the internet. Therefore, a choice of reality, or factual basis, is available to judges 
and legislators8 in the application of copyright law to online activity.  
This thesis utilises these two concepts and develops them into a framework for analysis, 
referred to as the Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives. For this purpose, the 
concepts are modified and grounded in the theoretical basis of metaphor and literalism. 
The result is a theoretically grounded framework for the analysis of the construction of 
digital truth; to determine if the application of legal regulation online is being interpreted 
with an internal or external perspective. 
Kerr suggested that the perspective of the law can be determined through analysis of 
the legal doctrine, the relevant case law or the perspective of the group of people the 
law seeks to regulate.9 Therefore, the Framework is first applied to the relevant statutory 
law. This falls in line with the first human interaction in the development of the law; the 
drafting of the law. 
The ability of the CDPA 1988 to adapt to technologies never possibly envisaged at the 
time of drafting, could only come from the judge’s interpretation and application of the 
law in a way that goes beyond the literal meaning of the original terms. If the CDPA 1988 
was interpreted purely literally then the law would be unable to encapsulate technologies 
invented subsequent to its enforcement. A purposeful interpretation of the statutory law 
by the judges is vital in allowing the law to remain relevant. (the literal and purposive 
approaches to interpreting the law is discussed in more detail in chapter 1). 
In certain circumstances the legislature has stated that defining law is better left to 
Courts.10 The judge’s role, therefore, is to understand the purpose of law in society and 
to enable the law to achieve its purpose in the present day.11 In doing so, the judge may 
give the statute a new meaning that seeks to bridge the gap between the law and life’s 
changing reality without changing the statute itself.12 Therefore the Framework is applied 
to the case law that interprets and applies the statutory law. This mirrors the second 
point of human intervention in the development of copyright law through the judge’s 
																																								 																				
6 Ibid., p. 357. 
7 Ibid., p. 357. 
8 Ibid., p. 358. 
9 Kerr O. S., The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal, 
pp. 357-405. 
10 Hansard, HL, Debates of the CDPA 1988 Bill 5th ser., col.268 (2 November 1988). 
11 Barak A., Judge in a Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 2008) p. 3. 
12 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
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interpretation of the regulation and the application of the law to the circumstances of the 
case.  
Thus, the Framework is applied to the statutory provisions and the case law, where the 
statutory provisions are interpreted by the judges in order to determine if copyright 
infringement is applied online from an internal or external perspective. In particular, (1) 
if the law was drafted from an internal or external perspective and (2) if the judges 
interpret and apply the law to online activity from an internal or external perspective.  
This enables the exploration of questions concerning regulatory legitimacy. Taking either 
the internal or the external perspective determines the outcome of a legal decision. 
Therefore, it is necessary to investigate if judges apply an internal or external perspective 
when defining digital copyright infringement. Furthermore, how does this impact the 
scope of the law in relation to communication to the public and copying online? Is the 
approach taken effective and legitimate? And finally, is this approach taken by the judges 
consistent with the perspective of the statutory instruments and legal doctrine? 
The originality of this thesis is thus three-fold. The first is the creation of the Framework 
for Understanding Digital Perspectives, which is a tool for analysis of the application of 
the law to the internet, developed using the internal and external perspectives. Using the 
Framework allows a researcher to identify if the law is drafted and applied from an 
internal or external perspective. This illuminates previously-unseen inconsistencies in 
the law as it is applied to online activity and can explain incoherent landscapes of law.  
Secondly, is the use of this Framework as lens through which to analyse online copyright 
infringement. Online copyright infringement has been studied in various ways, usually 
looking at consumer attitudes and numbers of illegal uses of copyright works. However, 
this thesis presents a novel approach at considering the challenges of applying copyright 
law to online activity. The second contribution to knowledge, therefore, provided by this 
thesis is the original analysis of a concept viewed in the light of new interpretation.13 
Thirdly, as a result of the novel approach in the analysis of online copyright infringement, 
novel conclusions are drawn. The application of the Framework provides new insights to 
the challenges that legislators and judges face in regulating the use of copyright works 
online.  
 
																																								 																				
13 Hicks F. C., Materials and Methods of Legal Research (New York: The Lawyers Co-operative 
Publishing Company; 1942) p. 23. 
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The Methodology of This Thesis  
	
The Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives is applied to the statutory and case 
law relating to online copyright infringement. In order to do this the thesis builds on 
foundation of doctrinal research with a more holistic understanding of the development 
and interpretation of the law. This section sets out the methodology of this thesis in 
context of recent trends in legal research methods. 
Legal research tends to find its discovery in the collecting and organising of secondary 
data14 or relevant materials to a particular problem.15 Given the vast available materials,16 
the lawyer’s skill is usually to locate17 and systemise the relevant material in order to 
illuminate and analyse the current state of the law.18 However, the distinction between 
primary and secondary data is merely theoretical;19 because the data of secondary 
research becomes original data when viewed in the light of new knowledge or 
interpretation.20 
Law is a unique type of research that requires its own methodological approach.21 
However, treating the study of law as a study within the social sciences; dealing with 
legal problems “critically and constructively, in the process of overstepping artificial 
boundaries… champions law reform…and is of practical utility.”22  
As mentioned, the novelty of this thesis both in the discoveries made and in the method 
of analysis. The construction of the Framework for analysis is intended to be a robust 
and repeatable model. The model is fashioned for the purpose of addressing the 
																																								 																				
14 Hicks F. C., Materials and Methods of Legal Research (New York: The Lawyers Co-operative 
Publishing Company; 1942) p. 24: “The discovery of the relationship between facts is a great an 
act of invention as is the unearthing of those facts.” 
15 Ibid., p. 23: “The object of legal research is to establish propositions concerning law.” 
16 Campbell E., Glasson E. J., York L. P. and Sharpe J. M., Legal Research Methods and 
Materials (Sydney: The Law Book Company; 1988) p. 1. 
17 Love Notz R. L., Legal Bibliography and Legal Research (Chicago: Gallaghan and Company; 
1952) p. 13: “Success or failure…will depend very largely on ability to find the law.” 
18 Campbell E., Glasson E. J., York L. P. and Sharpe J. M., Legal Research Methods and 
Materials (Sydney: The Law Book Company; 1988) p. 271. 
19 Hicks F. C., Materials and Methods of Legal Research (New York: The Lawyers Co-operative 
Publishing Company; 1942) p. 24: “No sharp line of distinction can be drawn between the two.” 
20 Ibid., p. 23. 
21 Genn H., Partington M. and Wheeler S., The Nuffield Inquiry: Law in the Real World: 
Improving Our Understanding of How Law Works (London: The Nuffield Foundation; 2006) p. 
94: “Legal scholarship is characterised as a law centred enterprise.” 
22 Hicks F. C., Materials and Methods of Legal Research (New York: The Lawyers Co-operative 
Publishing Company; 1942) p. 30. 
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particular research questions that this thesis poses, but may also be utilised for the 
purpose of investigating other areas of regulation that are applied to the internet. 
Therefore, it is necessary to specify the methodological approach, including a clear 
identification of the method of application that will be used in the following chapters. As 
Cryer et al. stated; “it is better to be open about the bases of research and to think about 
them, than to leave them unaddressed and uncritically accepted.” 23 
Before explaining the departure from doctrinal legal research, it is necessary to briefly 
confront the traditional approach.24 Black-letter doctrinal legal research is understood as 
the principal approach to legal research25 and is identified as a core skill for lawyers.26 It 
involves the exposition and analysis of legislation and case law, the integration of 
statutory provisions and judicial statements into a coherent and workable body of 
doctrine.27 
However, the doctrinal method has been subject to much criticism; it is considered very 
narrow in scope,28 looking at the law as a self-contained body of rules,29 which is not an 
adequate way of explaining the truth about the law.30 Thus, the utility of doctrinal 
research is considered limited.31 This was emphasised in the Nuffield Inquiry which 
stated that: “The dominant emphasis on doctrine questions in legal scholarship has 
																																								 																				
23 Cryer R., Hervey T. and Sokhi-Bulley B., Research Methodologies in EU and International 
Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing; 2011) p. 5. 
24 Minkkinen P., Critical Legal Method as Attitude in Watkins D. and Burton M. (ed.) Research 
Methods in Law (Abingdon: Routledge; 2013) p. 119-138: Stating that in order to argue 
successfully for departure from a traditional approach, the researcher must first engage with 
that tradition. 
25 Genn H., Partington M. and Wheeler S., The Nuffield Inquiry: Law in the Real World: 
Improving Our Understanding of How Law Works (London: The Nuffield Foundation; 2006) p. 
85: “There is little disagreement that law schools have historically been dominated by 
theoretical and text based doctrinal research.” 
26 Hutchinson T., Doctrinal Research; Researching the Jury in Watkins D. and Burton M. (ed.) 
Research Methods in Law (Abingdon: Routledge; 2013) p. 7. 
27 Brownsword R., An Introduction to Legal Research (2008) Scribd, p. 3. Available:  
https://www.scribd.com/doc/14260230/An-Introduction-to-Legal-Research    
28 Adams J. N. and Brownsword R., Understanding Law (Oxford: Sweet & Maxwell; 1999) p. 30. 
29 Thornton M., Technocentrism in the Law School: Why the Gender and Colour of Law Remain 
the Same (1998) 36(2) Osgoode Hall Law Journal, pp. 369-398, p. 370: Describing doctrinal 
study as “technocentric to capture the way in which rules rationality exercises a centripetal pull 
within legality so as to disqualify other forms of knowledge.” 
30 Twining W., Some Jobs for Jurisprudence (1974) 1(2) British Journal of Law and Society, pp. 
149-174, p. 163. 
31  Research Excellence Framework 2014, Overview Report by Main Panel C and Sub-Panels 
16 to 26 (January 2015) p. 71: “Increasingly narrow specialisation sometimes produced outputs 
which suffered from failing to situate their analyses within the wider legal or contextual frame of 
reference.” Available: 
www.ref.ac.uk/media/ref/content/expanel/member/Main%20Panel%20C%20overview%20report
.pdf  
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directed the energy of many legal academics more towards influencing legal reasoning 
and rather less toward influencing and shaping policy and practice.”32 
Nevertheless, doctrinal method still necessarily forms the basis for legal research 
projects.33 Valid research is built on the foundation of a thorough understanding of the 
legal doctrine being examined.34 However, overall, purely doctrinal legal research alone 
is considered less compelling,35 and is now regarded more as an essential underpinning, 
or starting point, on which a broader perspective should be built.36   
Accordingly, there has been a move from a purely black-letter approach. As Fiona 
Cownie observed in her study of academic culture; legal academics were reluctant to 
describe themselves as taking a purely black-letter approach to their research.37 
Brownsword argued that Cownie’s study supported a transition from black-letter 
research towards other legal methodologies such as socio-legal, critical legal studies or 
feminist approaches.38  
However, another way to think about this shift in the approach to legal research is that 
the definition of what doctrinal legal research entails has broadened in scope. As Cownie 
noted in her study: “In the course of the interviews…legal academics describing 
themselves as “black-letter” then went on, without any apparent sense of contradiction, 
to talk about how they regarded knowledge of policy, feminism, and other arguably socio-
legal perspectives as vital to their work, both as researchers and teachers.”39 
Furthermore, in the most recent Research Excellence Framework Report, the panel 
noted the “trend towards more broadly ‘contextual’ approaches to the discussion of legal 
issues and the field of legal studies as a whole is increasingly influenced by socio-legal 
																																								 																				
32 Genn H., Partington M. and Wheeler S., The Nuffield Inquiry: Law in the Real World: 
Improving Our Understanding of How Law Works (London: The Nuffield Foundation; 2006) p. 
96. 
33 Bartie S., The Lingering Core of Legal Scholarship (2010) 30(3) Legal Studies, pp. 345–69, p. 
351–52. 
34 Hutchinson T., Doctrinal Research; Researching the Jury in Watkins D. and Burton M. (ed.) 
Research Methods in Law (Abingdon: Routledge; 2013) p. 7. 
35 Cotterrell R., Why Must Legal Ideas be Interpreted Socialogically? (1998) 25(2) Journal of 
Law and Society, p. 173. 
36 Twining W., Some Jobs for Jurisprudence (1974) 1(2) British Journal of Law and Society, pp. 
149-174, p.167. 
37 Cownie F., Legal Academics; Culture and Identities (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) p. 55: 
Explaining that only a fifth of the respondents described themselves as taking a purely black-
letter approach. In addition, a third of the respondents claimed to take a black-letter approach 
that also considered contextual issues (10% described themselves as critical legal studies and 
40% socio-legal). 
38 Brownsword R., An Introduction to Legal Research (2008) Scribd, p. 3. 
39 Cownie F., Legal Academics; Culture and Identities (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) p. 20.  
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research methods and techniques.” 40 The panel viewed this as a positive shift for legal 
research, developing in sophistication and purposeful effect “as a body of knowledge 
and understanding with wide-ranging insights, impacts and implications for the social 
world.” 41  
As such, this thesis falls in line with the trend of a foundation of doctrinal research upon 
which a broader understanding is built by considering the historical development and 
intended policy purpose of copyright regulation.  
An Overview of This Thesis 
 
This section sets out an overview of how this thesis is presented.  
Chapter 1 introduces the key concepts of the thesis. This chapter provides an overview 
of the themes which underlie the rest of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 undertakes a detailed analysis of the internal and external perspectives and 
grounds these concepts in the theoretical basis of metaphor and literalism. Thereafter, 
these concepts are developed into the Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives.  
Chapters 3 and 4 address copyright infringement by way reproduction. Chapter 3 entails 
an analysis of section 17 CDPA 1988; looking in detail at the development of the law and 
the factors which affected the wording of the clauses within the section. The chapter 
considers each subsection with the view to evaluating its intended meaning, its current 
policy purpose and whether or not it suggests either an internal or external perspective.  
Based on the findings of chapter 3, chapter 4 looks in detail at the case law relating to 
section 17(2) copying by storage and section 17(6) making transient or incidental copies.  
Chapters 5 and 6 mirror chapters 3 and 4 in structure, but are concerned with copyright 
infringement by way of communication to the public. Chapter 5 considers the 
development of section 20 of the CDPA 1988 in order to determine the intended meaning 
and policy purpose of the section. 
Chapter 6 undertakes an analysis of the case law relating to copyright infringement by 
way of communication of the public. This analysis compares the case law before and 
																																								 																				
40 Research Excellence Framework 2014, Overview Report by Main Panel C and Sub-panels 
16 to 26 (January 2015) p. 71. Available: 
www.ref.ac.uk/media/ref/content/expanel/member/Main%20Panel%20C%20overview%20report
.pdf  
41 Ibid. p. 72. 
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after the 2003 Regulations42 that amended section 20 of the CDPA 1988 from a 
broadcasting right to a right of communication to the public. Thereafter, the chapter 
undertakes a detailed analysis of the post-2003 regulation in light of the European 
influence on UK case law. 
Chapter 7 brings together the findings of chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. The unique framework 
of analysis brings to light many tensions between copyright law and internet technologies 
that have not been discussed before in this way. 
																																								 																				
42 Copyright and Related Rights Regulations SI 2003/2498. 
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Chapter 1 
 
The Human Element in the Story of Online Copyright Infringement 
 
“People do not buy goods and services. They buy relations, stories and magic.” 
Seth Godin 
	
Introduction 
 
The title of this chapter represents the key thread that runs throughout this thesis. It is 
an analysis of copyright law building on a doctrinal approach and moving beyond to 
consider the human element in the application of copyright infringement online. There 
are three key instances in which the human mind intersects with the development of 
copyright law.  
The first instance of human intervention in the development of copyright law is in the 
drafting of the statutory law. The statute is a product of its time,43 it reflects the economic 
and political status of the legislator and can only be as informed as those contributing to 
its construction.44 Only through the debates in the House of Lords and House of 
Commons and a consideration of the circumstances within which the law was drafted 
can the true meaning of the law be understood. Thus, the second human element 
involved in the development of copyright law comes from the thinking and intention of 
the legislators. As such, the historical context and development of the law is considered 
in this thesis in order to establish the intended meaning, or policy purpose, of the relevant 
sections of the CDPA 1988.  
The second instance is the interpretation of the copyright statutory law by the judges. 
The role of the judge is to apply the law to the facts of the case. In order to do this, the 
judge must interpret the meaning of the statutory law and of the facts. Therefore, the 
judge’s interpretation and application of copyright is the second human intervention. In 
this thesis, the reasoning in the relevant judgements are considered in order to ascertain 
the judge’s interpretation of the law and the facts of the case.  
The third is the cognitive interaction with new technologies by all humans. The way in 
which people respond to and understand new technologies from a cognitive perspective 
																																								 																				
43 Whitford Committee Report: Copyright and Designs Law, Report of the Committee to 
Consider the Law on Copyright and Designs (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office; 1977) 
Cmnd 6732, para 15. 
44 Dworkin G. and Taylor R. D., Blacktone’s Guide to the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988 (London: Blackstone Press Ltd; 1989) p. 15. 
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is the same way that humans respond to any new situation; by applying previous 
knowledge. This often means that in order to be able to understand experiences online, 
the mind will relate the experience to something already known. As such, if a person is 
looking at a website, what they are actually doing is viewing a set of pixels reflecting the 
0 or 1 state of the binary digits that collate to form images on a screen. However, the 
human mind experiences this technology as shopping online, for example. Human 
interaction with new technology has become far-reaching, almost in fact, an extension 
of the self.45 This can be on a small scale; from using a phone memory to store 
information that might otherwise have been retained in the mind. Or, on a larger scale, 
the extension of the personality through social media, online games and virtual 
realities.46  
In light of this, the thesis considers how the internet has introduced a new phenomenon 
for the application of copyright law. The nature of the internet and the way that humans 
cognitively digest their experience online means that there are two ways in which the 
facts of the internet can be interpreted. This is because the facts of the case can be 
determined by either the technological function of the hardware and software or the 
cognitive perspective of the technology. These two ways to understand online activity 
are known as the internal and external perspectives.47 
The context of this thesis is digital copyright infringement by way of reproduction and 
communication to the public, in light of the development of the internet and online 
technologies. This analysis is undertaken through the lens of the internal and external 
perspectives which takes into account the human element in both the development and 
application of the law in relation to the internet. As Aiken stated: “For too long technology 
has been about data, devices and tech experts. Now it is time to turn our focus to the 
greater socio-technological implications…In other words, it’s time to factor in the 
human.”48 
Thus, the incident that sets this thesis in motion was the advent of the internet and online 
technologies. It is necessary to define what is meant by the internet for the purposes of 
this thesis. This study considers the tensions that occur in the application of copyright 
infringement to online activity, in the context of the internet. The meaning of the internet 
																																								 																				
45 Shaw J. A., From Homo Economicus to Homo Roboticus: An Exploration of the 
Transformative Impact of the Technological Imaginary (2015) 11(3) International Journal of Law 
in Context, pp. 245-264, p. 246. 
46 Ibid., p. 246. 
47 Kerr O. S., The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal, 
pp. 357-405. 
48 Aiken M., The Cyber Effect (London: John Murray Publishers; 2016) p. 18-19. 
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here is not the components that create an online experience such as email or a website. 
The internet refers here to the network or networks49 upon which these online 
technologies and components are built.  
The original intention for the development of the technology that has now become the 
internet was for military communication, commissioned by the US Department of 
Defence.50 Nevertheless, in the first recorded description in 1962 J. C. R. Licklider of MIT 
envisioned a globally interconnected set of computers through which everyone could 
quickly access data and programs; naming the concept the “Galactic Network.”51 
Subsequently in March 1989, Tim Berners-Lee proposed the idea of a linked information 
management system52 which ultimately led to the development of the World Wide Web. 
Berners-Lee has revealed how it took 18 months to persuade his company that the 
technology he was building should be royalty free for anybody to use and has expressed 
his aspirations for “one web that is free and open.”53 However, he has also recognised 
the importance of intellectual property: “Intellectual property is an important legal and 
cultural issue. Society as a whole has complex issues to face here: private ownership 
versus open source and so on.”54 Ultimately, it is noted that the nature of the internet 
was intended to be an open, sharing network. 
This concept of the internet as a communication device is developed further in chapter 
6 in relation to communication the public. Nevertheless, the internet is regarded within 
this thesis as the network system that encompasses online technologies to which 
copyright law is applied.  
This chapter introduces the main themes and concepts that are built upon throughout 
this thesis. It begins by considering the interpretation of online activity through the 
internal and external perspectives. Thereafter, the application of copyright infringement 
to online activity by way of copying and then by communication to the public is 
																																								 																				
49 Laddie, Prescott and Victoria, Modern Law of Copyright (London: Butterworths Law; 2011) 
37.2: “Physically, the Internet consists of many networks which interconnect many individual 
computers (hundreds of millions).” 
50 Leiner B. M., Cerf V. G., Clark D. D., Kahn R. E.,Kleinrock L., Lynch D. C., Postel J., Roberts 
L. G. and Wolff S., Brief History of the Internet, available: 
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet  
51 Ibid. 
52 https://www.w3.org/History/1989/proposal.html  
53 Berners-Lee T., 14 September 2008, speaking at the Newseum in Washington, D.C. (USA), 
at the announcement of the World Wide Web Foundation (14 September 2008, Washington, 
DC, USA) available: http://webfoundation.org/about/community/transcript-of-tim-berners-lee-
video/  
54 BCS The Chartered Institute for IT, Leaders in Computing: Changing the Digital World 
(Swindon: British Informatics Society; 2011) p. 44. 
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considered. As mentioned, this analysis looks at the development of the statutory law 
followed by the application and interpretation of the law by the judges.  
 
Copyright Before the Internet 
 
Copyright regulation and technology are entwined and bound together.55 As Groves 
stated: “Every major leap forward in the history of copyright law is linked to a 
technological leap forward.”56  
The development of copyright law can be seen as responses to changes in the 
environment to encompass new technologies.57 Sherman and Bentley explained that 
changes in the law could “be seen as attempts to modernise the law, to bring it in to line 
with the cultural and technological changes.”58 Each major development in copyright law 
can be associated with the development of a new technology; from the first Copyright 
Act 171059 which was adapting to the challenges of printing press technology.60 
Thereafter sound recordings,61 films,62 broadcasts,63 computer programs64 and many 
other developments have all left their marks on the development of copyright law.65 
Copyright law is thus a product of its time; the Whitford Committee likened the amending 
of the Statute of Anne “to a modest Queen Anne house to which there have been 
Georgian, Victorian, Edwardian and finally Elizabethan additions, each adding 
																																								 																				
55 Jones R., Intellectual Property Reform for the Internet Generation: An Accident Waiting to 
Happen (2010) 1(2) European Journal of Law and Technology, pp. 1-17, p. 2: “The close and 
inevitable relationship between copyright and technology.” 
56 Groves P., Copyright and Designs Law: A Question of Balance (London: Graham and 
Trotman Ltd; 1991) p. 1. 
57 Sherman B. and Bently L., The Making of Modern Intellectual Property (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; 1999) p. 65. 
58 Ibid., p. 65. 
59 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the 
Authors or Purchasers 1709, commonly referred to as the Statute of Anne.  
60 Jones R., Intellectual Property Reform for the Internet Generation: An Accident Waiting to 
Happen (2010) 1(2) European Journal of Law and Technology, pp. 1-7, p. 2. 
61 CDPA 1988, section 1(1)(b). 
62 Ibid., section 1(1)(b). 
63 Ibid., section 1(1)(b). 
64 Ibid., section 3(1)(b). 
65 Groves P., Copyright and Designs Law: A Question of Balance (London: Graham and 
Trotman Ltd; 1991) p. 2. 
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embellishments in the style of the times.”66 Therefore, as new technologies have been 
developed, copyright law has adapted to encompass them.67 
At every advent of a new technological development a fear rises in stakeholders that 
copyright is under threat; copyright law is claimed to be out of date and if immediate 
action is not taken, copyright will become obsolete. For example, at the introduction of 
the photocopier, the technology that enabled quicker and cheaper copying of books was 
considered a serious threat to copyright holders at the time.68 It was claimed that the 
photocopying technology threatened a complete breakdown of copyright observance 
and the copyright laws were inadequate to cope.69 
As a result, the Gregory Committee was set up in order to consider how the law should 
evolve in response to these technical developments.70 The consultation highlighted the 
need for copyright to respond and adapt to new technologies, whilst also upholding a fair 
balance between stakeholders. For example, the publishers insisted that the law could 
not allow large-scale copying; but scholars wanted to be able to make copies for their 
research, and librarians required clarity on which they should base their practice.71 In 
order to address these conflicting interests the Gregory Committee suggested an 
extension of fair dealing that would allow reproduction by mechanical or photographic 
means, but only of extracts up to a certain length for private study.72 Feather described 
this balancing act as an “important conceptual innovation…an ingenious compromise.”73 
In this respect, copyright responds to technology development. In the same way the 
current statutory legislation, the CDPA 1988, was drafted in response to new 
technologies by recognising copyright protection in computer programs,74 and cable and 
satellite broadcasting,75  which did not appear in the previous act.  
																																								 																				
66 Whitford Committee Report: Copyright and Designs Law, Report of the Committee to 
Consider the Law on Copyright and Designs (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office; 1977) 
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67 Bracha O., Copyright history as history of technology (2013) 5(1) The World Intellectual 
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Intellectual Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1999). 
68 Feather J., Publishing, Piracy and Politics: An Historical Study of Copyright in Britain 
(London: Mansell Publishing; 1994) p. 205. 
69 Dworkin G., Reports of Committees; the Whitford Committee Report on Copyright and 
Designs Law (1977) 40 Modern Law Review, pp. 685-700, p. 696. 
70 The Board of Trade Report of the Copyright Committee (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary 
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71 Ibid., p. 1. 
72 Ibid., para 52. 
73 Feather J., Publishing, Piracy and Politics: An Historical Study of Copyright in Britain 
(London: Mansell Publishing; 1994) p. 206. 
74 CDPA 1988, section 3(1)(b). 
75 CDPA 1988, section 1(1)b, 6(4). 
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The reason, perhaps, that the internet is considered different to other technological 
developments is due to the increased pace of technological advance. As Moore’s Law 
forecast, the rate of technological power increases by double every 2 years and lowers 
in price accordingly.76 Lawrence Lessig noted that technological changes have 
previously been gradual and that the enabling of cheaper and easier copying had been 
only by degrees, and over an extended period of time.77 This allowed the law time to 
react by slowly modifying its protections and extending them where technology seemed 
to be eroding them.78 It could be argued that the current technological developments, the 
latest challenge to copyright law of the internet and online technologies,79 has increased 
at such a rate of accessibility80 that cultural and behavioural changes81 occurred too fast 
for the law to keep up.82 Some argued that copyright law is rendered obsolete in the face 
of the internet.83 For example, copyright is challenged by internet technologies that 
allowed multiple copies of copyright works, of equal quality, to be copied instantly at an 
almost zero cost. 84 
It has also been argued that attempting to map copyright law onto online activity simply 
does not work,85 and copyright law is thus regarded as being incapable of keeping up 
with the pace of technology;86 unable to embrace the future of the internet. For example, 
John Perry Barlow stated:	“real world conditions will continue to change at a blinding 
pace, and the law will get further behind and more profoundly confused.”87 Furthermore, 
Murray argued that “the move from physical to digital distribution models and the 
																																								 																				
76 Mollick E., Establishing Moore’s Law (2006) 28(3) IEEE Annals of the History of Computing, 
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77 Lessig L., Code: and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books; 1999) p. 125. 
78 Ibid., p. 125. 
79 Hardy T., Computer RAM Copies: A Hit or a Myth? Historical Perspectives on Caching as a 
Microcosm of Current Copyright Concerns (1997) 22 University of Dayton Law Review, pp. 423-
621, p.425. See also Hargreaves I., Digital Opportunity; A Review of Intellectual Property and 
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80 Van Santen R., Khoe D. and Vermeer B., 2030 Technology That Will Change The World 
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83 Davis G., Copyright and the Public Interest (London: Sweet and Maxwell; 2002) p. 326. 
84 Landes W. and Posner R., An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law (1989) 18 Journal of 
Legal Studies., pp. 325-364, p. 326. 
85 Davis G., Copyright and the Public Interest (London: Sweet and Maxwell; 2002) p. 326. 
86 Ploman E. W. and Hamilton L. C., Copyright: Intellectual Property in the Information Age 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; 1980) p. 148. See also Patterson L. R., Copyright in 
Historical Perspective (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press; 1968) p. 214. 
87 Barlow J. P., The Next Economy of Ideas, After the Copyright Revolution (2000) 10 Wired, 
available at: http://www.wired.com/2000/10/download/  
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development of the internet are two of the most disruptive events of the twentieth 
century.”88 
	
The Development of Internet Sharing Technologies 
	
Needless to say, the advent of internet technologies has introduced new challenges to 
copyright regulation. Copyright infringement may have occurred pre-internet, but the 
internet has created the phenomenon of online copyright infringement. These 
technologies allow users to easily access and replicate copyright material89 and limits 
the ability of copyright holders to control the use of their work.90  
Some have argued that the internet offers nothing new and that applying copyright 
regulation online is the same as applying the law to any new set of facts.91 For example, 
Goldsmith suggested that whilst it is a challenge to apply traditional legal doctrine to the 
novel internet context, it is manageable.92 
However, the internet has been recognised by many as a radical departure from previous 
technologies and therefore within a legal context is vastly different from that of the past.93 
This is because the nature of the internet presents challenges “of an entirely different 
order.”94 As Ola stated: “The switch from the Advanced Research Project Agency 
Network (ARPANET) to Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) 
marked the birth of the internet, and the world has not been the same ever since.”95 
There are many factors that set the internet apart from previous technological 
developments. As	Epstein stated: "Nowhere is this task of reconciliation more daunting 
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90 Ibid., p. 125. 
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than with cyberspace, where the speed and spread of information has been ratcheted 
up to levels that were unimaginable even a generation ago."96 
Firstly, the internet allows data to be in multiple places at once, whereas previously data 
could only be in one place at one time.97 This means that copyright material is no longer 
subject to scarcity. It also means that there is a lack of proximity between cause and 
effect which therefore makes enforcing copyright more challenging.  
Secondly, bandwidth is infinite compared to the physical limitations of real space. Online 
technologies facilitate instantaneous transmission of perfect reproductions of copyright 
works at almost zero costs.98 This makes copyright infringement much easier and 
cheaper on an unlimited scale, therefore challenging the copyright owner’s ability to 
control the distribution of their work.  
Thirdly, online technologies disconnect copyright works from their original format.99 
Previously, technological developments had an effect on a specific type of copyright 
work, such as the photocopier and literary works. Digitalisation on the other hand, applies 
to all types of copyright works and therefore the impact is much larger. The technology 
is increasingly subsuming all media into itself.100 Communications such as mail and 
telephoning, and entertainment such  as film, television, music, photography and radio 
have all been translated into digital form.101 Therefore, the exclusive rights that attach to 
such creative works are more frequently defined in technical terms.102 These 
technological parameters are largely prompted by lobbying on the part of entertainment 
industries in response to new technologies that allow novel ways to reproduce and share 
creative content.103  
Lessig had previously emphasised the contrast between imposing the legal principles of 
the physical world online and the code barriers in the networked information 
environment.104 This rationale was explained by comparing the architecture of the 
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97 Lemley M., Place and Cyberspace (2003) 91 California Law Review, pp. 521-542, pp. 525-
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internet to a door or wall in the physical world; whereas legal sanctions are designed to 
influence behaviour in order to avoid them, code barriers perform the virtual equivalent 
of physically preventing engagement in certain behaviour.105 Filby argued that a gulf 
exists between the approach of the regulator and the technical effect of the code.106 
Murray added that this must be recognised by the regulator or the battle between the 
designers of digital rights management systems and hackers, crackers and peer-to-peer 
systems will continue.107 
Fourthly, as a result of the development of internet technologies, consumption 
behaviours have altered changing copyright’s monopoly value due to unlimited 
unauthorised dissemination.108 Online technology has enabled users to share and 
connect with the 3,366,261,156109 other people online and sharing thus became an 
established part of modern culture.110 For example, Facebook statistics state that it has 
more than 1 billion active users111 who share 30 billion pieces of content every month.112 
Sharing has now become a complete functionality of web pages,113 allowing endless 
possibilities of broadcasting any information on any portable device.114 It has become 
impossible to control the spread of information on the internet; as soon as content is 
online, it is accessible and sharable.115 
The nature of online sharing and copyright infringement in general has been explored 
through academic research, particularly focusing on how much sharing is done, by whom 
and why. A brief overview of this research is considered in order to demonstrate the 
impact of internet technologies on the consumption of copyright works. In addition, this 
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is an opportunity to identify the novelty of the investigation undertaken in this thesis. 
Whilst there has been a number of studies on copyright infringement online, as set out 
below, they have mainly focused on the users’ behaviour, decision making, attitudes and 
level of understanding of the law. By contrast, this thesis focuses on the development of 
copyright law and its application to online behaviour in light of the cognitive 
understanding of new technologies. 
Since 2003 there have been around 200 empirical studies on the user’s decision to 
engage in online copyright infringement.116 These studies have examined end-user 
motivations using the following frameworks: cost benefit analysis, legal deterrence, value 
of the goods in question, technical ability, social influence and moral associations.117 
However, there is no overwhelming evidence to suggest that one, any or all of these 
motivations have a casual effect on a user’s decision to infringe. 
Twelve of these studies considered legal awareness. Although no causation could be 
shown, the evidence from these twelve studies strongly suggested that people were 
unaware of whether their activity online was legal.118 For example, the Palfrey et al.119 
study revealed that when students were asked ‘do you know what copyright means?’ 
84% responded yes,120 but their subsequent description of copyright was either wholly 
or partially incorrect.121 
Furthermore, there is general recognition that illegal activity online is a social norm, with 
no moral implications.122 As early as 2003, surveys indicated that a substantial number 
of young people believed that sharing digital music was morally acceptable.123 The 
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Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property Policy (SABIP) concluded in 2009 that: 
“There is also substantial evidence that many individuals do not perceive software piracy 
to be an ethical problem at all”.124 
This was supported by a study in 2010 that found students to have “relatively high levels 
of anti-copyright norms.”125 More recently, a study in 2012 continued to find that the 
younger population do not have moral or ethical concerns about the practice of online 
copyright infringement.126 A further study concluded that the imposition of stricter 
penalties for copyright infringement would further erode respect for copyright law and 
may even prove counterproductive to the entertainment industries.127 In this study, 404 
non-law students were surveyed.128 The results suggested that students’ evaluation of 
the music industry was negatively affected by the enforcement of copyright law.129 The 
authors stated that: “The younger demographic are convinced that file sharing 
technology has many beneficial uses and that copyright law is out dated or biased 
towards music publishers”.130  
According to the most recent survey by Kantar Media in 2015, awareness and 
understanding of copyright infringement remains confusing for users.131 The study found 
that 40% of internet users claimed to be either ‘not particularly confident’ or ‘not at all 
confident’ in terms of what is and is not legal online.132 
These studies demonstrated that the development of new technology has had a 
significant impact on the way that copyright works are consumed and regulated. In 
recognising both the benefits and the challenges that online technological developments 
bring, the Secretary of State Ben Bradshaw stated that “the digital revolution has brought 
huge benefits and opportunities for a country such as Britain that is creative, innovative 
and flexible, but such rapid change also brings challenges. The overriding challenge…to 
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address is that of keeping the legal framework that applies to our digital and creative 
sectors up to date in such a fast-moving world.”133 
Therefore, the development of copyright law can be seen as a reaction to technological 
developments which create new types of works and new means of exploiting existing 
works.134 As Litman warned, failing to adapt in these circumstances results in unintended 
consequences in the law: “New developments change the pitch of the playing field. 
Industries effected by copyright find that the application of old legal language to new 
contexts yields unanticipated results.”135 Thus, the law must adapt136 to new technologies 
in order to stay relevant137 in balancing138 the interests of creators and rights-holders with 
the public interest of accessing and using creative material.139  
This is ultimately the context of this thesis; the development of new online technologies 
and the effect on copyright regulation. In particular, the thesis considers the application 
of copyright law to online activities that are deemed to be infringement by copying or 
communication to the public.  
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Interpretation of Online Activity and the Internal and External 
Perspectives  
 
The internet introduced a new dimension to the interpretation and application of the law 
to the facts of a case. In this regard, the nature of the internet presents challenges “of an 
entirely different order."140 
 
The Internal and External Perspectives  
	
As mentioned, the essential task of the judge is to interpret the law and apply the legal 
rules to facts of the case.141 However, when applying this to the internet there can be 
more than one set of facts, depending on whether the physical (external) or virtual 
(internal) perspective is considered. The law is contingent on the facts, and the facts are 
contingent on the perspective.142 
In his article “The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law”143 Kerr set out the internal and 
external perspectives of the internet.144 He explained that the internal perspective is 
where a user’s understanding of their activity online derives from their understanding of 
real life. This is the virtual reality perspective that derives from the understanding of the 
internet as equivalent to the physical world. From this perspective, a person chooses to 
accept the virtual world of cyberspace as a legitimate construct in order to cognitively 
process their activity.145 Kerr stated that: “the internal perspective adopts the point of 
view of a user who is logged on to the Internet and chooses to accept the virtual world 
of cyberspace as a legitimate construct. To this user, a computer connected to the 
Internet provides a window to a virtual world that is roughly analogous to the physical 
world of real space.” 146 
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In contrast, the external perspective focuses on the technical functioning of the computer 
or access device and the online network. This perspective considers the hardware and 
technicalities of how the information is presented to the user. The physical reality 
perspective considers the technical functioning of the network rather that of the user.147 
Kerr explained this as the external viewpoint whereby the internet is simply a network of 
computers located around the world and connected by wires and cables.148 The 
hardware sends, stores, and receives communications using a series of common 
protocols.149 Keyboards provide sources of input to the network and monitors provide 
destinations for output. The internet allows the transfer of trillions of 0s and 1s, which 
computers connected to the network can translate into commands, text, sound, and 
pictures.150 Kerr stated that: “the external perspective adopts the viewpoint of an outsider 
concerned with the functioning of the network in the physical world rather than the 
perceptions of a user. From this external viewpoint, the Internet is simply a network of 
computers located around the world and connected by wires and cables.”151 
A relevant example to illustrate these different perspectives is web browsing and cache 
copying. From an external perspective in order for an end-user to browse material online, 
the computer makes a copy of that material and temporarily stores it in the internet 
‘cache’ on the hard disk of the computer. Alternatively, from an internal perspective the 
end-user’s intention is to view material online. He accepts the virtual world of cyberspace 
as a legitimate construct, and therefore perceives only that he is observing material 
online. The temporary copies retained in the cache are not relevant from this perspective. 
At most it is merely an incidental consequence of using a computer to view the material. 
In the case of Meltwater152 for example, both Mrs Justice Proudman in the Chancery 
Division153 and Lord Justice Jackson and Lord Justice Elias in the Court of Appeal154 
held that temporary copies in the end-user’s computer were “generated by the user’s 
voluntary decision to access the web-page.”155 Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated 
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that “browsing by its very nature is an end-user function.”156 In this case, the Court 
appeared to take an external perspective on temporary copying157 and subsequently 
establish copyright infringement based on the technical function of the computer 
process.158  
In contrast, a more recent mention of perspective was made by The Hon Mr Justice 
Arnold when considering online copyright infringement, he stated that: “Viewed from the 
perspective of the user, the websites do in a very real sense make the content available 
to the public.” 159 This suggests an internal perspective as he considered the user’s 
experience of the technology. 
Kerr argued that the internet is a physical network, but that it can create a virtual world 
that can appear sufficiently realistic to its users to make a plausible claim for equal footing 
with the physical world.160 Tim Wu recognised the ability of code to submerge a user into 
the virtual reality, particularly when sharing networks exploit ambiguity.161 This is done 
through a design that is intended to look and feel more like non-commercial home 
copying than like breaking into a record shop.162 In addition, Lior Jacob Strahilevitz 
suggested that charismatic code creates an illusion of reciprocity that can manipulate 
people into file sharing.163  
Kerr suggested that the perspective of the law can be determined through analysis of 
the legal doctrine, the relevant case law or the perspective of the group of people the 
law seeks to regulate.164 In the application of these concepts, Kerr suggested that a 
particular perspective can be established and should thereafter be applied. Kerr argued 
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that “the fact that we can always present an internal and external version of the facts 
does not mean that those two versions are equally viable, any more than the fact that 
there are two sides to every argument means that we can never choose between them. 
Judgements can be made.”165 
Overall, it can be seen that taking an internal or external perspective on internet activity 
determines the facts of the case and therefore has a significant impact on the law of 
copyright online. This thesis therefore uses the internal and external perspectives as a 
catalyst for the analysis of the statutory and case law regulation of copyright infringement 
online. This is done by developing the internal and external perspectives into a 
framework for analysis in chapter 2 which is then applied to the statutory law and case 
law in the remaining chapters.  
 
The Human Element of Legal Drafting 
 
When analysing statutory law, it is imperative to take into account the context and 
circumstances of the drafting in order to obtain the meaning. As Sir William Dale 
illustrated in this fictional scenario: 
“Solicitor: I am not an expert in copyright law, you know. But let us see what the 
Act says. You’ve explained your objection to ‘In this Act ‘copyright’ … means …’ 
Now read on.  
Author: ‘means the exclusive right …’  
Solicitor: You’ve left something out, ‘except where the context otherwise 
requires’.  
Author: That is to say, copyright means what the Act says it does, except where 
it means something different?  
Solicitor: More or less – it’s a favourite formula. One has to wait and see whether 
in any passage the general drift indicates something different. Author: I do not 
call that helpful. The seed of uncertainty is sown at the outset.”166 
 
This thesis therefore takes into account the context of the CDPA 1988 in two ways. The 
first is to consider the discussions and debates that occurred at the time of the drafting 
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in order to reveal the intended meaning and policy purpose of the regulation. It is not 
possible to consider if a regulation fulfils its intended purpose, unless the purposes is 
first established. This has been supported by legislators and judges alike. For example, 
in a House of Lords debate on the interpretation of legislation Bill, Lord Chancellor Mr 
Quintin Hogg recalled a conversation with draftsman who stated: “It really is very difficult 
to understand what they mean sometimes. I always look at Hansard, I always look at the 
Blue Books, I always look at everything I can in order to see what is meant.”167  
Lord Denning also referred to Hansard in Court on several occasions, for example in 
order to find out why cinematograph film exhibitions were excluded from the Obscene 
Publications Act 1959; Denning stated: “I propose to look at Hansard to find out. I know 
we are not supposed to do this. But the Law Commission looked at Hansard… So I have 
looked at Hansard to refresh my memory.”168 As a result he was able to ascertain the 
reasoning: “We have the reason why cinematograph films were omitted. It was because 
they could be left to the common law and the existing means of censorship.”169 
However, the use of Hansard by the Courts is controversial. Please see the section 
below under the heading ‘Judges Interpretation of the Law’ for a more detailed 
discussion on this topic.  
This research includes an analysis of the discussions, debates and development of the 
relevant law in order to understand the intended meaning of the statute. This is 
particularly reflected in the first part of Chapter 3 and Chapter 5. 
The second factor to take into account is the nature of legal drafting. A key characteristic 
of legal drafting is the need to use wording that accurately reflects the intended policy 
decision.170 However, in the context of copyright law, the challenge is two-fold, as the 
need for technologically accurate words has to be balanced with the need to be 
technologically neutral.171 This is because if the wording is too specific to the technology, 
it becomes quickly out of date in the face of technological developments.  
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The drafting of the new text and data mining copyright exception introduced in 2014, is 
an example of this challenge.172 Technical reviews are required as part of the 
consultation process, which involves careful discussion on the specific choice of 
terminology used to define the intended meaning within the statute. For example, in 
introducing the text and data mining exception,173 the Government queried if the term 
‘electronic analysis’ reflected the range of analytical techniques used in research.174 
Whilst some stakeholders felt that the term was appropriate to describe the range of 
activities normally meant by text and data mining, others argued that a more detailed 
definition was needed.175 Another response argued that the term was too technologically 
specific and suggested the word ‘computational’ as an alternative.176 
The Government stated its intention to draft legislation that is technologically neutral177 
and, in this instance, to permit all activities that could reasonably be considered to be 
“text and data mining.”178 Therefore, the draft legislation was updated and the wording 
of the exception can be seen to reflect this discussion. As such, the word ‘electronic’ has 
been replaced by computational: “The copy is made in order that a person who has lawful 
access to the work may carry out a computational analysis of anything recorded in the 
work for the sole purpose of research for a non-commercial purpose”179 [emphasis 
added].180 
The legislative process also involved taking into account various stakeholder 
perspectives; striking this balance can be challenging and has a direct impact on the 
language of the law. For example, the CDPA 1988 was not a hastily-conceived 
measure.181 The Bill was finally brought to the House of Commons in the spring of 1988 
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after a great deal of research and consultation182 between lawyers, civil servants, 
publishers, authors, librarians, broadcasters, designers, industrialists and many others 
who would be affected by it.183 The numerous and competing interests of different 
stakeholder representatives was reflected in the complexity and lengthy Bill.184 At the 
introduction of the second reading of the Bill it was acknowledged that “this 
Bill…is…lengthy and complex. It has 285 clauses and eight schedules.”185 
Groves argued that no amount of consultation and deliberation could avoid the multiple 
difficulties in reforming copyright law.186 In fact, it appeared, that the more consultation 
that took place, the more irreconcilable viewpoints became apparent.187 As a result of 
such negotiation, the law became very long and specific.188 The process of reaching 
such a consensus between the stakeholders was evidently challenging; as has been 
demonstrated by the lengthy and complicated consultation process.189 
Therefore, this thesis takes into account the context of the drafting of the CDPA 1988 in 
order to ascertain the intended meaning of the law, before turning to consider the judge’s 
interpretation and application of the relevant sections.  
As mentioned, looking back at the context of the legal drafting is insightful for research 
purposes. However, the extent to which the Courts are able to do this to inform their 
understanding is not straightforward.  
As part of the research method this thesis considers the context of the drafting of the law 
and the judge’s application of the statutory law in the cases. This falls in line with the 
recent trend of a foundation of doctrinal research upon which a broader understanding 
is built by considering the historical development and intended policy purpose of 
copyright regulation. (Please see methodology of this thesis in the introduction for a 
detailed discussion on the methodology.) 
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However, there are a number of controversies that arise within this area that should be 
noted. These revolve around the issue of the separation of powers between the judiciary 
and the Courts. Namely, the judge’s role in interpreting and applying the statutory law, 
whether or not there is an intended policy purpose, or meaning of the statutory law and 
if that should be taken into account by the judge or not. These issues are considered in 
the discussion below.  
 
Judicial Interpretation of Statutory Law: The Rules 
	
In relation to statutory interpretation, Francis Bennion stated: “An enactment has the 
legal meaning taken to be intended by the legislator. In other words, the legal meaning 
corresponds to the legislative intention.”190 
However, there are three main approaches to statutory interpretation that are considered 
the cardinal rules in the way that judges should interpret the law.191 These rules are 
known as the literal, golden and mischief rules, and are discussed below.  
However, it is not clear if these rules are descriptive of how statutes are interpreted or 
prescriptions of how they should be.192 Furthermore, it is also not certain if these rules 
should be considered together or if one supersedes the other.193 As Feldman stated: 
“These are not totally distinct, much less mutually exclusive; they run together, and 
interpreters either choose between them or treat intention and mischief as techniques 
for establishing the "true meaning" of the statutory text.”194 
The following section considers that when interpreting legislation, judges must take the 
ordinary meaning of the words in the statute. However, if those words in their ordinary 
meaning lead to absurdity then the Court must consider the intent behind those words, 
and in particular what problem the legislation attempting to solve. This leads the judges 
to consider policy reasoning behind the statute, which is a controversial issue. This, 
therefore, leads to a consideration of the exclusionary rule which stands to separate the 
powers between the judiciary and Parliament, protecting the freedom of speech of 
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members of the House. Thereafter, the Pepper v Hart rule, which introduced an 
exception to the exclusionary rule, which allows the Courts to consider Parliamentary 
debates in specific circumstances.  
 
The Literal Rule 
 
The literal rule involves taking the plain meaning of the words in the statute. As 
expressed by Lord Atkin: “the Legislature must be taken to have meant and intended 
what it has plainly expressed.”195Some argue that the UK Courts primarily take a literal 
approach to statutory interpretation.196  
However, using this approach alone has been considered limited.197 The reason for this 
is that it is not always straightforward to literally interpret the wording of a statute,198 for 
example the nature of language is such that it can be ambiguous and vague. As Lord 
Bingham stated: "The basic task of the court is to ascertain and give effect to the true 
meaning of what Parliament has said in the enactment to be construed. But that is not 
to say that attention should be confined and a literal interpretation given to the particular 
provisions which give rise to difficulty.”199 
This was illustrated in the case of Smith v Hughes (1960)200 where Lord Parker found 
that the relevant legislation was vague and unclear. So instead of relying only on the 
literal reading of the words in the Act, he recalled the purpose of the legislation: “For my 
part, I approach the matter by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act. 
Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets…I am content to 
base my decision on that ground and that ground alone.”201 This is considered the mischief 
rule and is explained in the following section. 
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The Mischief Rule 
	
Taking a purely literal reading of the words in a statute may not enable the Courts to 
remedy the mischief that Parliament intended to deal with.202 The mischief rule is based 
on the principle that legislation is created to solve a problem, with the goal of suppressing 
the mischief	and advancing the remedy.203 As set out in Heydon’s case (1584):204 “By 
enquiring what was the mischief and defect against which the common law did not 
provide; what remedy the Parliament had appointed to cure the disease of the 
commonwealth; and what was the true reason of the remedy:”205 
The mischief rule can be understood in the context of Karl Llewellyn’s “law-jobs” theory. 
This theory essentially argues that the purpose of law lies in the need to resolve conflicts 
that occur within a group of people.206 The law then acts as a mechanism by which these 
conflicts or problems can be resolved. Accordingly, the mischief rule provides that 
regulation is drafted with the intention to address a problem that may occur in society, 
and remedy the issue to restore social order.207 As Llewellyn stated the fundamental 
purpose of law is the “adjustment of people's behavior that the society (or the group) 
remains a society (or a group) and gets enough energy unleashed and coordinated to 
keep on with its job as a society (or a group).”208 
In order to understand what the mischief was that Parliament intended to remedy the 
judge may need to know the previous law and the history that lead the legislator to pass 
the Act in question.209 Therefore, as Lord Hailsham stated, the Courts may look at 
committee reports “for the purpose of defining the mischief of the Act but not to construe 
it.”210 
However, Bennion has noted that the Courts have been seen to go beyond simply 
ascertaining the mischief and also consider the legal effect of an Act. For example, in 
the case of British Leyland Motor v Armstrong Patents [1986]211 the House of Lords 
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considered detailed argument in relation to the Gregory Committee Report which, as 
discussed in chapter 3, was the basis for the Copyright Act 1956. In this case, Lord 
Templeman stated: “S9(8) of the Copyright Act 1956 was defective to achieve the 
intended purpose.”212 Lord Edmund-Davies added: “My Lords, I have to say respectfully 
that I do not know what Parliament intended to do. Assume, as one reasonably may, that 
the Gregory Report was available to the legislators in 1956, and one will l still have no 
knowledge of how far they intended to implement any of its recommendations when 
legislating as expansively as they did. We may think that they could, and should, have 
done better, but that is by the way.”213 
These remarks appear to go beyond simply recognising the mischief that the legislation 
intended to remedy, to commenting on the effectiveness of the legislation itself in 
achieving the mischief identified by the Committee. However, the Court must not 
question the sufficiency of the Parliamentary debate.214 Bennion argued that this was 
beyond the role of the judge and as such “transcended mere statutory interpretation and 
struck a blow for justice.”215 As Lord Nicholls stated in a later case: “The court is called 
upon to evaluate the proportionality of the legislation, not the adequacy of the minister's 
exploration of the policy options or of his explanations to Parliament.”216 
 
The Golden Rule 
 
The literal rule and mischief rule are supplemented217 by the golden rule, which is 
understood to mean that legislation should be construed according to the intention 
expressed in the language used. When the language is not clear, or would produce an 
absurd outcome, the judges may assume that this was not the intention and instead 
consider the words to mean something other than their ordinary meaning.218 
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As such, the function of the Court is to interpret legislation according to the intent of the 
legislator, understood through the language. As Lord Wensleydale stated in Grey v 
Pearson (1857)219: "I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, 
now, I believe, universally adopted-at least in the courts of law in Westminster Hall that 
in construing wills, and indeed statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and 
ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some 
absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which 
case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid 
the absurdity and inconsistency, but no further."220 
Thus, according to the golden rule, the Courts seeks the intention of the legislation, 
taking a purposive approach,221 rather than a literal one as described above in the literal 
rule. Although, Stephan argued222 that the Bennion quote mentioned at the beginning of 
this section223 rejects the distinction between literal and golden rules. 
A principal point of disagreement has been how far the Courts can go in presuming from 
the context, the underlying policy intention for the purposes of drawing from it inferences, 
in cases of doubt as to their literal application. As Lord Loreburn stated: “[the courts] are 
not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be 
found within the four corners of the Act itself.”224 
As such, there are three rules which have been discussed above, the literal, mischief 
and golden rule. As mentioned, the relationship between these rules is not clear. For 
example, in his seminal article on statutory interpretation Willis argued that the judge 
uses “whichever of the rules produces a result which satisfies its sense of justice in the 
case before it.”225 
However, Bennion argued that Willis was wrong, stating that “the court takes (or should 
take) an overall view, weighs all the relevant factors, and arrives at a balanced 
conclusion.”226 This is how Charleton J described227 the decision of Justice Arnold in the 
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Golden Eye case:228 “…balancing the proportionality of the order sought judged in the 
context of the mischief at issue and the competing rights and the burdens and benefits 
to the parties was taken.” 
 
The Exclusionary Rule  
	
The rules above appear to suggest that the Courts must first consider the literal meaning 
of the wording of the legislation. The golden rule allows the judges to consider the 
intended meaning behind the words where necessary. In addition, where the wording is 
ambiguous or unclear, the Courts may consider the intended mischief that the legislation 
was created to deal with. However, these rules create a tension with the ‘exclusionary 
rule’ which traditionally prohibits the Court from relying on parliamentary debates as an 
aid to statutory construction.229 The exclusionary rule is rooted in the doctrine of the 
separation of powers,230 whereby the roles of parliament and the Court are distinct.231	
The exclusionary rule232 meant that the use of Hansard in statutory interpretation was 
considered contrary to the Bill of Rights 1688.233  
Article 9 of the Bill of Rights protects freedom of speech234 of Members of Parliament 
and is a fundamental part of the structure ensuring the separation of powers between 
the judiciary and the legislator. As Lewison J stated in the case of Baron Mereworth v 
Ministry of Justice [2011]: "The separation of powers…part of the demarcation line 
between the province of the Courts and the province of Parliament is written down, 
notably in art.9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 which provides that freedom of speech and 
debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any 
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Court or place out of Parliament. Article 9 protects not only freedom of speech in 
Parliament but also proceedings in Parliament."235	
This was acknowledged by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the Pepper v Hart case: "Article 9 
is a provision of the highest constitutional importance and should not be narrowly 
construed. It ensures the ability of democratically elected Members of Parliament to 
discuss what they will (freedom of debate) and to say what they will (freedom of 
speech)…the plain meaning of art.9, viewed against the historical background in which 
it was enacted, was to ensure that Members of Parliament were not subjected to any 
penalty, civil or criminal for what they said and were able, contrary to the previous 
assertions of the Stuart monarchy, to discuss what they, as opposed to the monarch, 
chose to have discussed.”236 
Moreover, the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to ensure that the Courts applied the 
legislation as passed, and not by eliciting the intentions of the Government in their 
proposals and debates. This approach lends itself to the literary rule, discussed above, 
as Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC described the exclusionary rule as “part and parcel 
of…austere judicial literalism.”237 
However, the exclusionary rule is not absolute238 and, as explained, taking a purely literal 
reading is not always adequate. This issue culminated in the controversial development 
of the Pepper v Hart rule, discussed in the subsequent section.  
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The Pepper v Hart Rule 
	
In the matter of Pepper v Hart [1992]239 an issue arose about the interpretation of 
sections 63(1) and 63(2) of the Finance Act 1976 in relation to the interpretation of the 
words “cash	equivalent of the benefit.”240 
In order to understand the intended meaning behind the wording of the Finance Act the 
House of Lords relaxed the exclusionary rule, which prohibited the Court from 
referencing Parliamentary material to aid the construction of legislation, where the 
wording was ambiguous, obscure or would lead to absurdity.241  
This was a narrow exception to the exclusionary rule242 which, as explained, had 
previously stated that the use of Hansard was considered contrary to Article 9 of the Bill 
of Rights 1688.243 However, as Lord Browne-Wilkinson recognised, relaxing the rule in 
these circumstances was not to question the independence of Parliament and its 
debates, but so that the Courts could give effect to what was said and done by it.244 
As a result, the Pepper v Hart rule gave the Courts permission to consider Parliamentary 
papers, and in particular Hansard, as an aid to interpretation, in certain circumstances. 
As Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated: "the exclusionary rule should be relaxed so as to 
permit reference to parliamentary materials where: (a) legislation is ambiguous or 
obscure, or leads to an absurdity; (b) the material relied on consists of one or more 
statements by a minister or other promoter of the Bill together if necessary with such 
other parliamentary material as is necessary to understand such statements and their 
effect; (c) the statements relied on are clear."245 
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However, the judgement has been subject to much criticism. For example, Bennion 
argued “that the majority opinions were seriously flawed” and that on the whole it 
“amounted to a failure of law-text analysis.”246  
Kavanagh argued that the Pepper v Hart rule undermines the rationale and integrity of 
the legislative process and the doctrine of the separation of powers as well as wrongly 
attributing the intention of an individual Minister to Parliament as a whole.247 Kavanagh 
goes on to explain that considering one Minister’s statement to define the law gives law-
making powers which goes against the constitutional principle which vests law-making 
power in Parliament.248 
Ramage raised concerns about the potential for the rule to permit other types of materials 
into the judge’s consideration, stating: “One could go so far as to say that since Pepper 
v Hart, any hearsay; any blog, social network, lobbying, or other forceful act can change 
the meaning of a statute, making a mockery of the law.”249 
Another issue with the Pepper v Hart rule is that it could introduce more sources of law 
for citizens and lawyers to understand. For example, as Lord Simon recognised: “in a 
society living under the rule of law citizens are entitled to regulate their conduct according 
to what the statute said, rather than by what it was meant to say or by what it would 
otherwise have said if the newly considered situation had been envisaged.”250 This was 
confirmed by Lord Diplock, who regarded it a matter of elementary justice for citizens to 
be bound by law that they have access to by way of identifiable sources.251 
As a result, judges have been cautious about their utility of the rule. As Greenberg 
warned: “But the courts will certainly wish to be mindful of the fact that Hansard is not, 
and has never purported to be, a transcript or verbatim record, and that its usefulness 
depends on an understanding of the nature of and constraints upon its reliability and 
accuracy.”252 In addition, the reasoning in Pepper v Hart was criticised and rejected by 
the Irish Supreme Court in the case of Crilly v Farrington Ltd [2002].253 
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On the other hand, the Pepper v Hart rule has been seen to provide helpful support. For 
example, the rule was utilised in the case of Innes v Information Commissioner [2014]254 
where Longmore LJ stated: “I can hardly say, in the light of the views referred to above, 
that my own preferred reading of section 11(1) is unambiguously correct, and this seems 
to me one of the rare cases in which the Pepper v Hart criteria are satisfied.”255 
The use of official committee reports can be used to identify the intention of the 
legislation, or the mischief it intended to remedy.256 Parliamentary material can be 
insightful for establishing the background and context of the legislation in order for the 
Courts to determine a purposive construction. This was stated in a more recent case: 
"domestic courts may…examine background material, including a white paper, 
explanatory departmental notes, ministerial statements and statements by members of 
parliament in debate."257  
Nevertheless, it continues to be the case that the Courts are fairly reluctant to consider 
Hansard where there is any doubt as to the application of the Pepper v Hart criteria. As 
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead has stated: "Experience has shown that the occasions on 
which reference to parliamentary proceedings is of assistance are rare."258 
In a seminal case on the issue, Wilson [2003],259 Lord Nicholls reverted to the golden 
rule explained above. He stated that “it is a cardinal constitutional principle that the will 
of Parliament is expressed in the language used by it in its enactments.”260 He also 
reported that use of additional committee materials should only be for background and 
should not control the meaning of an Act of Parliament.261 
However, the Court has recently referred to the Pepper v Hart rule in a copyright 
infringement case, namely Phonographic Performance Ltd v Hagan [2016].262 This case 
involved the application of section 97(2) CDPA 1988, which concerns additional 
damages for copyright infringement to be dissuasive. The court considered that there 
were two ways to read the word ‘dissuasive’; to dissuade the defendant or to dissuade 
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other infringers or potential infringers. This was considered a legitimate case for use of 
the Pepper v Hart rule.263 
Therefore, it can be seen that there are several different rules in the interpretation of 
legislation. The literal, mischief and golden rule explain different ways in which judges 
can interpret statutory law. The literal rule emphasises a literal approach whereas the 
mischief and golden rule lean towards a more purposive approach. The exclusionary 
rule prohibits the use of parliamentary material; however, the Pepper v Hart rule has 
provided an exception. Whilst this exception has received much criticism, it continues to 
be utilised by the Courts where appropriate. 
The following section considers in more detail the wider issues underlying the tension 
between the rules discussed above. The controversy behind the use of the mischief, 
golden and Pepper v Hart rules stems from their purposive nature.  
 
Judge’s Interpretation and Application of Copyright Law 
	
As mentioned, the compromises made in the drafting of a statute can create an imperfect 
text in terms of efficiency264 and deem it necessary for legislation to be interpreted and 
applied by the Courts.265 The essential task of the judge is to apply legal rules to facts.266 
In approaching this task, there are different opinions on whether or not judges should 
take policy into consideration. As discussed above, there is no clear agreement between 
the use of the literal, mischief, golden rules for example. However, it seems that the 
judges are able to introduce a more purposive approach through the golden and mischief 
rule, when the literal does not suffice. Furthermore, the use of the Pepper v Hart rule 
allows the Courts to consider the policy intentions behind an Act of Parliament in certain 
circumstances.  
Posner suggested that judges should interpret and apply the law whilst taking into 
consideration the stakeholder’s interest considered in the legislation.267 Lord Denning 
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also argued that a Court must be free to decide a novel case on policy grounds.268 
Furthermore, it would be inconvenient to have to send all cases of unsettled law back to 
the legislature for democratic resolution.269 
On the other hand, Dworkin contended that judges do not have the discretion to make 
policy based decisions as they are not elected and that policy based law making would 
render the law retrospective instead of upholding rights and duties that already exists.270  
In relation to how judges might interpret the law, the approach that judges should take is 
equally non-consensus. For example, Posner stressed that interpretation is a matter of 
reading carefully and letting the plain meaning of the words dictate the interpretation of 
the text.271  
Holmes, however, argued that when interpreting legal text, the judge should consider the 
ordinary meaning of the word in the circumstances: “We ask not what the author meant, 
but what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using 
them in the circumstances in which they are used.”272 
The difficulty with this approach is that words often have more than one meaning in the 
normal use of the language. For this reason, the judge must take the context of the 
statute and the circumstances of the case into consideration in order to determine the 
meaning: “Any document purporting to be serious and to have some legal effect has one 
meaning and no other, because the known object is to achieve some definite result.”273 
Holmes argued that as words have more than one dictionary meaning, when interpreting 
legal evidence or statutory law, the method requires not an understanding of what the 
author intended, but to take the general meaning of the word within the context.274 
As noted above, in practice draftsman and judges have been known to refer back to 
Hansard in order to determine the intended meaning behind the words in the statute.275 
Furthermore, Denning noted that European Judges in particular adopt a schematic and 
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teleological method, which means taking a purposive approach; he explained: “The 
judges do not go by the literal meaning of the words...They go by the design or 
purpose…behind it. When they come upon a situation which is to their minds within the 
spirit - but not the letter - of the legislation, they solve the problem by looking at the 
design and purpose of the legislature - at the effect it was sought to achieve. They then 
interpret the legislation so as to produce the desired effect. This means they fill in gaps, 
quite unashamedly, without hesitation. They ask simply: what is the sensible way of 
dealing with this situation so as to give effect to the presumed purpose of the legislation? 
They lay down the law accordingly.”276 
Denning’s approach contrasted with T. S. Eliot’s sardonic version of the English lawyer’s 
motto: “The spirit killeth, the letter giveth life.”277 Denning was initially met with opposition, 
for example, Viscount Simonds responded that it “appears to me to be a naked 
usurpation of the legislative function under a thin disguise of interpretation.”278 
Nevertheless, Denning continued to argue for the European approach.279 Bennion 
suggested that British lawyers tended only to use this approach in relation to Community 
law, however, Denning's view of the creative function of the judiciary in relation to 
statutes has grown in influence: “Lord Denning may in the end have his way.”280 
Patterson argued that copyright is a statutory concept which leaves little room for judges 
to define functions and formulate guiding principles: “Copyright statutes provided rules 
not principles.”281 
However, the ability for the CDPA 1988 to adapt to technologies never possibly 
envisaged at the time of drafting could only come from the judge’s interpretation and 
application of the law in a way that goes beyond the literary meaning of the original terms. 
Furthermore, in certain circumstances the legislature has stated that defining law is 
better left to Courts.282 The judge’s role, therefore, is to understand the purpose of law in 
society and to enable the law to achieve its purpose in the present day.283 In doing so, 
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the judge may give the statute a new meaning that seeks to bridge the gap between the 
law and life’s changing reality without changing the statute itself.284 
Therefore, the analysis in this thesis tackles the legal drafting and statutory law including 
a consideration of the historical context and the meaning of the words chosen by the 
drafters to reflect the policy. The analysis then looks closely at the judges understanding 
and application of the wording of the law to the facts of the case in order to determine 
the meaning given to the statute through its interpretation and application by the Courts. 
The analysis of both the statutory law and case law is viewed through the lens of the 
internal and external perspectives.  
Although it is likely that due to the internal and external perspectives providing alternative 
meanings, the criteria for the Pepper v Hart rule would be met,285 this thesis does not 
take a view as to whether that the judges should or should not consider Hansard in their 
judgements. This thesis considers Hansard in its research methodology in order to 
analyse the legal drafting and case law application, in light of the internal and external 
perspectives, to highlight the tensions in the regulation of copyright infringement online. 
It is therefore, for the most part, a capture of what is done, not what should be done.  
The analysis should be considered in light of the discussion above, which demonstrates 
that whilst the Courts aim to abide by the literal and exclusionary rule, at times it is 
appropriate to consider a more purposive approach by way of the mischief, golden and 
Pepper v Hart rules.  
In resolving the tensions that the Framework illuminates, this thesis does however, 
suggest that in applying copyright law to the internet, the judges should take copyright, 
as a doctrine, in context of its intended purpose, in line with the mischief rule286 and the 
Wilson287 case discussed above.  
 
 
																																								 																				
284 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
285 As Lord Mackay argued in his dissent, the criteria would easily be fulfilled: “I believe that 
practically every question of statutory construction that comes before the courts will involve an 
argument that the case falls under one or more of these three heads.” Pepper (Inspector of 
Taxes) v Hart [1993] I.C.R. 297. 
286 Heydon’s case (1584) 3 Cop Rep. 7a. 
287 Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No.2) [2003] UKHL 40. 
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From Regulating Copying to Regulating Access 
 
The primary purpose of copyright is to encourage creativity by rewarding creators for 
their work.288 It is not a positive right, but gives creators the ability to restrict other 
people’s use of their work without permission. Thus, copyright infringement occurs when 
a person does any of the restricted acts without authority from the copyright owner.289 
However, the broad application of copyright infringement online has resulted in a shift in 
the meaning of copyright protection. As Lessig stated: “Basic functions like copying and 
access are crudely regulated in an all-or-nothing fashion. You generally have the right to 
copy or not, to gain access or not.”290 
This thesis focuses on the law that is applied to online activities; copyright infringement 
by copying291 and communication to the public.292 In particular, it will consider to what 
extent the application of these rights to the internet has extended their meaning from 
restricting copying to restricting access to copyright material.  
 
Online Copyright Infringement by Way of Reproduction  
 
The right to reproduction will be analysed first as it is arguably the most fundamental 
right in copyright legislation.293 The restricted act of copying is, as Mr Clarke stated in 
the second reading of the Bill: “The most fundamental is…the right to prevent copying.”294 
Drassinower noted that “copyright law is not a prohibition on copying but rather an 
institutionalized distinction between lawful and wrongful copying.”295 
The CDPA 1988 referred to this right as the creators “exclusive right to copy.”296 
However, the Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of 
																																								 																				
288 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (London: 
Butterworths Law; 2011) 1.9. 
289 Or without the benefit of a copyright exception.  
290 Lessig L., Code: and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books; 1999) p. 129. 
291 CDPA 1988 Section 17. 
292 CDOA 1988, section 20.  
293 Hansard, Copyright, Designs and Patents Bill [Lords] HC Deb 28 April 1988 Vol 132 cc525-
99, Order for Second Reading read, Mr Clarke at 256-257. 
294 Ibid., 256-257. 
295 Drassinower A., What’s Wrong With Copying? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 2015) 
p. 2: Arguing that the wrongfulness of copying is a socio-historical construct and that, therefore, 
there is nothing inherently wrong with copying per se. 
296 CDPA 1988, section 17. 
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Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society297 uses the term ‘reproduction 
right’, which it defined as “the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, 
temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in 
part”298 of the work. 
Under section 17 of the CDPA 1988, there is specific reference to “storing the work in 
any medium by electronic means”299 and making a “transient”300 copy as included within 
the definition of copying. The implications of the Information Society Directive301 meant 
that this must be interpreted in light of Article 2 which specifically referred to “temporary 
… reproduction by any means and in any form.”302  
It is evident that copyright infringement by way of copying is highly relevant to the 
research question. In particular, the wording of the statutory law requires further 
investigation. As a result, section 17 of the CDPA 1988 is integral to the understanding 
of the perspective of the law in relation online copyright infringement and will be subject 
to the framework for analysis in chapters 3 of this thesis. 
 
Online Copyright Infringement by Way of Communication 
to the Public  
 
Infringement by communication to the public is considered one of the most controversial 
and contentious developments in copyright law. The right of communication to the public 
exemplifies the application of copyright regulation onto online activity and “lies at the 
heart of modern copyright law.”303 
Communication to the public was introduced in 2003304 under Section 20 of the CDPA 
1988. This section provided the restricted act of communication to the public by 
electronic transmission.305 This included making a copyright work available in such a way 
																																								 																				
297 Hereafter the Information Society Directive. 
298 The Information Society Directive, Article 2. 
299 CDPA 1988, section 17(2). 
300 CDPA 1988, section 17(6). 
301 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (London: 
Butterworths Law; 2011) 14.13. 
302 Information Society Directive, Article 2. 
303	Keane B., Ill Communication? The Concept of a Communication to the Public Under EU 
Copyright Law (2013) 24(5) Entertainment Law Review, pp. 165-171, p. 165. 
304 Copyright and Related Rights Regulations SI 2003/2498. 
305 CDPA 1988, section 20(20). 
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that members of the public may access it from a place and at a time individually chosen 
by them.306  
The application of this section has been instrumental in the development of jurisprudence 
relating to online copyright infringement. For example, in March 2010, Mr Justice Kitchin 
held website Newzbin307 liable for communicating protected works to the public when 
indexing copyrighted content.308 Subsequently, The Pirate Bay309 website was also found 
to be infringing copyright when acting as a search engine; providing links to copyrighted 
content.310 Therefore, section 20 of the CDPA 1988 is integral to the research question 
and will be subject to the Framework in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis.  
These sections of the CDPA 1988 are analysed by first considering the drafting of the 
law and secondly by analysing the way in which judges apply the law to cases of online 
activity. In considering the legal drafting, the thesis analyses the historical context of the 
statutory law, in particular considering the meaning of the words choses by the drafters 
to reflect the policy. Subsequently, the relevant cases are then analysed, looking closely 
at the judges understanding and application of the wording of the law to the facts of the 
case.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has set the scene for the thesis, in that it provided the foundation upon 
which the analysis is built. Therefore, this chapter set out the main themes that run 
throughout the thesis and the thread that binds them all together.  
These included firstly, the development of new online technologies and the cognitive 
interplay between the human mind and the technological function of the internet 
technologies. In particular, how the internet has introduced a new phenomenon for the 
application of copyright law, in that there are two sets of facts available for the judges to 
take; the internal and external perspectives.  
																																								 																				
306 CDPA 1988, section 20(2)(b). 
307 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v Newzbin Ltd [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch). 
308 Ibid., as per Mr Justice Kitchin. 
309 Dramatico Entertainment Ltd & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2012] EWHC 268 
(Ch) (20 February 2012). 
310 Ibid. 
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Secondly, the drafting of statutory copyright law and the intended meaning of the CDPA 
1988 followed by the interpretation of the law by the judges in applying the law to cases 
of online activity. This included a consideration of the different ways in which judges 
interpret and apply the law. From the literal approach, using the literal rule, and the more 
purposive approaches such as the mischief and golden rules. It also considered that the 
exclusionary rule prohibited the use of additional parliamentary materials by the Courts, 
however the Pepper v Hart case provided an exception to the rule where the wording of 
the statute is ambiguous, obscure, or leads to an absurdity.  
Finally, how the application of copyright law to online activity has extended the meaning 
of copyright from regulating copying to regulating access, in particular considering 
section 17 infringement by copying and section 20 infringement by communication to the 
public. 
In the following chapter the internal and external perspectives are developed into a 
Framework of analysis.311 This Framework is applied to the statutory law and case law 
relating to copying312 and communication to the public313 in order to determine the current 
state of digital copyright infringement and the effect of applying copyright regulation 
online.  
																																								 																				
311 See chapter 2. 
312 See chapters 3 and 4. 
313 See chapters 5 and 6.  
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Chapter 2 
 
The Internal and External Perspectives of the Internet: A Framework 
Of Analysis and Methodology  
 
“Words are but symbols of symbols and are thus twice removed from reality.” 
A Course in Miracles  
Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 set out the three main themes of the thesis; firstly, the development of new 
online technologies and the cognitive interplay between the human mind and the 
technological function of the internet, through the use of the internal and external 
perspectives. Secondly, the drafting of the CDPA 1988 and the interpretation of the law 
by the judges in applying the law to cases of online activity. Finally, how the application 
of copyright law to online activity has extended the meaning of copyright, in particular 
considering infringement by copying and communication to the public.  
In order to establish the methodology with which this thesis is undertaken, this chapter 
focuses on the first theme: the interpretation of the internet. In particular, this chapter 
considers Kerr’s external and internal perspectives314 which were introduced in chapter 
1. This chapter goes into deeper critical analysis of the two concepts and thereafter 
develops them into a framework which is utilised as the lens through which the research 
questions are addressed in the subsequent chapters.  
This chapter is presented in two parts. The first part recognises that the internet has 
introduced a new phenomenon for the application of copyright law, in that there are two 
sets of facts available for the judges to take; the internal and external perspectives. 
Undertaking an analysis of the internal and external perspectives, the chapter develops 
the concepts; modifying and grounding them in the theoretical basis of purposivism and 
literalism. 
The second part of this chapter establishes the methodology and method for analysing 
the application of copyright law to the internet, utilising the internal and external 
perspectives. This novel approach is named the Framework for Constructing Digital 
Perspectives. Thereafter the framework is applied315 in the subsequent chapters to the 
																																								 																				
314 Kerr O. S., The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal, 
pp. 357-405, p. 360. 
315 The Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives is developed in such a way that it is a 
methodology that could be applied to other areas of law that intersect with online behaviour. 
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statutory law and case law relating to copying316 and communication to the public317 in 
order to determine the current state of digital copyright infringement and tensions of 
applying copyright regulation to online activity. 
 
Part 1: Applying Copyright Law Online: The Two 
Perspectives of the Internet 
 
When applying copyright law318 to the internet, there are more than one set of facts to 
which the law can be applied.319 In this context, two perspectives can be taken when 
considering online activity. As a result, the problem of perspective occurred for the first 
time.320 
This new problem of interpretation of the internet and the application of digital copyright 
infringement was captured by Professor Orin Kerr in his paper The Problem of 
Perspective in Internet Law.321 Kerr explained that the facts of the internet depend 
entirely on taking either the internal or external perspective; “the law is contingent on the 
facts, and the facts are contingent on the perspective.”322 Accordingly, there are two 
possible perspectives that can determine the meaning of online behaviour.  
On the one hand, there is the virtual reality, this is the understanding of the internet as 
equivalent to the physical world. From this perspective, a person understands the virtual 
world of cyberspace as a legitimate construct.323 Kerr described this as the internal 
perspective.324  
On the other hand, the facts of the physical reality perspective considers the technical 
functioning of the network.325 Kerr explained this as the external viewpoint whereby the 
																																								 																				
The framework serves as a methodology for any legal research studying the application of law 
from an offline context to an online context. 
316 See chapters 3 and 4. 
317 See chapters 5 and 6.  
318 Or any law that attempts to regulate online activity. 
319 Wu T., Application Centred Internet Analysis (1999) Virginia Law Review, pp. 1163-1204., 
p.1193: Wu was one of the first to suggest that the internet should not be interpreted as a 
singular entity. 
320 Kerr O. S., The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal, 
pp. 357-405, p. 358. 
321 Ibid., p. 357. 
322 Ibid., p. 362. 
323 Ibid., p. 359. 
324 Ibid., p. 1. 
325 Ibid., p. 357. 
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internet is simply a network of computers located around the world and connected by 
wires and cables.326 The hardware sends, stores and receives communications using a 
series of common protocols.327 Keyboards provide sources of input to the network, and 
monitors provide destinations for output.328 The internet allows for the transfer of trillions 
of zeroes and ones across a network, which computers connected to and translate into 
commands, text, sound and pictures.329 
To demonstrate the effect of taking either the internal or external perspective, Kerr 
referred to four examples;330 one of which was the case of MP3.com.331 Kerr explained 
that in this case the record companies relied on an external perspective;332 arguing that 
MP3.com made unauthorised copies of copyright works when digitalising music files 
from CD to MP3 and then distributed these copies on their website.333 However, 
MP3.com argued from an internal perspective, that no copyright infringement had taken 
place334 as they were simply allowing legitimate owners of music to access their CD 
collection without physically having to carry them around; effectively acting as the 
functional equivalent of storing its subscribers’ CDs.335 The difficulty is that both 
perspectives are descriptively valid.336 In addition, judges and commentators often 
switch between the two perspectives frequently without any awareness.337  
																																								 																				
326 Reno v Am. Civil Liberties Union 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) Syllabus para 1; describing the 
internet as “an international network of interconnected computers that enables millions of 
people to communicate with one another in "cyberspace" and to access vast amounts of 
information from around the world.” However, the term ‘cyberspace’ is actually an internal 
perspective word as it is a metaphorical construct that allows the human mind to understand the 
internet as if it is a space, which is technically incorrect.  
327 Gralla P., How the Internet Works (Indiana: Que Corporation; 1999). 
328 Ibid., p. 360. 
329 Ibid., p. 360. 
330 Kerr O. S., The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal, 
pp. 357-405. 
331 UMG Recordings Inc v MP3.com Inc, 92 F. Supp. 2D 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) Rakoff J; this 
case involved a website providing a service whereby users who had legitimately purchased a 
CD could register their purchase and then access an MP3 version of the music online; by 
running a copy from MP3.com’s servers which they had uploaded from their own CD collection.  
332 Kerr O. S., The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal, 
pp. 357-405, p. 379. 
333 UMG Recordings Inc v MP3.com Inc, 92 F. Supp. 2D 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) as per 
Rakoff J. 
334 Except by way of “space-shift” from real space to cyber space which is permitted under the 
fair use doctrine; UMG Recordings Inc v MP3.com Inc, 92 F. Supp. 2D 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) as per Rakoff J at 351. 
335 UMG Recordings Inc v MP3.com Inc, 92 F. Supp. 2D 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) Rakoff J at 
350. 
336 Frischmann B. M., The Prospect of Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace (2004) 35 Loyola 
University Chicago Law Journal, pp. 205-234, p. 206. 
337 Kerr O. S., The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal, 
pp. 357-405, p. 358. 
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Kerr’s perspectives can be aligned with a literal, as described by the literal rule in chapter 
1, or purposive approach, indicated by the mischief, golden and Pepper v Hart rules. 
Literalists focus exclusively on the text of the law, whilst purposivism places emphasis 
on the purpose behind the rule.338 Building on this, the chapter will now analyse the 
internal and external perspectives in more detail and in doing so, modify and develop 
the concepts so that they may be utilised by the Framework for Constructing Digital 
Perspectives. 
 
The External Perspective: Taking a Literal Approach 
 
As explained, one way in which the facts of the internet can be interpreted is by taking 
the external perspective. This involves taking the point of view of the physical world, 
rather than the virtual one. It is concerned with the technical functioning of the network 
in the physical world, focusing on the physical network and the technical details of how 
it works.339 Therefore in applying copyright law to the internet, the judge would consider 
the electronic transactions underlying the network’s operation.340 
Hutchison suggested that “a technical understanding might consider the internet to be a 
series of electronic impulses that transfer packets of data between a network of 
computers by means of a common protocol.”341 He elaborated that this means 
considering the internet from the outside, real-space point of view: “The external 
perspective focuses on the Internet from the outside. From this external perspective, one 
perceives the Internet in terms of its technical real-space operations—the Internet is a 
global meta-network that serves as an open platform for the transmission of information 
among end users that connect computers to the network.”342  
Frischmann supported Kerr’s analysis and stated that he agreed “wholeheartedly with 
Kerr that we need to be aware of the problem of perspective. Both perspectives are 
																																								 																				
338 Hutchinson C. J., Interpretation and the Internet (2010) 28 John Marshall Journal of 
Computer and Information Law, pp. 251-272, p. 257. 
339 Kerr O. S., The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal, 
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340 Ibid., pp. 361-362. 
341 Hutchison C. J., Interpretation and the Internet (2010) 28 John Marshall Journal of Computer 
and Information Law, pp. 251-272, p. 255. 
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descriptively valid and real, and both perspectives yield important insights about the facts 
of the internet and the interests at stake in a legal decision.” 343  
Kerr’s internal and external perspectives of the internet can serve to illuminate many 
different issues with legal regulation online, particularly considering digital copyright 
infringement. Copyright, and in particular digital copyright infringement, provisions are 
regarded as singularly ill-adapted to the internet.344 It can be argued that this is because 
copyright law is a regulatory tool for protecting and balancing the interests of the 
copyright owners and the public interest, within a factual context. However, the evolution 
of technological has fundamentally changed the factual context of copyright and thereby 
disturbed previously struck balances.345 Furthermore, these insights are critical to the 
outcome of copyright infringement cases. As Burk stated: “Judicial adoption of an internal 
or external approach to digital content delivery relates directly to the structure of statutory 
requirements governing such cases.”346 
In the application of these concepts, Kerr suggested that a particular perspective can be 
established and should thereafter be applied.347 However, Hutchison pointed out that 
taking a purely literal interpretation can lead to the law falling short of serving its 
purpose.348 He illustrated this point by considering substantial taking of digital copyright 
material via BitTorrent software.349 From a purely literal perspective BitTorrent software 
communicates copyright material from multiple computers and therefore, from an 
external perspective may not constitute substantial taking.350 However, judges have 
determined substantial part from an internal perspective as it is a matter of quality and 
not quantity.351 Therefore it could be argued that whilst the file is in many parts, the quality 
of the file is intact. Nevertheless, Hutchinson’s example illustrates the impact of taking 
the external perspective.  
																																								 																				
343 Ibid., p. 207. He goes on to debate the need to choose between perspectives. 
344 Reed C., Making Laws for Cyberspace (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2013) p. 237. 
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346 Burk D. L., Copyright and the Architecture of Digital Delivery (2014) University of California 
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This is also the case across many different types of online activity. For example, from an 
external perspective, the CDPA 1988 provides that it is an infringement to copy a 
copyright work.352 It is also an infringement of copyright for a person to authorise such 
an activity.353 However, it is a feature of the internet that communications pass through 
the memories of a series of computers from which it follows that each computer makes 
a copy of the material and does so, not at the instigation of the server's owner, but of the 
client whose owner wanted the material in the first place.354 
Furthermore, as the same item is usually repeatedly requested for by multiple 
computers, it is commonplace to automatically save any item that has been requested 
onto a server so that it can be retrieved quickly. This avoids the need to keep issuing 
requests to the same remote server. This is called caching, and the cached material is 
a copy. As mentioned, in the case of Meltwater355 the Chancery Division,356 the Court of 
Appeal357 and the Supreme Court established copyright infringement based on the 
technical function of the computer process,358 taking the external perspective.  
When the Courts apply the external perspective, the specific workings of the technology 
form an important component of the legal analysis.359 This means that the law can 
become very specific, technologically accurate and, from an external perspective, 
provides clarity on the legality of technological function. However, drafting copyright 
regulation in such a way may also create difficulties. These drawbacks are discussed 
below; such as incentivising avoidance creations,360 as well as being too specific and 
therefore quickly becoming obsolete.  
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360 Such as the Aereo software which was “designed solely to avoid the letter of the copyright 
statute”: American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., Et Al. v Aereo, Inc., Fka Bamboom Labs, Inc.2nd 
Circ. 13-461 (2013) Judge Chin Dissent Aereo at 29. 
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The Disadvantages of Taking a Purely External 
Perspective in Applying Copyright Law Online  
		
The first challenge of taking the external perspective is that taking a literal reading of the 
wording of copyright regulation can influence the shape of technological development. 
Karjala identified this as an unintended consequence of the way in which copyright 
regulation is drafted: "Instead of the law adapting itself to meet the needs of society 
under conditions of new technology, these judicial interpretations push technology in odd 
directions as systems engineers seek to avoid falling on the wrong side of what is 
essentially an arbitrary line."361 
The development of peer-to-peer file sharing technology exemplifies this point. Napster 
is regarded as the first peer-to-peer web service,362 held liable for secondary copyright 
infringement based on its centralised file-sharing system.363 The reaction from the next 
generation364 of services with the same aim then deliberately decentralised their system 
to avoid secondary liability under the legal definition365 set out in Napster.366  
Regulators responded and the law was developed to encompass the decentralised 
systems; finding websites such as Grokster367 liable for secondary copyright 
infringement. However, as before, the designers of services adapted the architecture of 
their systems and now, currently the most popular format is BitTorrent.368 This online 
technology differs significantly from the previous generation of online activity as the 
websites software is disassociated with the indexing and searching functions.369 
As the law works to adapt and encompass this activity, more advanced software is 
already being developed. For example, The Pirate Bay370 was subject to a High Court 
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ban due to being found liable for copyright infringement via BitTorrent technology.371 
However, the site has now begun phasing out the majority of the torrent files it hosts and 
replacing them with magnet links.372 As a result, the current law becomes redundant and 
fails to encompass this type of online activity.373  
In the more recent case of Aereo,374 the technology was noted to be explicitly designed 
to conform to definitions of permissible activity articulated in previous copyright cases.375 
Judge Chin commented that the Aereo software was “over-engineered…designed solely 
to avoid the letter of the copyright statute.”376 Burk commented that “every step of the 
Aereo transmission was designed to permit only “private” performances, not public 
performances as defined by the Courts.” 377 
As the cases of Napster,378 Grokster,379 Pirate Bay380 and Aereo381 demonstrated, the 
wording of copyright law can encourage designers to adopt a formalistic view of 
technological architecture.382 The designers take the external perspective as a spring 
broad to avoid architectural liability.383  
From this perspective, the law can be criticised as simply creating parameters of rights 
that digital designers can create architecture specifically around the formal definition of 
infringement. By defining copyright infringement from an external perspective, according 
to particular technological determinants, it is simultaneously sign-posting the direction of 
future technology. Developers will simply take direction as to what, technically, is not 
infringement, and create accordingly. Therefore, suggesting that the law shapes 
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technology, although not necessary as desired, more likely as an unintended outcome 
of taking an external perspective. 
The second challenge for the external perspective is that if the law is drafted and 
interpreted specifically in relation to technical function, there is a risk that it will quickly 
become obsolete in the face of developing technology.384 Regulating and interpreting 
from a technologically specific and accurate perspective suggests that the law will be 
clear and increases legal certainty, a goal repeatedly stated in the EU Directive’s 
Recitals.385 In addition, when developing new copyright legislation, the Government has 
stated its intention to draft legislation that is technologically neutral.386 
However, Hugenholtz remarked that due to the way in which the law is drafted, this 
actually creates new uncertainties by the use of unintelligible language.387 He stated 
that: “The last thing the information industry needs in these dynamic times are rigid rules 
that are cast in concrete for the years to come. How can a legislature in his right mind 
even contemplate drafting…inflexible, technology-specific language, when the Internet 
produces new business models and novel uses almost each day?” 388  
The challenge is that if the law relates to specific technology it becomes obsolete at the 
introduction of new and unforeseen technological developments. As internet 
technologies are subject to continual change, if the law is drafted with specific technology 
in mind, new developments may not fall within the meaning of the law intending to 
encompass it.389  
Furthermore, in the meantime, it would not be clear how the law would address the new 
technology and therefore the law would be uncertain until such a time that it is updated.390 
In addition, this creates a ripe environment for another wave of lobbying and infighting 
at the national level, followed by the court having fill the gaps left by the legislator.391 
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Moreover, this approach contradicts the European Commission intention that “the 
general legal frameworks should be applied online as they are offline. In view of the 
speed at which new technologies are developing, they will strive to frame regulations 
which are technology-neutral, whilst bearing in mind the need to avoid unnecessary 
regulation.”392 
Overall, taking the external perspective involves considering the technical function of the 
internet. The benefits of taking this perspective are that the law is specific, 
technologically accurate and, from an external perspective, provides clarity on the 
legality of technological function. However, difficulties include incentivising avoidance 
creations, the risk of becoming quickly obsolete and uncertainty for the legality of new 
technologies. 
 
The Internal Perspective: Taking a Metaphorical Approach  
 
The other way in which the facts of the internet can be determined is from the internal 
perspective. This involves a consideration of the virtual reality, as opposed to the 
physical reality discussed above. From this perspective, the virtual world of cyberspace 
is accepted as a legitimate construct.393 Kerr described this as the internal perspective 
of the internet.394 He stated that: “From the internal perspective…the Internet is 
cyberspace, and we apply law to the Internet by trying to map the physical world of 
“realspace” onto the virtual world of cyberspace. We look for analogies between 
cyberspace and realspace, and try to match the rules between them.”395 
He explained that although we may know that virtual reality is not reality, in order to 
understand what we experience online, we might treat the virtual world as if it were real: 
“The virtual perspective is like the perspective inside the Matrix: it accepts the virtual 
world of cyberspace as akin to a reality. Of course, unlike Neo, we know all along that 
the virtual world that the computer generates is only virtual. But as we try to make sense 
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of what the Internet is, to understand what we experience online, we might decide to 
treat that virtual world as if it were real.”396 
What is important about this perspective is not knowledge, but cognition. From the 
internal perspective, the technical function of the internet is not relevant because it is 
essentially a cognitive tool for people to process online experience. As Kerr explained, 
from an internal perspective: “A computer connected to the Internet provides a window 
to a virtual world that is roughly analogous to the physical world of real space. The 
technical details of what the computers attached to the Internet actually do “behind the 
scenes” don’t particularly matter. What matters is the virtual world of cyberspace that the 
user encounters and interacts with when he or she goes online.”397 
Frischmann interpreted Kerr’s internal perspective as the way in which the online 
applications affect the end-users as an experiential explanation of the workings of the 
internet: “From this internal perspective, one perceives the Internet in terms of the 
applications it enables and the ways in which those applications affect end users; the 
technical operation of the network infrastructure may be largely irrelevant in terms of 
one’s experience. It is this internal perspective that leads to the conception of cyberspace 
as a sort of virtual reality.”398 
Frischmann suggested that Kerr’s definition of the internal perspective could be 
improved by leaving open the empirical question of whether end-user’s employ the virtual 
reality construct in a particular circumstance.399 Instead, Frischmann suggested that the 
internal perspective could be simply based on user’s perceptions of their experience.400 
However, Kerr’s internal perspective need not be interpreted to require knowledge of the 
personal or empirical perspective of the end-user at all. In fact, it could be argued that in 
his article Kerr explained what this would mean to the end-user simply just to illustrate 
his definitions of the internal and external perspective. The definition of the internal 
perspective is based on a choice of interpretation of the facts of the internet, not a user’s 
personal perception. 
Furthermore, Kerr clearly stated that the problem of perspective is an issue due to the 
legitimacy of taking either approach. Therefore, the question that needs to be addressed 
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is not; what perspective do end-users take? Rather it is; based on the principles of the 
particular regulation, which perspective should we take? 
This is why the internal and external perspectives are perspectives and not perceptions. 
A perspective is a point of view, an angle from which the internet is observed. 
Conversely, a perception is an understanding that a person gains through awareness. 
Considering user’s personal perceptions on copyright and the internet is not the 
objective. This affirms that actual knowledge of the technical function of the network, or 
social attitudes towards copyright industries does not validate or influence a choice of 
perspective. Kerr stated that both perspectives are valid and legitimate on the basis of 
fact finding.401 
Therefore, from an internal perspective, activity online is understood by analogies with 
the physical world. Thus, we try to “map the physical world of real space onto the virtual 
world of cyberspace.”402 The process of understanding the internet from an internal 
perspective therefore involves a consideration of past technologies; adopting a 
metaphorical projection onto new technologies. The internal perspective is the 
understanding of ‘visiting’ cyberspace.403 Hunter argued that this tendency is somehow 
hardwired, an inevitable by-product of human cognition.404  
As with the external perspective, there are challenges faced by taking a purely internal 
perspective in applying copyright law online, particular due to the nature of metaphorical 
cognition. The following sections consider the difference between metaphors and 
skeumorphs and the impact these devices have on copyright regulation.  
 
The Challenges of Applying the Internal Perspective in 
Copyright Regulation  
	
Taking the internal perspective can lead judges to treat new media as old media that 
presents similar characteristics. For example, in the case of Aereo,405 the court chose to 
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treat Aereo as if it were a cable transmission because ultimately it acted as a cable 
transmission and the outcome was the same406 [emphasis added].  
This internal approach tends to merge the viewpoint of the decision maker into the 
technology, pushing technical processes into the unnoticed background.407 
Consequently, under this approach the legal decision maker treats the results of a given 
technological process as epiphenomenal, largely divorced from the actual structure and 
function of the technology. The mechanics or workings of the technology are of little 
interest, rather it is the result that matters, regardless of how it was produced.408 
Therefore, the internal approach can be understood as purposive and outcome driven. 
Lemley warned that the internal approach could be taken too far if judges were to literally 
take cyberspace as if it were real space; “should the law assume that I am, in fact, hitting 
someone in this game because it looks to the outside world like I’m hitting someone, 
even though on some level we all know that we are merely sending electrical impulses 
back and forth across copper wires?”409 Cohen also argued that there is a danger, at any 
rate, in over-physicalizing the virtual.410 
However, Calo argued that the Courts tends to apply the internal perspective through 
the use of metaphor.411 An appropriate metaphor can be used to understand the activities 
that take place online and apply the legal rule to an analogical representation of the facts 
that best fit. Calo maintained that “case law more commonly turns on finding the proper 
metaphor or analogy412… Courts look to whether a given digital activity is “like” an activity 
for which there are already rules. Legal, policy, and academic debates become battles 
over the proper analogy or metaphor. A Court might ask whether email is more like a 
postcard or a sealed letter for purpose of determining its level of protection.”413 
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Taking the internal perspective therefore invites the use of a metaphorical approach to 
the internet and the law. Thinking metaphorically is not controversial in relation to human 
cognition. In fact, our ordinary processing of information and action is fundamentally 
metaphorical in nature.414 Lakoff and Johnson, leading scholars in cognitive theory of 
conceptual metaphors, stated that metaphors are not only language-based but “form an 
important part of our conceptual system and how we understand reality…to bring order 
to abstract phenomena.”415 Lakoff elaborated that “a Metaphor is not just a figure of 
speech it is a figure of thought.”416	Modell agreed that: “Metaphor is not merely a figure 
of speech but is a fundamental form of cognition.”417 
It has been argued that people not only talk in metaphor, but also think, reason, and 
make sense of their world through metaphor, acting in ways that are consistent with their 
metaphors.418 Therefore, Lawley argued that changes in a metaphorical landscape 
reflect changes in cognition which, in turn, generate new thoughts, feelings and 
behaviour.419 
Metaphors “make use of everyday concrete things to illustrate intangible, complex and 
relational aspects of life, they are vivid and memorable… Metaphors carry a great deal 
of information in a compact and memorable package.”420 A key feature of a metaphor is 
one concept being projected onto other concepts; from the source domain to the target 
domain, in order to create an effect of meaning.421 Professor Richards proposed that a 
metaphor is the interaction between the ‘vehicle’ and the ‘tenor’ which results in a 
meaning.422 The vehicle describes the concept that is being transferred and the tenor is 
the concept that is to be understood through the vehicle. The intention of the metaphor 
is that “the vehicle is not merely an embellishment of a tenor which is otherwise 
unchanged by it but that the vehicle and the tenor in cooperation give a meaning of more 
varied powers than can be ascribed to either.”423 
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Therefore, metaphorical understanding is an omnipresent principle of both language and 
cognitive understanding.424 Metaphorical understanding is particularly relevant in relation 
to the interpretation of new technologies because the more abstract a concept is, the 
more heavily we rely on metaphors to support our understanding.425 
Copyright law is grounded in the use of conceptual metaphors.426 For example, in the 
case of Designers Guild427 Lord Bingham relied on the metaphor “No one else may for a 
season reap what the copyright owner has sown.”428 This metaphorical reference to 
ploughing has a long-standing history in copyright discourse. Mark Rose explained that 
“the writing implement being a kind of plow which one makes furrows on the field of a 
wax tabled…[and] the conceit of a mind as a field is as old as pastoral poetry, and in the 
Middle Ages, under the influence of the evangelic trope of the word of God as a seed, 
the author was often represented as a sower of seeds.”429 
This explanation shows that from the use of a short metaphor, Bingham was able to 
conjure up a range of imagery and meaning to support his argument. Advancing on our 
basic understanding of agriculture, he gains the cultural emotive connotations of a farmer 
hard at work sowing seeds, which grow into the fruits of his labour, for which he is able 
to reap the benefits.  
The contemporary copyright debate also attracts metaphorical rhetoric devices; the 
pirates, thieves and trespassers against the Luddites and monopolists squelching 
freedom of expression and forcing corporate culture.430 The tension between copyright 
industries and users who illegally download copyright material is often referred to as a 
“battle”431 or the “copyright wars.”432 
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Therefore, the use of metaphorical thinking enables the cognitive digestion of new 
technology. In particular, the use of metaphors can assist in the interpretation and 
application of copyright law. Although Patry warned that the use of an inappropriate 
metaphor can have adverse consequences: “the acceptance of inapposite metaphors 
have led to an unjustified expansion of our copyright law.”433 
In relation to new technology, the metaphor usually stems from the understanding of the 
ancestral technology. The internet technology is novel and therefore concepts of 
previous copyright delivery are metaphorically transferred because they share some 
similar elements or associations. The transition from analogue to digital requires a 
learning process that involves the deployment of metaphors from the physical 
representations in order to orient the novelty of the new media. The development of 
internet technologies has created a considerable need for labels and concepts that can 
describe the multitude of phenomena that follow.434 
 
Attempting to Describe Online Activities: The Difference 
Between a Metaphor and a Skeumorph  
	
When a new phenomenon arises, it is processed by the mind and cognitively understood 
by the terms already known by currently accepted concepts of the mind. Therefore, this 
explains why new technology is often addressed in a similar way to its ancestor, for 
example the email has been likened to postal mail.435 
This particular type of metaphorical device is known as a skeumorph; this is the reuse of 
old concepts for new phenomena.436 Whilst this theory of skeumorphs as a way to 
cognitively digest new technologies is relevant to all areas of online activity, it is 
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particularly compelling for copyright law and digital copyright infringement. There are two 
key reasons for this.  
The first reason is that copyright is a legal concept that is constantly changing over time 
in response to technology and is therefore strongly path dependant.437 This is as a result 
of the nature of copyright invoking competing stakeholder interests. In particular, it is 
beneficial for those who have historically exercised control over dissemination of 
copyright works to rely heavily on tradition.  
The second reason is that the application of copyright law online is a portrait of the 
obvious challenges to regulating in the digital context. Copyright illuminates the tension 
between new technological phenomena, regulation and cognitive understanding of 
through both skeumorphs and metaphors.438 Copyright attempts to control the creation 
and dissemination of copies of copyright works using traditional understanding in a new 
environment that has fundamentally revolutionised both the concept of reproduction and 
distribution.439  
Cass and Lauer argued that the use of skeumorphs has implications for social norms 
and collective understanding. 440 By borrowing an understanding of a phenomenon from 
an older concept, the norms connected to that older concept will likely transfer to the 
new phenomenon.441 This means that the metaphorical bridge between the old and the 
new is important not just for cognitive understanding of the new reality, but also for how 
the process sustains normative behaviour.442 
This is an interesting perspective when considering the divide between the approach of 
the entertainment industries and the social norms relating to use of digital copyright 
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material. The illegal use of digital copyright material has been recognised as a social 
norm,443 particularly among young people.444  
The entertainment industries attempted to project their historical understanding of 
physical copyright control onto digital material,445 turning to the legislator to overcome 
this problem with draconian measures,446 much to the confusion and hostility of the 
users.447 Depoorter, Van Hiel and Vanneste stated that: “the younger demographic are 
convinced that file sharing technology has many beneficial uses and that copyright law 
is outdated or biased towards music publishers.”448 This demonstrated a clear divide 
between the user’s understanding and that of the entertainment industries.449 The 
distance between the entertainment industry, the law and the internet users continues to 
expand.450 The moral arguments litigated by the entertainment industry, that there will 
be no more creation if artists do not get paid, appear to have had little impact.451 
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Perhaps this could be explained by using the theory of skeumorphs. The entertainment 
industries’ understanding is based on their previous normative experience with control 
over copyright material connected to tangible products such as Compact Discs (CDs). 
However, for young people growing up in the digital age with access to, and 
sophisticated skills in technology,452 their normative behaviour is based on a largely 
digital experience. Larsson recognised that the difficulties of conceptual metaphorical 
developments are particularly evident when new types of phenomena emerge more 
frequently and society is changing more rapidly than normal.453 This is relevant as the 
pace of technological development is clearly moving very fast, requiring adjustment from 
all humans acquainted with previous processes.  
The use of skeumorphs enables the new to become more easily acceptable when it 
refers back an earlier iteration that is displacing it.454 However, a skeumorph 
simultaneously focuses on the past and the future, while reinforcing and undermining 
both.455 Therefore the use of skeumorph projection within legal regulation should be 
taken with caution. As Justice Cardozo famously observed: “Metaphors in law are to be 
narrowly watched, for through starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by 
enslaving it.”456 
Litman argued that the development of metaphors in relation to copyright infringement 
online, such as the use of the term ‘Pirate’ has allowed copyright to expand without real 
consideration, she stated that: “this evolution in metaphors conceals immense sleight of 
hand…into believing that copyright had always been intended to offer content owners 
extensive control.”457 The issue appears to be when metaphors are used without 
awareness that a metaphorical approach is being taken. As Patry explained: “When we 
say that man is a wolf, we are aware we are pretending. But when it is said that internet 
service providers are pirates, there is no pretence: The statement is meant to be taken 
as true.”458 
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The benefits of a metaphorical perspective are evident; it allows the quick understanding 
of modern concepts and can help to provide a smooth transition into the new. It also 
means that new legal regulation do not need to be created every time a new 
technological concept arises, overcoming the challenges of taking the external 
perspective.  
However, two things are clear; firstly, the metaphor must be recognised as a metaphor. 
Bellia explained that this can be a difficulty but that awareness of this perspective is 
essential: “we must be acutely aware of the metaphors that lawyers and judges employ 
when thinking about internet legal issues.”459 The difficulty is that we do not always 
recognise that we are thinking metaphorically, as it is an automatic cognitive response.460 
As Lakoff and Johnson stated: “Human thought processes are largely metaphorical.”461 
When metaphors are not perceived as metaphors, the original conceptions could 
unknowingly transfer the meaning of the previous concept and be perceived as the only 
purpose of a given regulation.462 
Secondly, caution must be taken when using skeumorphs because of the connotations 
that carry when using past concepts for understanding new technology. Due to the pace 
of technological development, trying to map the old understanding of copyright material 
is incompatible with the divide in social norms. Furthermore, the choice or 
appropriateness of the particular skeumorphs as a bridge from the old to the new must 
be questioned.463  
However, this concern could be overcome when considering Kerr’s internal perspective 
within a purposive approach. The chosen metaphorical understanding should reflect the 
purpose of copyright in the digital age, not attempt to mimic the nature of control 
previously understood by the entertainment industry.  
As Lemley highlighted: “One of the things that the novelty of technological space does 
is open up the possibility of novelty in legal space. Because we don’t have a clear and 
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direct analogy, we have an opportunity to rethink certain legal rules not only as they 
apply to that technology, but in ways that might feed back into other spaces as well.”464 
 
Concluding Part 1  
	
Part 1 of this chapter has discussed the intersection between internet technology, 
interpretation and cognitive perceptions within the context of digital copyright 
infringement. This chapter first discussed Professor Orin Kerr’s internal and external 
perspectives of the internet.465 It was explained that the external perspective offers a 
technical perspective of the internet466 and can be aligned with the literal reading of the 
law. This allows precision, accuracy and clarity in determining the facts of the case. 
However, this perspective encounters challenges such as attaching law to specific 
technological function which could result in a quick expiry date when a new technology 
is developed.  
 
Thereafter the internal perspective467 was explored, aligning with a more purposive 
approach468 which looks beyond the literal meaning of the words and leads to the use of 
metaphorical interpretations of the law of copyright online. This perspective can 
overcome the limitations of the external perspective as it is not based on a technicality 
and therefore would be more sustainable. However, the use of skeumorphs – old 
concepts projected onto new phenomena – limits the usefulness of this approach. 
 
Ultimately, it is important to recognise that there are two ways in which the facts of the 
internet can be interpreted; particularly as choosing a perspective can determine the 
outcome of a decision, and as Frischmann concluded “it would be better if such choices 
were made consciously and explicitly.”469  
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Both perspectives are equally valid and legitimate470 and each perspective has a 
particular effect on the regulation of copyright material online.471 Moreover, Kerr stated 
that Courts and commentators switch frequently between perspectives without even 
recognising the change.472 This brings us to the investigation of this thesis; the 
application of copyright law to the internet. In order to address this, part 2 of this chapter 
formulates a framework of analysis, utilising the internal and external perspectives, which 
will then be applied in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.  
 
Part 2: The Framework for Analysis and Research Methodology  
 
This section will set out the methodology for the thesis, which falls in line with the trend 
in legal research set out in the introduction to this thesis. As such, a strong doctrinal 
foundation is built by identifying and analysing the legal doctrine; looking at the historical 
development and intended purpose of copyright regulation. This supports an “inside out 
approach”473 whereby the subsequent case law can be assessed by its ability to align 
with the values of the legal doctrine.474 The inside out approach facilitates the address 
of the research question concerning the effectiveness of the law and allows for the 
assessment of whether the law is fit for purpose.475 
The internal and external perspectives are the critical vantage points476 outside the law 
that nourish the doctrinal analysis of digital copyright law with a wider understanding of 
the relevant social phenomena; the human interaction with the internet. This is the 
“outside in approach”477 which views the operation of law through a critical lens that 
adopts a particular theoretical perspective.478 
This approach enables the exploration of questions concerning regulatory legitimacy. 
Taking either the internal or the external perspective determines the outcome of a legal 
decision. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate if judges apply an internal or external 
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perspective when defining digital copyright infringement. Furthermore, how does this 
impact the scope of the law in relation to communication to the public and copying 
online? And finally, is this approach consistent with the intended purpose of the law? 
Ultimately, this leads to the consideration of whether the application of copyright law 
online is consistent with the values of the doctrine and the intended purpose of the 
regulation when taking an internal or external perspective of the internet. As Kerr stated: 
“Once we agree on our goals, we can then use them to develop a framework for choosing 
between perspectives.”479 
 
Method of Analysis: The Framework for Constructing 
Digital Perspectives 
 
The method of application480 will now be addressed to identify how the internal and 
external concepts will be applied to the law.481  
As mentioned, Kerr set out the internal and external concepts482 as practical ways of 
interpreting activity online.483 He has demonstrated that there are two distinct,484 yet both 
viable,485 ways of interpreting the facts of the internet. Therefore, a choice of virtual 
reality, or technical basis, is available to judges and legislators.486 
For this framework of analysis, Kerr’s definitions have been modified and grounded in 
the theoretical basis of purposivism and literalism. The result is a theoretically grounded 
framework for the analysis of the construction of digital facts; to determine if the 
application of legal regulation online is being interpreted from an internal or external 
perspective. 
																																								 																				
479 Kerr O. S., The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal, 
pp. 357-405, p. 390. 
480 “A special form of procedure or characteristic set of procedures employed (more or less 
systematically) in an intellectual discipline or field of study as a mode of investigation and 
inquiry, or of teaching and exposition.” Oxford English Dictionary definition of Method; Online, at 
3. A: http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/117560?rskey=mBhmKAandresult=1#eid  
481 “What you actually do to answer your research question.” Cryer R., Hervey T., Sokhi-Bulley 
B., Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing; 2011) p. 5. 
482 Kerr O. S., The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal, 
pp. 357-405. 
483 Ibid., p. 361: “This is a very practical problem.” 
484 Ibid., p. 357. 
485 Ibid., p. 357. 
486 Ibid., p. 358. 
78	
	
This Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives487 can be extracted and applied to 
any number of online circumstances that are regulated by law. In order to measure the 
impact and legitimacy of taking either the internal or external perspective (as developed), 
or the type of fact constructed, the framework needs to be tailored to that particular 
circumstance. This would involve taking into consideration the purpose or justification of 
the relevant legislation, thereby looking at the historical developments, to consider if 
these are achieved by either perspective.  
Kerr suggested a normative framework for resolving the problem of perspective; looking 
at the importance of the doctrine, rooted in fidelity to text first488 and then secondly, 
considered the perspective of the people the law seeks to regulate.489 However, Kerr 
acknowledged that this resolution is simply “a guidepost [that] can help resolve the 
problem of perspective, they are not self-executing.”490 Therefore this requires some 
consideration.  
In relation to Kerr’s second approach of applying the perspective of the individual the law 
seeks to regulate;491 as both perspectives are viable,492 Kerr recognised that “the 
question is not whether a particular individual subjectively understood the internet in a 
particular way.”493 Instead he argued that: “When the law seeks to regulate offline 
conduct, we can apply an external perspective; when it seeks to regulate online conduct, 
we can apply an internal perspective. The law’s perspective will track the perspective of 
the individual the law seeks to regulate.”494 
However, this is to suggest that the internal perspective is the most appropriate 
construction of the facts of the internet without investigation into its impact on the ability 
of the specific regulation to fulfil its purpose and is therefore not appropriate.  
On the other hand, Kerr’s suggestion to determine perspective through the examination 
of the language used in the statutory and the case law495 is useful for this thesis.496 He 
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suggested that the language of the statutory law will often signal the adoption of an 
internal or external approach.497 Legislation is a literary manifestation of law498 and is 
therefore one of the ways in which law exposes its intentions.499 
It is unlikely that the legislator explicitly considered whether it wanted Courts to follow an 
internal or external perspective when the CDPA 1988 was enacted. However, Kerr 
suggested that the language used may nevertheless point to a particular perspective 
today.500 As Oliver Wendell Holmes argued: “We do not inquire what the legislature 
meant; we ask only what the statute means.” 501 
In contrast, Hicks argued that: “Legislation is the ideas of legislators, symbolized by 
combinations of words…Whenever we deal with written or spoken words we are one 
remove from the idea which they represent.”502 And as Mr Justice Holmes stated “a word 
is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary 
greatly in colour or content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is 
used.”503 
Thus, the words used in legislation are symbols of the legislator’s ideas and may become 
symbols for other ideas in the mind of the reader.504 Therefore, it is also necessary to 
consider the case law, where the statutory provisions are interpreted by the judges. 
Furthermore, it is a basic principle of justice that like cases ought to be decided alike; 
the doctrine of precedent.505 Therefore, the perspective taken by judges when making 
their decisions506 may influence the scope of digital copyright infringement. 
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Kerr also suggested that when considering a doctrine that has a complex heritage507 or 
was derived from common law, the view-point must also be assessed from a body of 
case law.508 This requires a close reading of the cases interpreting the statutory 
provisions.509 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated how Kerr’s internal and external perspectives have been 
modified and grounded in theory in order to create a Framework for Constructing Digital 
Perspectives.  
The application of the Framework was then considered, the analysis revealed that the 
most appropriate and effective method takes on three phases of analysis. Firstly, a 
historical consideration of the development of the regulation is required in order to 
understand the intended purpose of the law. Secondly, the wording of the statutory law 
is considered as to whether it takes on an internal or external perspective. Thirdly, the 
relevant case law then needs to be analysed, in order to determine the meaning of the 
law as interpreted and applied by the Courts.  
This thesis therefore follows this method of analysis, applying it first to digital copyright 
infringement by way of copying and thereafter applying the same method to investigate 
digital copyright infringement by way of communication to the public.  
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Chapter 3 
 
The CDPA 1988 and its Application to Online Activity: An Analysis of 
Digital Copyright Infringement by way of Copying 
 
“No re-examination of the concepts of copyright can throw off the shackles of 
history.” The Whitford Committee Report 
 
Introduction 
 
Copyright law is a product of its time, as Sheldon Light remarked: “Copyright is a beast 
of substantial historical ancestry.”510 
However, this is a challenge for copyright, which must also keep up to date with new 
technological developments that create new types of works and new means of exploiting 
existing works.511 As Litman warned, failing to adapt in these circumstances results in 
unintended consequences in the law: “Industries effected by copyright find that the 
application of old legal language to new contexts yields unanticipated results.”512 Thus, 
the law must adapt513 to new technologies in order to stay relevant514 in balancing515 the 
interests of creators and rights-holders with the public interest of accessing and using 
creative material.516  
The development of the CDPA 1988 required a lengthy consultation process; spanning 
over 15 years of consideration.517 The challenge of trying to make policy decisions that 
reflected the many different stakeholder interests were demonstrated by the number of 
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consultations, proposals and amendments that led up to the Bill, including last minute 
changes made whilst the Bill proceeded to Royal Assent.518 
It is important to understand why and how the development of the CDPA 1988 occurred, 
as Broom stated: “When the reason ceases, the rule also ceases.” 519 Therefore, as 
explained in the previous chapter, the method of applying the Framework for 
Constructing Digital Perspectives will be applied first by considering the historical 
development of the law, secondly by analysing the wording of the statutory law and then 
finally through analysis of the relevant case law. The Framework is applied first to 
copyright infringement by way of copying and subsequently to copyright infringement by 
way of communication to the public.  
This chapter therefore first looks at the historical development of the CDPA 1988, 
considering the context and development of the current statutory law in order to 
understand the intended meaning and purpose behind it. The narrative moves through 
the long and complex journey from Committee to Green Papers, White Papers and the 
Bill, to the law as it stands today. As stated in the previous chapter, the methodology has 
its foundations in doctrinal analysis and builds on this with a holistic approach in 
considering the circumstances of the implementation. As a product of its time, this is 
imperative for understanding why the law appears as it does; as it is a clear reflection of 
the debates, interests, and technological developments of the time.  
The second part of this chapter then applies the second phase of the Framework by 
focusing specifically on section 17 of the CDPA 1988; the most fundamental restricted 
act of copying. The language of the law is analysed in detail in order to determine the 
meaning and purpose of the law, in light of the analysis undertaken in the first part of this 
chapter. The drafting of section 17 was determined long before the modern technologies 
used to access, use, create and copy copyright material and the discussion considers 
the impact of the wording on the meaning of the law in light of the internet. In particular, 
analysing the wording to determine if the internal or external perspective has been taken 
and what impact that has on the meaning of the law.  
The third phase of the framework is the case law analysis which looks at the judge’s 
interpretation and application of the statutory law in order to determine any 
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inconsistencies in perspective and meaning. This part of the analysis follows in chapter 
4.  
 
Before the CDPA 1988: Understanding the Context and the 
Need for a New Copyright Act 
 
This section will set out the context within which the CDPA 1988 was developed. The 
purpose of this section is to understand the reasons why the CDPA 1988 was needed 
and the effect that the previous laws had on the development of the new regulation. In 
the context of this thesis, this is important to establish the intended meaning behind the 
regulation. This can then be analysed in relation to the Framework for Constructing 
Digital Perspectives in order to discover how the meaning and perspective of the law has 
developed in its application to the internet. 
The CDPA 1988 was introduced following the Whitford Committee Report.520 The 
development of new technologies and the continuing evolution of the Berne 
Convention521 prompted522 the setting up of a new departmental Committee in 1973. The 
Committee was set up under the Chairmanship of Mr Justice Whitford523 to consider the 
impact of the Universal Copyright Convention 1971 and the Rome Convention for the 
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations 
1961.524  
In order to understand the challenges faced by the Whitford Committee, it is necessary 
to briefly consider the starting point of their work, as Groves stated: “One must first 
understand the process by which we reached it.”525 It is important for this thesis to 
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understand as far as possible the position of those drafting the law, because, as 
explained this investigation focuses on the human element in copyright regulation. 
Therefore, a consideration of the Copyright Act 1956 is necessary, so as to fully 
understand the context of the development of the current CDPA 1988.  
In 1951 the Hon. Harold Wilson MP, president of the then Board of Trade, appointed a 
Committee, chaired by H. S. Gregory “to consider and report whether an, and if so what, 
changes are desirable in the law relating to copyright in literary, dramatic, musical and 
artistic works with particular regard to technical developments and to the revised 
International Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artist Works signed at 
Brussels in June 1948, and to consider and report on related matters.”526 
The Committee held 57 meetings,527 receiving representations in writing from 34 
organisations and nine individuals.528 The Committee also heard oral evidence529 from 
29 organisations and five individuals.530 Of this evidence, which was published and 
available from the Patent Office Library,531 it transpired that one of the main criticisms of 
the previous Act of 1911532 was its complexity in presentation.533 The Committee 
reported that they heard from many witnesses that “the Act requires clarification”534 and 
that it emerged there were “further examples of doubt as to the precise effect of the 
Act.”535 
Thus, the Gregory Committee recommended that the form of any future Act be drafted 
so as to reduce complexities.536 In order to achieve this, the Committee suggested that 
the provisions be organised thematically: “Complexities which have been introduced by 
the compression of a number of different subjects into a single section…would be more 
clearly expressed if the appropriate provisions were expanded and dealt with separately. 
It appears to us that drafting the Act by reference to the subject matter of the particular 
right – its scope, and whatever special conditions attach to the right – together with a re-
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arrangement of its various provisions, would make the position clearer for the public 
generally.”537 
The technological developments that the Gregory Committee specifically considered 
included broadcasting, television and technical developments used in libraries by micro-
film processes and in book production by photo-lithography.538 Photocopying539 was 
considered to be a cheap, quick and simple way to copy and therefore “the real threat.”540 
The Gregory Committee considered the issuing of photocopying to be one of their most 
important considerations;541 it was an issue of real contention and conflict between 
interests of stakeholders.542 The Committee reported on the competing interests, for 
example that the “publishers objected to a law which would allow large scale 
copying…scholars wanted to be able to make copies for their own use… librarians 
needed a clear law which would give them unequivocal guidelines.”543 
In order to resolve this conflict, the Gregory Committee recommended a compromise in 
the form of an extension of fair dealing.544 Therefore, it was suggested that photocopying 
a work would be an infringement but that an exception would allow the reproduction by 
mechanical or photographic means of extracts up to a certain length for private study, 
either by the person or a librarian.545 This solution was considered to be an important 
conceptual innovation.546 Feather described it as “an ingenious compromise, which the 
publishers eventually accepted.”547 
However, the Gregory Committee was considered to have taken a conservative and 
minimalist approach in their recommendations.548 The Bill was brought to Parliament in 
June 1956, it was supported from all sides of the House and passed all its stages without 
difficulty.549 This quick and smooth adoption demonstrates that the Bill was not 
considered particularly controversial.  
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Nevertheless, legal language is difficult to understand for those who are not legally 
trained, largely due to the syntax characteristics.550 This is particularly the case for 
copyright legislation, as it reflects the debates and compromises made between the 
different stakeholders at the time of drafting.551 This leads to law that may appear to be 
archaic and obscure to a layperson.552 Thus, despite good intentions to simplify the law, 
The Copyright Act 1956 was met with much criticism.553 Sir William Dale heavily criticised 
the draftsmanship of the Act, using it as an example of how not to draft legislation.554 
Dale castigated the 1956 Act and suggested that statute law should be understood by 
the people that it intends to regulate.555 
Francis Bennion, one of the draftsman of the 1956 Act, responded to Dale’s criticism 
with a review.556 Bennion argued in his retort that Dale’s suggestions were impractical.557 
In response to Dale’s argument, Bennion highlighted the Swedish copyright statute as 
an example of legislation drafted in layman’s language, which stated that: “The 
performance of a work at a place of business for a comparatively large closed group of 
people shall be considered a public performance.” Bennion argued that this language 
created ambiguity in the law: “it would be interesting to hear laymen discussing whether 
a public hall hired by a firm for a staff party is a place of business, or 43 persons 
consisting of the firm’s staff with a few relatives and friends is a comparatively large 
closed group.”558 
Nevertheless, Groves argued the 1956 Act was complicated and badly constructed.559 
Moreover, Feather added that it was inflexible Legislation: “The Gregory Committee’s 
apparent determination to avoid enunciating general principles, left the United Kingdom 
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with a very specific law which was applicable to the technological, economic and political 
situation of 1956.”560 
This section has identified the setting in which the development of the CDPA 1988 was 
developed. This allowed for an understanding of the starting point for the Whitford 
Committee and provided an insight into the challenges that the Gregory Committee 
faced. In particular, it has been noted that the Gregory Committee was set up in order to 
assess and need to update the law and make recommendations in light of new 
technologies. However, the analysis demonstrated that the Gregory Committee faced 
many conflicting stakeholder opinions and compromises needed to be made in order to 
appease the different requests. Ultimately, this analysis supports the argument that 
copyright law is a product of its time; from a technological, political and societal 
standpoint.  
This chapter now undertakes a review of the development of the CDPA 1988, looking 
closely at the Whitford Committee, the green and white papers, and the discussions that 
took place at the time in order to ascertain the intended meaning and purpose of the law. 
This is necessary for the investigation to ascertain if the regulation was drafted from an 
internal or external perspective, and whether this perspective was carried through in the 
application of the law to the internet.  
 
The Background Behind the CDPA 1988: The Whitford 
Committee Report 
 
As mentioned, 20 years after the 1956 Copyright Act, the Department of Trade 
established a Committee under Mr Justice Whitford “to consider and report whether any, 
and if so what, changes are desirable in the law relating to copyright as provided in 
particular by the Copyright Act 1956 and the Design Copyright Act 1968.”561 
The Whitford Committee’s consultation process was considerably more in depth than 
that of the Gregory Committee;562 it held over twice the number meetings (106), as well 
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as smaller working group meetings, four outside visits,563 and received written and oral564 
evidence from a considerable number of organisations, companies and individuals. 
However, unlike its predecessors, the Whitford Committee did not publish any of this 
evidence.565 
In the introduction to the Report, the Whitford Committee re-stated the continuing theme 
that the law needed to be simplified: “The Act of 1956 is a remarkable feat of 
draftsmanship but…has proved a nightmare to those who have to try to understand it 
whether as laymen for their own purposes or as lawyers seeking to guide their clients. It 
is for this reason no doubt that one of the most constant themes in the submissions 
received by the [Whitford] Committee has been the request that something must be done 
to simplify the law. A principal objective in any future legislation must be that copyright 
law should be ‘placed on a plain and uniform basis’ to adopt the words of the 1952 
[Gregory] Committee echoing the words of the 1909 Committee.”566 
The Whitford Committee Report submitted that no re-examination of the concepts of 
copyright can throw off the shackles of history,567 recommending that the law simply be 
re-stated rather than reformed: “This is simply a restatement of the existing law and 
further support for the status quo is provided by the generally held view that the balance 
between the rights of the copyright owner on the one hand and the exceptions in favour 
of copyright users on the other is about right and that no abrupt change in the balance 
is called for.”568 
However, the Whitford Committee also considered specific technological developments 
such as the photocopier, audio and video recording and computer programs.569 The 
present copyright laws were considered inadequate to cope with photocopying and 
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recording machines.570 The Report also acknowledged the desire to find a modus 
vivendi571 between, on the one hand, the legitimate copyright interests of authors and 
publishers to control or at least receive remuneration in respect of reproduction of their 
works and, on the other hand, the equally legitimate interest of those engaged in 
research and education who were mainly interested in the dissemination of 
information.572 
The Whitford Report was four years in the making, and was considered at the time to be 
the most thorough investigation of British copyright law and practice for over half a 
century.573 The Committee presented its Report to Parliament in March 1977.574 
However, whilst it was acclaimed to be a highly valuable contribution to the copyright 
debate, legislation did not follow for over a decade.575  
Therefore, the line of investigation in this chapter continues by considering the 
development of the CDPA 1988, looking particularly at the discussions, debates, drafts, 
Green Papers and finally the Bill. This analysis enables the discovery of the original 
intention, purpose and nature of the CDPA 1988, which then informs the subsequent 
analysis as to whether the law fulfils its purpose, and is applied consistently from an 
internal or external perspective.  
 
The Development of the CDPA 1988: Attempting to Update 
Copyright Regulation 
 
The anticipated early implementation of the recommendations made by the Whitford 
Committee Report did not occur.576 The Government stated that whilst they were 
prepared to accept many of the recommendations, the Committee was not unanimous 
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in its view on a number of important matters.577 Therefore a further consultative 
document was issued in 1981.578 
The subsequent Green Paper, titled Reform of the Law Relating to Copyright, Designs 
and Performers’ Protection,579 thus invited further comment on proposals made for the 
revision of the law relating to copyright as well as other intellectual property rights.580 In 
particular, the Green Paper recognised that the 1956 Act needed to be updated in light 
of changing economic conditions, social requirements and technical developments.581 
The Green Paper also made use of statistics provided by the British Phonographic 
Industry that supported the argument that private recording resulted in lost sales to the 
recording industry.582 
Among other matters, the Government was debating the idea of introducing a levy 
system on audio, video or blank tape equipment, but stated that it had not received 
enough convincing evidence that the introduction of a levy would provide an acceptable 
solution.583 They welcomed further evidence but admitted a short sighted view, stating 
that “at the end of the day it may have to be accepted that there is in fact no acceptable 
solution.”584 
Several hundred responses to the 1981 Green Paper were considered but there were 
still issues left unresolved and further consultation was required, and as a result a further 
Green Paper conducted in 1983.585 The second Green Paper, which considered 
exceptional measures,586 was produced in 1985.587 Although this Green Paper had 
limited effect on the law, it was noteworthy for the fact that it contradicted some of the 
first Green Paper’s recommendations.588 It had three primary concerns; to heighten 
awareness of the system inside and outside Government, to make the system more 
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effective and accessible, and to ensure that the interests of British Industry were fully 
reflected in international negotiations.589 The second Green Paper contained a number 
of thoughts on the proper balance between, on the one hand, the protection of authorship 
and initiative, and on the other, the need to free industry from restrictions imposed by 
intellectual property rights.590 The Government received about 1,000 comments and 
submissions in response to the 1985 Green Paper.591 
Taking on board the Whitford Committee Report, the responses to the 1981 Green Paper 
and the responses to the 1985 Green Paper; the Government finally produced the White 
Paper; Intellectual Property and Innovation in 1986.592 At this stage the Government 
conceded that there was no realistic alternative to a compulsory levy on blank recording 
tape as a means of providing remuneration to copyright owners and performers.593  
In relation to reproduction by computers, the White Paper stated that the new law would 
be clear in stating that the rights given to copyright owners over reproduction extend to 
copying by fixing a work on any medium from which the work could principally be 
reproduced.594 
The subsequent CDPA Bill was finally brought to the House of Commons in the spring 
of 1988 after a great deal of research and consultation595 between lawyers, civil servants, 
publishers, authors, librarians, broadcasters, designers, industrialists and many others 
who would be affected by it.596  
Despite a plea from the Hon Sir Geoffrey Pattie MP597 to interest groups to refrain from 
trying to get too many amendments made to the Bill, over 1,500 amendments were 
made.598 The Bill also received detailed scrutiny from Parliament, and many changes 
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were made.599 The Bill was announced in the Queen’s Speech on 25 June 1987. 
Exceptionally, the then Department of Trade and Industry were permitted to retain the 
services of Parliamentary Counsel on the Bill.600 Furthermore, 46 draft clauses on 
copyright where circulated even at the late stage of July 1987.601 
The numerous and competing interests of different stakeholder representatives was 
reflected in the complex and lengthy Bill.602 At the introduction of the second reading of 
the Bill, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister of Trade and Industry, Mr 
Kenneth Clarke acknowledged: “This Bill comes here from another place, is, as every 
hon. Member can see, lengthy and complex. It has 285 clauses and eight schedules.”603 
Nevertheless, the Government sought to produce policy that balanced these competing 
interests. As the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Lord Young of Graffham 
explained: “Those with ideas deserve a fair reward for their labours but they cannot 
expect to be completely sheltered from the real world. This would stifle rather than 
stimulate creativity. In drawing up the Bill we have sought to provide a fair return for 
creative talent and those who develop and use their work, while ensuring that ideas are 
not locked away but are accessible to society as a whole.”604 
The process of reaching such a consensus between the stakeholders was evidently 
challenging; as has been demonstrated by the long and complicated consultation 
process.605 
The drafting of the Bill was praised by representatives of some of the stakeholders who 
took part in the consultation process.606 The Government claimed that the Bill restricted 
the law on a more logical and consistent basis and took into account the technological 
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advances made in the 30 years since the last Act, and even strived to anticipate further 
developments.607 
However, academic discourse acknowledged that the need to achieve agreement 
between stakeholders imposed constraints on the legislation.608 For example, Cornish 
described the debate as “a ferment of proposition and counter-proposition.”609 This 
recognised the distortion the effect of drafting legislation in this way can course. As 
Litman highlighted with the question of “is this a Bill that current stakeholders agree on?” 
is not the same as asking “is this a good Bill?”610 
This analysis thus highlighted the challenges faced by the legislator and the drafters of 
the CDPA 1988. It offered insight into why the regulation later appeared as it did and 
provided a foundation of understanding upon which the subsequent analysis is built.  
 
The Result of 15 Years of Discussion: The CDPA 1988 
 
Nevertheless, the CDPA 1988 eventually received Royal Assent on 15th November 1988 
and came into force on 1st August 1989. As demonstrated, this was not a hastily-
conceived measure.611 However, it was argued no amount of consultation and 
deliberation could avoid the multiple difficulties in reforming copyright law.612 In fact, it 
appeared, that the more consultation that took place, the more irreconcilable viewpoints 
became apparent.613 As a result of such negotiation, the law became very long and 
specific.614 
Litman explained that one of the difficulties with developing copyright law is that 
stakeholders will not support changes that would leave them worse off; “no effected party 
is going to agree to support a bill that leaves it worse off than it is under current law.”615 
Therefore, the outcome of new regulation, subject to the debates of current stakeholders 
would likely fall in their favour, or at least retain their current position. Laddie argued that 
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some of the drafting of the new law was clearly advantageous towards the copyright 
owner.616 He determined that an examination of the parliamentary debates showed areas 
of drafting specifically intended as a form of quid pro quo to copyright owners who were 
unhappy at the amendment of other areas.617  
Lord Preston was also of the view that the consultation process, debate, and 
consequently the law was heavily represented by the copyright owners and, in contrast, 
hardly a word said on the consumers' side:618 “I find that lack of balance less than 
satisfying.”619 Litman observed that the law had been transformed into the right of a 
property owner to protect their work providing them with more control,620 she stated that 
it “is far less about incentives or compensation than it is about control.”621  
Groves, on the other hand, suggested that the CDPA 1988 appeared to have moved 
away from exclusivity and towards a right to remuneration for the use of one’s work.622 
Others praised the new law, for example Feather named it “the great consolidated law 
which some have been seeking for over a century.”623  
However, doubts and on its meaning arose quickly.624 One reason for such doubt was 
that, on recommendation of the Whitford Committee, many of the provisions in the CDPA 
1988 were simply a re-statement of the previous law, but using different words.625 A key 
aim of the law reform was to simplify the law and therefore it was not actually updated, 
in fact section 172(2) of the CDPA 1988 stated, in setting out how the Act should be 
interpreted, that: “A provision of this Part which corresponds to a provision of the previous 
law shall not be construed as departing from the previous law merely because of a 
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change of expression.”626 Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran recognised the illogicality in a new law 
that should be read in line with its predecessor; arguing that this was “one of the most 
curious clauses that any Bill could possible contain…The previous law is to apply 
although we have changed the words of the Act. That sounds very curious from a 
lawyer’s point of view.”627 Lord Lloyd also noted that the fact that Government had simply 
recited the law as it was in the 1911 and 1956 Copyright Acts had lead it to be named 
the “Humpty Dumpty Bill”.628 
Some acknowledged the CDPA 1988 as an improvement on the 1956 law629 in terms of 
logic and clarity.630 However, others disagreed, for example recognising the ambiguity in 
certain terms: “With a word like reasonable in a statute, lawyers can make fortunes. They 
can argue about it for days. They may not be able to make so much out of ‘substantial’. 
They can still make a great deal.”631 
Overall, this part of the chapter has considered firstly, the contextual basis for the 
development of the CDPA 1988 and secondly the legislative process by which the law 
was reformed. It has been shown that the reform of the law which led to the enactment 
of the CDPA 1988 was no hasty measure;632 the consultation process was extremely 
long and far more thorough than had previously been undertaken.633 The Whitford 
Committee considered competing stakeholder interests in light of the development of 
new technologies such as the photocopier, and attempted to make recommendations 
that held these factors into account.634 However, the result of this was that the law 
became very long and complex.635 Furthermore, a key aim was to simplify the law and 
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this led to much of the new legislation being a re-statement of the old legislation;636 
leaving copyright law in the 21st Century dating back to 1956. 
The subsequent sections look closely at the wording of section 17 of the CDPA 1988. 
This is done by taking each subsection in turn to consider the way in which it was drafted, 
what this means in light of the development of online technology and in applying the 
Framework, if an internal or external perspective was taken. 
 
An Analysis of Section 17 of the CDPA 1988: Infringement by 
Copying… or Reproduction  
 
As mentioned this part of the chapter now applies the second phase of the Framework 
by focusing specifically on section 17 of the CDPA 1988. The language of the law is 
analysed in detail in order to determine the meaning and purpose of the law through a 
holistic understanding, in light of the analysis undertaken in part one of this chapter, 
before considering if it is drafted from an internal or external perspective. 
The restricted act of copying is arguably the most fundamental in copyright legislation. 
As Mr Clarke stated in the second reading of the copyright Bill: “the rights which the 
copyright owner is to enjoy, of which the most fundamental is contained in clause 17: the 
right to prevent copying.”637 Furthermore, Drassinower argued that “copyright law is not 
a prohibition on copying but rather an institutionalized distinction between lawful and 
wrongful copying.”638 
Section 17 of the CDPA 1988 specified that it is an infringement to reproduce a copyright 
work in any material form, including storing the work in any medium by electronic 
means.639 The specific language of legislation that is so closely tied to technology is 
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evidently crucial.640 However, terms are often used interchangeably,641 for example The 
CDPA 1988 refers to section 17 as the creators “exclusive right to copy.”642 As a general 
controversy, the term copying has been criticised on the basis that it combines and 
confuses two separate concepts; the mental act of derivation and the act of making a 
copy.643  
However, the CDPA 1988 refers to a ‘reproduction right’ in relation to the performer's 
right,644 following amendment by the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 1996. 
The Information Society Directive645 also used the term ‘reproduction right’ and defined 
it as “the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent 
reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part”646 of the work. 
Nevertheless, section 17(2) defined the meaning of copying as “reproducing the work in 
any material form” 647 [emphasis added]. 
Section 17 has six subsections. The first subsection is section 17(1) which stated that: 
“The copying of the work is an act restricted by the copyright in every description of 
copyright work; and references in this Part to copying and copies shall be construed as 
follows.”648 
The opening paragraph to the section sets the scene of restricted act of copying; as is 
to protect the copyright owner.649 During the consultation process the words ‘and copies’ 
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were removed and replaced with ‘in that context,’650 presumably to be more specific 
although there is no explanation provided.  
At this stage there appears to be no indication of an internal or external perspective, 
although terms such as ‘very description of the work’ suggest an attitude of broad and 
encompassing rights.651 The following sections will now consider subsections 2-6. 
 
Infringement by Reproducing in Any Medium By 
Electronic Means: An Analysis of Section 17(2) CDPA 
1988 
 
Subsection 17(2) CDPA 1988 stated that it is an infringement to reproduce a work: 
“Copying in relation to a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work means reproducing 
the work in any material form. This includes storing the work in any medium by electronic 
means.”652 
The words ‘this includes storing the work in any medium by electronic means’ are 
prevailing, and interestingly, were added into the CDPA 1988 at the very late stages of 
the consultation.653 This analysis will first consider the meaning of storage, and then 
electronic means.  
To uncover the meaning of storing a work it is necessary to consider its conception. This 
subsection reflected the provisions that were set out in the Copyright (Computer 
Software) Amendment Act 1985. The clause to restrict the storing of a work was 
supported by Lord Coville, who admitted to having limited computer knowledge.654 He 
gave an example of the circumstances for which the clause was designed: “If you switch 
off the machine at any time the electronic memory is erased and you have nothing left. 
The matter may not be complete at the time when such a disaster occurs…It is not written 
down, it is not recorded anywhere else, it is not palpable in any shape or form… Thus, 
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("and copies").” 
651 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (London: 
Butterworths Law; 2011) 14.13. 
652 CDPA 1988, section 17(2). 
653 Hansard, Infringement of Copyright by Copying, HC Deb 25 July 1988 vol 138 Mr. Butcher at 
129: “Amendment made: No. 38, in page 8, line 41, at end insert “This includes storing the work 
in any medium by electronic means.” 
654 Hansard, Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Bill, HL Deb 05 June 1985 vol 464 
cc823-9, Viscount Colville of Culross at 824. 
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in the amendment we are referring to the storage of the work in the electronic memory 
of the computer so that when you put in something which you consider constitutes a 
work which deserves to be protected by copyright the Bill will, in fact, protect it; that is, 
the creation of the work.”655 He stated that his intention was to make sure that where a 
work had “not yet been written down it is still protected.”656 This statement appears to 
suggest that the requirement for copyright to subsist in a literary, dramatic or musical 
work being recorded or written down657 would be met by the storage of a work. Protection 
had not previously extended this far before the introduction of the section 17(2) 
subsection.658 
Lord McIntosh accepted the suggestion on behalf of the Whitford Committee, who 
applauded Lord Coville’s expertise and also admitted to having “no particular knowledge 
of copyright law.”659 Lord McIntosh did suggest that the concept of storage on a computer 
should only be relevant when it related to “the concept of access to that work and the 
use of that work.”660 This suggested that storage of a work on a computer would only 
invoke copyright when that work is accessed or used, not simply by the fact that it is 
stored. 
Subsequently, Lord Brabazon supported the amendment on behalf of the 
Government.661 He affirmed that the main motivation for the clause was to protect a new 
copyright work created and stored on a computer “it will also apply, for example, to a 
novel or to any other sort of work being written directly into computer storage. In so far 
as there is any doubt now that such a work is ‘fixed in material form’, and therefore 
qualifies for copyright protection at the instant of its creation within the machine, the 
amendment will remove that doubt.”662 
Interestingly, the clause was originally neglected from the CDPA Bill. However, the 
Government were held to account on maintaining the policy that storing a work in a 
																																								 																				
655 Ibid., Viscount Colville at 824. 
656 Ibid., Viscount Colville at 828. 
657 CDPA 1988, section 3(2). 
658 For example, in the US case of Data Cash Systems Inc. v J.S. and A Group 480 F Supp. 
1063 (N.D) III. 1979) it was held that as information stored on a chip could not be seen or read 
by a person, it could not be protected under copyright. Additionally, in the Australian case of 
Apple Computer Inc v Computer Edge Pty Ltd [1984] F.S.R 487; the Court stated that 
adaptations of literary works must be capable of being seen or heard. 
659 Hansard, Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Bill, HL Deb 05 June 1985 vol 464 
cc823-9, Lord McIntosh at 825. 
660 Ibid., Lord McIntosh at 825. 
661 Ibid., Lord Brabazon at 826. 
662 Ibid., Lord Brabazon at 826. 
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computer was a form of reproduction which required the copyright owner's consent:663 
“We have the excellent Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act 1985. One of 
the provisions in that Act was important. It made it clear that storing a work in a computer 
is a form of reproduction which requires the copyright owner's consent. The Bill does not 
make that clear. I feel confident that the Government intend to uphold the promise that 
was made on that in the other place and that we shall see an amendment to clause 17(2) 
to that effect.”664 
Turning now to ‘electronic means’, this term is defined in section 178 of the CDPA 1988 
as meaning “actuated by electric, magnetic, electromagnetic, electro-chemical, or 
electro-mechanical energy.”665 Moreover, ‘in electronic form’ means in a form usable only 
by electronic means.666 
Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria stated that the term ‘electronic’ is defined widely in its legal 
interpretation.667 ‘Electronic’ is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “(of a device) 
having or operating with components such as microchips and transistors that control and 
direct electric currents: such as an electronic calculator, an electronic organ.”668 This is 
a very broad definition. It is interesting that the examples do not include a computer.  
In relation to the internal or external perspective it would appear that this subsection 
references hardware and the technical function of an electronic device, and therefore 
suggests an external perspective. This is confirmed by the understanding that the 
intention of the subsection was to include storing copyright protected material on a 
computer as a restricted act under copying. However, the use of the term storage in this 
context is a metaphorical understanding of how a computer works, which suggests an 
internal perspective. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the case law that applies 
subsection 17(2) in order to determine how the judges interpret and apply this regulation 
online. 
In summary, it can be seen that this subsection of the CDPA 1988 was introduced without 
foresight or particular expertise in the understanding of computer function or 
																																								 																				
663 Hansard, Copyright, Designs and Patents Bill [Lords] HC Deb 28 April 1988 Vol 132 cc525-
99, Order for Second Reading read, Miss Emma Nicholson (Torridge and Devon, West) 578. 
664 Ibid. 
665 CDPA 1988, section 178. 
666 These provisions are re-enactments of sections 2(5) and 3(5) of the 1956 Act as amended 
by the Copyright (Computer Software) Amendments Act 1985 and, as regards to reproducing in 
any material form, section 49(4). 
667 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, 4th Edit. (London: 
Butterworths Law; 2011) Part II: Copyright and Related Rights, Chapter 14: The Reproduction 
Right, at 14.10. 
668 Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2010). 
101	
	
technological development. Furthermore, the intended purpose of the clause is not 
relevant to modern technology, and may well have not ever been a circumstance that 
would have arisen. The case law relating to storing copyright works will be considered in 
the subsequent chapter, in order to determine if the judges apply this subsection with an 
internal or external perspective. 
 
Infringement by Making a Three-Dimensional Copying: 
Section 17(3) CDPA 1988 
 
Subsection 17(3) CDPA 1988 stated that it is an infringement to make a copy in a 
different dimension: “In relation to an artistic work copying includes the making of a copy 
in three dimensions of a two-dimensional work and the making of a copy in two 
dimensions of a three-dimensional work.”669 
This section appears to be a codification of the law as determined in the case of 
Bradbury, Agnew and Co v Day.670 In this case a play was performed using characters 
from a cartoon; which was deemed to be indirect copying of the original two-dimensional 
drawing.671 This meant that the manner in which an artistic work can be copied depends 
primarily on form672 and became statutory with the introduction of section 17(3).  
The wording of this subsection has unusual implications in context of current 
technological developments. The terminology used in this section, taken at face value, 
read as a product of its time; is intended to restrict adaptions, for example from a book 
to a play. However, read today it may well encompass activity such as printing a 3D 
model from a 3D CAD file.673  
The application of the internal and external framework to this section, therefore, is not 
straightforward as the subsection was drafted with a specific analogue scenario in mind. 
Theoretically applying this section online674 could suggest that transforming an eBook 
																																								 																				
669 CDPA 1988, section 17(3). 
670 Bradbury, Agnew and Co v Day (1916) 32 TLR 349. 
671 Ibid. 
672 Merkin R., Richards Butler on Copyright, Designs and Patents: The New Law (London: 
Longman; 1989) p.150. 
673 CAD stands for Computer Aided Design. A CAD is an image file format used to create 2D 
and 3D designs. CAD files hold information for these images, as well as drafting information. 
674 World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty (WCT) (adopted in Geneva on 
December 20, 1996) Agreed statements concerning Article 1(4): “The reproduction right, as set 
out in Article 9 of the Berne Convention, and the exceptions permitted thereunder, fully apply in 
the digital environment, in particular to the use of works in digital form.” 
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into a computer game would be of parallel circumstance. From an external perspective, 
what dimension is copyright material online? Technically, the computer screen is 
displaying pixels, regardless of the type of material and therefore this might be 
considered two dimensional.  
Dividing types of copyright works, from an external perspective, leads to the 
consideration of what type of copyright work is a digital file? Historically, copyright law 
has been split into different media: written texts are literary works in copyright; still 
images are artistic works in copyright; moving images are films or broadcasting in 
copyright and so on.675 However, from an external perspective; in multimedia, all of these 
different items are bundled together in to a single product,676 or online file. On the other 
hand, from an internal perspective a computer file would be considered as a piece of 
music, an image, or a film experienced or consumed online.677 
Nevertheless, due to the technological specific nature of this subsection it has become 
irrelevant in the face of technological developments. Whilst the analysis has drawn from 
this subsection to contemplate how it might carry to online circumstances, and 
considered the implications of the internal and external perspectives, it is ultimately not 
relevant in the context of this thesis to continue investigation. Therefore, this section will 
be excluded from the case law analysis undertaken in the subsequent chapter.  
 
Infringement by Broadcasting: Section 17(5) CDPA 1988 
 
Under subsection 17(5) of the CDPA 1988 it is deemed an infringement of copyright to 
broadcast a work without permission: “Copying in relation to a film or broadcast678 
includes making a photograph of the whole or any substantial part of any image forming 
part of the film or broadcast.”679 
																																								 																				
675 Oppenheim C., Copyright in the Electronic Age in Parrinder P. and Chernaik W., Textual 
Monopolies: Literary Copyright and the Public Domain (London: Office for Humanities 
Communication; 1997) p. 105. 
676 Ibid., p.105. 
677 Kerr O. S., The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal, 
pp. 357-405, p. 379. 
678 The definition of ‘broadcast’ was later amended by The Copyright and Related Rights 
Regulations 2003 (S.I. 2003/2498) regs. 2(1), 5(5), Sch. 1 para. 3(1)(a) (with regs. 31-40), 
resulting from Directive 93/98/EEC; Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003; which 
came into force on 31st October 2003: “Section 3: Amendments to the definition of “broadcast” 
section 17(4); for the words “broadcast or cable programme” there shall be substituted “or 
broadcast.” 
679 CDPA 1988, section 17(4).  
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This section is another example of law that was carried forward from the Copyright Act 
1956. The intended mischief that this section sought to remedy, was explained in the 
case of Spelling Goldberg680 where the Court held that taking a ‘still’ from a film and 
publishing it in the form of a photograph was an infringement of the copyright in the 
film.681 
When considering the application of this section to the digital society, it is interesting to 
consider the phenomenon of the screen shot682 as a modern parallel. Would this be 
considered making a photograph? The exhibition of original works is not restricted by 
copyright.683 This might suggest that the right to control digital reproduction should not 
enable the copyright owner to control the display of works in a computer monitor684 or 
screen. 
However, Minister for the Department of Culture, Media and Sport Edward Vaizey stated 
in March 2016 that taking a screen shot of an image on social media app Snapchat, 
would constitute infringement of copyright: “Under UK copyright law, it would be unlawful 
for a Snapchat user to copy an image and make it available to the public without the 
consent of the image owner. The image owner would be able to sue anyone who does 
this for copyright infringement. Snapchat photos are automatically deleted after 10 
seconds. The Snapchat Privacy Policy states that if Snapchat is able to detect that a 
recipient has taken a screenshot of an image, they will try to inform the original poster. 
However, Snapchat advises users to avoid sending messages which they would not 
want to be saved or shared.”685 
Although this question has not been posed in a UK Court, it did arise inter alia in the US 
matter of Hoge v Schmalfeldt (2014).686 Blogger Mr Hoge sought an injunction against 
the defendant for sharing his work on social media platforms, including the use of image 
capturing.687 The injunction was not granted. However, Tan argued that this could have 
																																								 																				
680 Spelling Goldberg v BPC Publishing [1981] FSR 280. 
681 Ibid. 
682 This is image capturing by way of a digital photograph taken of the interface that the screen 
of the device is currently displaying, a common feature on smartphones, tablets or through the 
print screen option on a computer. 
683 Bookmaker’s Afternoon Greyhound Services v Wilf Gilbert (Staffordshire) Ltd [1994] FSR 
723. 
684 Ibid. 
685 Rt Hon Edward Vaizey MP, Department for Culture, Media and Sport (24 March 2016) Social 
Networking: Photographs: Written question 12484, asked by Jim Shannon (Strangford) on 19 
October 2015: https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-
statements/written-question/Commons/2015-10-19/12484/  
686 Hoge v Schmalfeldt, Civil Action No. ELH-14-1683 (US District Court for the District of 
Maryland, July 1, 2014). 
687 Ibid., p. 4. 
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been a policy decision to shield social media sites and services providers “given that the 
screenshot capturing function is made available by the operating systems of digital 
devices, users are inclined to take such functionalities for granted. If the specific 
injunction Mr Hoge sought was granted, it would have grave implications on how we may 
be compelled to turn away from the conveniences technological advancements have 
afforded us, and such counter-intuitive directives cannot be reasonable.”688 
In relation to the internal and external perspectives; again, this appears to be a clause 
focusing on a specific circumstance that does not directly relate to the use of the internet. 
As a result, the internal and external perspectives cannot be applied. This demonstrates 
the out-dated nature of the law in the face of internet technologies as a result of 
attempting to carry regulation from 1956.  
 
Infringement by Facsimile Copy: Section 17(5) CDPA 1988 
 
Under subsection 17(5) of the CDPA 1988 it is an infringement of copyright to copy a 
work by facsimile: “Copying in relation to the typographical arrangement of a published 
edition means making a facsimile copy of the arrangement.”689 
Again, this section is a re-state of the 1956 Act, and in doing so repeats the specific and 
confined clause.690 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria suggested that “presumably in these 
days of computer typesetting one might make a 'facsimile' by some sort of scanning 
process, such as a pdf file.”691 Their use of the word ‘presumably’ demonstrates that the 
pace technological development renders the law uncertain.  
Thus, another example of a technologically obsolete and specific clause that would be 
difficult to apply to the digital landscape.  
 
 
																																								 																				
688 Tan C. H. Y., Technological ‘Nudges’ and Copyright on Social Media Sites (2015) 1 
Intellectual Property Quarterly, pp. 62-78, p. 76. 
689 CDPA 1988, section 17(5). 
690 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (London: 
Butterworths Law; 2011) 14.22. 
691 Ibid., 14.22. 
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Infringement by Incidental and Transient Copying: An 
Analysis of Section 17(6) CDPA 1988 
 
Section 17(6) CDPA 1988 deemed incidental and transient copying as an infringement 
of copyright: “Copying in relation to any description of work includes the making of copies 
which are transient or are incidental to some other use of the work.”692 
The mischief this subsection aimed to remedy was the act of loading or storing a 
computer program onto a computer as an act of copying.693 In particular, Lord Mattistone 
explained that the desired effect was to deem “that incidental copying in the course of 
running a computer program, or viewing a work stored in a computer database, was no 
longer excluded from the restricted act of copying.”694 
The copying of a work, through incidental storage on a computer was included in the 
1956 Act when it was amended in 1985 but this was not brought forward in the original 
CDPA Bill.695 At the time of the Bill, clause 17(6) originally stated that “storing a work in 
a computer does not amount to copying the work where done only incidentally in the 
course of viewing the work, or in the case of a computer program, running the 
program.”696 However, the Lords Committee argued that the excision of incidental 
storage in the course of viewing a work or, in the case of a computer programme, running 
it, as was then proposed in clause 17(7) of the Bill would undermine the basis of licensing 
in the software field.697 Moreover, Lord Mottistone argued that “The information stored 
belongs to its originator in the same way that the text of a book belongs to its author. 
The author obtains royalties on the sale of his book. The originator of a database could 
reasonably expect the same... However, Clause 17(7) appears to have the opposite 
effect because it says that viewing a work stored in a computer is not infringing 
																																								 																				
692 CDPA 1988, section 17(6). 
693 The WCT 1996 specified that the reproduction right set out in Art 9 of the Berne Convention 
fully apply to the digital environment. It also specified that the storage of a protected work in 
digital form in an electronic medium constituted a reproduction within the meaning of Art 9 of the 
Berne Convention. 
694 Hansard, Copyright, Designs and Patents Bill [H.L.], HL Deb 29 March 1988 Vol 495 cc607-
96, Lord Mattistone at 647. 
695 Hansard, Copyright, Designs and Patents Bill [H.L.], HL Deb 12 November 1987 Vol 489 
cc1476-540; Lord Mottistone at 1501. 
696 Groves P., Copyright and Designs Law: A Question of Balance (London: Graham and 
Trotman Ltd; 1991) p. 56. 
697 Ibid., p. 55; referring to Lord Mottistone, Hansard, HL Deb Vol 490 Col 1177. 
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copyright.”698 Thereafter the clause was amended to appear as it does now that 
incidental and transient copying is an infringement of copyright.699 
Interestingly, the Government’s amendment within the Standing Committee, which 
inserted this provision originally used the word ‘ephemeral’ instead of ‘transient’. Emma 
Nicholson MP explained that this word came from the Greek ephemeros, meaning 
lasting for one day. In addition, ephemera are mayfly and ephemomorph is a general 
term for the lowest forms of life. Applied to the software industry, the expression was 
ambiguous and Nicholson, instead suggested transient, from the past participle of the 
Latin verb transire, meaning to be passed over, not durable or not permanent. The 
Government agreed and the word ‘transient’ was used.700  
This highlights the significance of word choice in legislation. On consideration, using the 
word ‘transient’ to encapsulate the activity of ‘storing’ on a computer appears to be an 
oxymoron. Whilst transient implies not durable or permanent; storage juxtaposes this as 
a term that implies some degree of permanency. As Merkin explains that “it is difficult to 
see how storage could have been merely incidental to running and viewing the 
program.”701 Therefore, the term may actually be considered contradictory to its intended 
meaning. 
The Information Society Directive, on the other hand, used the phrase “temporary or 
permanent reproduction”702 instead of “transient or are incidental.”703 The implications of 
the Information Society Directive was that the CDPA 1988 must be interpreted in light of 
Article 2; which specifically referred to “temporary…reproduction by any means and in 
any form.”704 It could be argued that the Information Society Directive used more 
accurate language. However, Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria argued that these terms mean 
the same thing.705  
																																								 																				
698 Hansard, Copyright, Designs and Patents Bill [H.L.], HL Deb 12 November 1987 Vol 489 
cc1476-540; Lord Mottistone at 1501. 
699 CDPA 1988, section 17(6). 
700 Groves P., Copyright and Designs Law: A Question of Balance (London: Graham and 
Trotman Ltd; 1991) p. 55. 
701 Merkin R., Richards Butler on Copyright, Designs and Patents: The New Law (London: 
Longman; 1989) p.196. 
702 The Information Society Directive, Recital 33. 
703 CDPA 1988, section 17(6). 
704 The Information Society Directive, Article 2. 
705 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (London: 
Butterworths Law; 2011) 14.10. 
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Overall, section 17(6) exemplifies the legislators struggle with technologically specific 
language. In choosing this route; this section clearly displays an external perspective, 
prima facia, due to the use of technical terminology.  
However, on closer inspection the section also demonstrates the human condition in 
cognitively processing new technologies in light of past knowledge. For example 
‘storage’ is a term that already has a meaning in the analogue world and is being directly 
applied to the digital environment. The difficulty is that this metaphor does not transpose 
smoothly to new technology. The term storage brings with it connotations of long term 
putting away. Whereas in this section the law is including temporary storage which may 
only last a matter of minutes.706 
Therefore, in order to further determine the meaning of this section and the perspective 
taken when it is applied online, the relevant case law will be considered in the 
subsequent chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The first part of this chapter considered the historical development of the CDPA 1988, 
this analysis uncovered the challenges faced when drafting copyright law. In particularly 
due to the need to meet different stakeholder interests and to keep up with technological 
developments. The analysis of the consultation all the way through to the final 1988 Act, 
demonstrated that the intention of the Government was to address specific technological 
developments. In particular, the copyright owners appeared to have the loudest voice 
during the debate which can be seen throughout the consultation process.  
The chapter demonstrated that the CDPA 1988 was a very long time coming707 after a 
lengthy consultation process stretching back some fifteen years.708 As Lord Willis 
exclaimed: “I feel rather like somebody who has been standing at a railway station on a 
cold winter morning for a very long time and when the train eventually arrives I do not 
care whether it has a buffet car or first class accommodation as long as it is there.”709 
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708 Ibid., p. 2. 
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However, it could be argued that the delays were not entirely without value, as this 
allowed for a great deal of debate.710 Moreover, due to the nature of the law, the political 
and practical difficulties took their toll.711 
The first part of this chapter sought to recognise the long, complex consultation process 
that led to the development of the CDPA 1988. The analysis recognised the challenges 
faced by the legislator in drafting copyright law. These included balancing the 
stakeholder interests and keeping up to date with technological developments, all the 
while keeping in line with developments in international laws and agreements. 
The second part of the chapter specifically considered section 17 of the CDPA 1988. 
This analysis looked closely at the wording of the legislation and highlighted ambiguities 
and inconsistencies within the law. It was demonstrated that the original intention of the 
law did not always apply easily to the development of new technologies and behaviours 
in the modern landscape. 
Finally, the Framework of Digital Perspectives was applied to section 17 CDPA 1988. 
The analysis demonstrated whilst the external perspective may have been the intention, 
as is seen throughout the section, internal perspectives were also found.  
In order to develop the understanding of the internal and external perspectives within the 
meaning of section 17 of the CDPA 1988, the next chapter will consider the case law 
that interprets these sections and applies it to cases of online activity. The subsections 
17(2) and 17(6) were selected as relevant for the case law analysis in the subsequent 
chapter.  
As Lord Atkin stated: “When these ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice clanking 
their mediaeval chains, the proper course is for the judge to pass through them 
undeterred.”712 However, it has been argued that in the case of copyright not only do the 
mediaeval chains remain, but they have been reinforced with late 20th century steel.713 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
710 See speech by Tony Blair on the Report Stage in PD HC 6th Ser. Vol 138 Cols 37-43. 
711 Hansard, 1442 Lord Cameron of Lochbroom Legislative Drafting, HL Deb 11 November 
1987 Vol 489 cc1417-49. 
712 Liversidge v Anderson [1941] AC 1 as per Lord Atkin at 29. 
713 Laddie J., Copyright: Over-Strength, Over-Regulated, Over-Rated? (1996) 18(5) European 
Intellectual Property Review, pp. 253-260, p. 260. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Online Copyright Infringement by Storage and Transient Copying; A 
Critical Analysis of the Case Law 
 
“It’s amazingly easy for a unicorn to completely disrupt a balloon factory. That’s 
because the factory is organized around a single idea…the unicorn changes all 
that.” Seth Godin, Tribes. 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter analysed the development of the CPDA 1988 followed by a focus 
on the specific wording of section 17 and in doing so highlighted ambiguities and 
inconsistencies within the law. It was demonstrated that the intended meaning of the law 
did not always apply easily to new technologies and behaviours in the modern 
landscape. In particular, it was recognised that sections 17(2) and 17(6) CDPA 1988 
were relevant to the investigation of online copyright infringement.  
In particular, whilst the intention of subsection 17(2) was to protect copyright material on 
a computer from an external perspective, the use of the term storage in this context was 
metaphorical which suggested an internal perspective.714 Similarly, in relation to 
subsection 17(6) the legislators struggled with technologically specific language taking 
an external perspective. However, the terminology used was also metaphorical in 
nature.715 
Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the case law that applies subsection 17(2) and 
17(6) in order to determine how the judges interpret and apply this regulation online. 
Further exploration is needed to ascertain the meaning of these sections and in 
particular, if they take on an internal or external perspective when applied to cases of 
online infringement.  
This chapter analyses the relevant case law relating to online copyright infringement by 
way of storage and transient copying. It considers how judges determine the facts of the 
case in relation to online activity; in particular whether they take an internal or external 
approach. This chapter looks at the application of the law to the facts, in order to 
																																								 																				
714 See chapter 3. 
715 See chapter 3. 
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determine the meaning of the subsections 17(2) and 17(6) CDPA 1988 within the context 
of the internet.  
There are four main tensions that are illuminated through analysing the case law relating 
to sections 17(2) and 17(6) CDPA 1988. The first, as the chapter demonstrates, is that 
over time the legal definition of both ‘storage’ and ‘transient copying’ has developed as 
technological developments have occurred. However, it questions whether, as a result, 
the broadening of the law now also encompasses access to and display of copyright 
materials. If so, this could contradict the closed lists of restricted acts and perhaps, 
undermines the aim of copyright to uphold a fair balance between stakeholders. 
Secondly, the analysis revealed that most often judges are seen to take an external 
perspective when describing the facts of the case as they take a considerable amount 
of time to understand in great detail the technical function of the process or program in 
question. This has led to a body of jurisprudence that is very technologically specific and 
therefore judges are faced with many cases of similar circumstances, that differ only 
slightly on technicality.  
Thirdly, and in contrast to the second point, the judges and counsel often attempt to map 
the law onto new technical circumstances, or to justify their arguments, with the use of 
analogy. Within the Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives set out in chapter 
2, this is considered an internal approach. The analogies used are often offline similes, 
metaphors or skeumorphs.716 This demonstrates the attempt to understand new 
technologies, and how the law applies to them, through the use of previous knowledge 
and understanding. Whilst this is a natural human response to cognitively digesting a 
new experience or phenomenon;717 there are disadvantages of using such an approach 
in the application of the law. The general drawbacks of using such an approach are set 
out in detail in chapter 2. However, for the purpose of this chapter the main argument is 
that applying the law to online activity as if it were offline activity can be inaccurate, 
misleading and inappropriate.  
																																								 																				
716 A skeumorph is the reuse of old concepts for new phenomena; see chapter 2 for more detail.  
717 In psychology, this is understood as a schema. Schemas are mental structures that humans 
use to organise their knowledge about the world. Schema theory was developed by Bartlett who 
argued that prior knowledge is stored in the brain in the form of schemas, which provide one of 
the main ways in which information in memory is organised. See, Bartlett F. C., Remembering: 
A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
1932). This was developed by Rumelhart and Norman who suggested that schema learning 
occurs in three ways, including ‘accretion’. This is where a new example of an existing schema 
is recorded and added to the relevant schematic information in long term memory. See, 
Rumelhart D. E. and Norman D. A., Analogical Processes in Learning in Anderson J. R. (ed) 
Cognitive Skills and Their Acquisition (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc; 1981). 
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Finally, the analysis of the case law also revealed that there is no longer a clear 
distinction between ‘storage’ and ‘transient copying’, when applying these subsections 
of the CDPA 1988 to the current technological landscape. There are some cases that 
clearly demonstrated the traditional view; that storage on a computer involves storage of 
material over time, whereas, transient copying is only temporary. However, the more 
recent case law focuses more on temporary storage within the Random Access Memory 
(RAM) of a computer or a server, demonstrating a clear overlap. From an external 
perspective, under both circumstances a copy is made in the memory of the computer. 
The only difference from a literal perspective would be that storage requires the passage 
of time. However, the Courts do not appear to apply storage in this way in relation to 
transient storage which is temporary. 
From an internal perspective, transient copying occurs automatically by the computer 
and without direct action, knowledge or perception of the user. However, long term 
storage implies that the user has saved the work, taking a direct action with the 
knowledge and understanding that a copy has been made. The analysis in this chapter 
illuminates the Courts’ struggle with this tension. 
In order to demonstrate these arguments this chapter first considers the case law that 
relates to section 17(2); infringement by the storage of a copyright work. This is followed 
by a consideration of the case law that relates to subsection 17(6); infringement by 
transient and incidental copying.  
 
Storing the Work by Any Technical Means: What Does It Mean? 
 
As mentioned, this section analysis the state of the law in relation to section 17(2) of the 
CDPA 1988, which provided that “copying in relation to a work means reproducing the 
work in any material form. This includes storing the work in any medium by electronic 
means.”718 
	
	
	
																																								 																				
718 CDPA 1988, section 17(2). 
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The Origin of Storage: Serendipity or Misunderstanding? 
	
The previous chapter set out the circumstances under which this clause arose.719 This 
analysis revealed that the original intention of the clause was to protect stored work as 
a copyright work in itself,720 in the event that somebody else might try to steal the work 
and there was no other version of the work written down in a recorded form.721  
This clause was first introduced prior to the CDPA 1988, by way of the Copyright 
(Computer Software) Amendment Act 1985 which amended the Copyright Act 1956. The 
suggestion for a clause to protect copyright work stored on a computer came from Lord 
Coville, who admitted to having limited computer knowledge.722 His justification was 
based on the idea that a work stored in a computer memory might be the only copy a 
creator could rely on – should the computer shut down and fail to save the work and in 
the meantime someone had stolen a copy of that work.723 He stated that his intention 
was to make sure that where a work had “not yet been written down it is still protected.”724 
This statement appeared to contradict the requirement that copyright only subsists in a 
literary, dramatic or musical work once it is recorded or written down.725 
Nevertheless the suggestion was accepted by Lord McIntosh for the Whitford 
Committee, who expressed gratitude for Lord Coville’s expertise and also admitted to 
having “no particular knowledge of copyright law.”726 Lord Mcintosh did suggest that the 
concept of storage on a computer should only be relevant when it related to “the concept 
of access to that work and the use of that work.”727 Meaning that storing a work on a 
computer should not invoke copyright, unless the work that is in storage is accessed or 
used. However, this suggestion did not appear to be taken on board. 
Subsequently on behalf of the Government, Lord Brabazon728 affirmed that the main 
motivation for the clause was to protect a new copyright work created and stored on a 
computer: “It will also apply, for example, to a novel or to any other sort of work being 
																																								 																				
719 See chapter 3. 
720 Hansard, Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Bill, HL Deb 05 June 1985 vol 464 
cc823-9, Viscount Colville of Culross at 824. 
721 As required by CDPA 1988, section 3(2). 
722 Hansard, Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Bill, HL Deb 05 June 1985 vol 464 
cc823-9, Viscount Colville of Culross at 824. 
723 Ibid., Viscount Colville at 824. 
724 Ibid., Viscount Colville at 828. 
725 CDPA 1988, section 3(2). 
726 Hansard, Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Bill, HL Deb 05 June 1985 vol 464 
cc823-9, Lord McIntosh at 825. 
727 Ibid., Lord McIntosh at 825. 
728 Ibid., Lord Brabazon at 826. 
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written directly into computer storage. In so far as there is any doubt now that such a 
work is "fixed in material form", and therefore qualifies for copyright protection at the 
instant of its creation within the machine, the amendment will remove that doubt.”729 Lord 
Brabazon’s language suggested a level of misunderstanding on the technical functioning 
of a computer, what he meant by “written directly onto computer storage”730 is not clear.  
It is suggested that the true intention at the root of the clause was simply that copyright 
should protect works that were created on a computer. However, in their confusion of 
the way a computer works and the choice of terminology used it appeared as if the Lords 
were concerned about works that were only, or directly created, in computer storage. In 
light of a better understanding of the function of a computer, it is in fact unlikely that 
works of this description would ever exist. Nevertheless, the clause quickly extended the 
scope of copyright to encompass work stored on a computer. 
The interpretation of the concept as it has been used in the case law was therefore not 
the main intended purpose when the clause was drafted, although it was mentioned as 
an afterthought.731 Lord Brabazon argued that it was uncertain if an existing work was 
copied into a computer, whether or not this would constitute a ‘reproduction in a material 
form’ under copyright law.732 He argued that the copyright owner should be entitled to 
control this use of his work and suggested that the amendment should also apply equally 
to the loading of works onto a computer.733 
The Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act 1985 thus amended the Copyright 
Act 1956 to state that reproduction of any work in a material form included the storage 
of that work in a computer.734 Elsom argued that whilst the amendment “partially 
clarified”735 that storage of a work in a computer was a reproduction of the work, 
uncertainty remained. He stated that “the 1985 Amendment failed to clarify whether a 
copy stored in the machine-readable medium independent of the computer (for example, 
in or on a floppy disk, magnetic tape, etc.) is included. A residual uncertainty existed as 
to the status of copies in such machine-readable media”736 
 
																																								 																				
729 Ibid., Lord Brabazon at 826. 
730 Ibid., Lord Brabazon at 826. 
731 Ibid., Viscount Colville at 827: “I had not actually thought of all those arguments.” 
732 Ibid., Lord Brabazon at 826. 
733 Ibid., Lord Brabazon at 827. 
734 The Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act 1985, section 2. 
735 Elsom S. M., Copyright Aspects of Information Technology: the Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Bill (1988) 10(11) European Intellectual Property Review, pp. 326-330, p. 327. 
736 Ibid., p.327. 
114	
	
Keeping Up Appearances: Recovering Storage From Lost 
Property  
	
Subsequently however, in an interesting turn of events, the infringement of copyright by 
reproducing a work in the storage of a computer was omitted from the original CDPA 
1988 Bill. There is no clear explanation or evidence as to why the clause was missing 
from the Bill, but there are only two possible motives: by mistake, or on purpose.  
Either way, the Government were reminded by Miss Emma Nicholson, who declared a 
“professional interest”737 in computer programming, of the policy developments of the 
Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act 1985.738 As Litman highlighted: “No 
effected party is going to agree to support a bill that leaves it worse off than it is under 
[previous] law.”739 As a result, the Government were held to account on the keeping up 
of policy and the clause was reintroduced to the CPDA 1988 Bill.  
Furthermore, Miss Nicholson also highlighted that as a computer program was a literary 
work, it would fall within the scope of clause 29; fair dealing for the purposes of research 
and private study.740 She suggested that this was an unintended consequence which 
would not be welcomed by the industry and therefore recommended that electronic 
reproduction be excluded from the fair dealing defence.741 
Section 29 CDPA 1988 can now indeed be seen to reflect Miss Nicholson’s request. Fair 
dealing for the purpose of research and private study explicitly states that it is not fair 
dealing to “incidentally…copy”742 or even “observe”743 a computer program in order to 
determine the ideas and principles which underlie it. However, section 50BA(1)744 states 
that it is not an infringement to observe if it is done whilst loading, displaying, running, 
transmitting or storing the program.745 This clause reflects Article 5(3) of the Information 
																																								 																				
737 Hansard, Copyright, Designs and Patents Bill [Lords] HC Deb 28 April 1988 Vol 132 cc525-
99, Order for Second Reading read, Miss Emma Nicholson (Torridge and Devon, West) at 576: 
“I was trained by ICL as a computer programmer. I went on to be an assistant analyst and 
computer consultant with 10 years hands-on experience in the industry. I am now enjoying an 
industry and Parliament fellowship with IBM, and I maintain links with my old colleagues who 
are now senior members of the British Computer Society.” 
738 Ibid., Miss Emma Nicholson at 578. 
739 Litman J., Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books; 2006) p. 23.  
740 Hansard, Copyright, Designs and Patents Bill [Lords] HC Deb 28 April 1988 Vol 132 cc525-
99, Order for Second Reading read, Miss Emma Nicholson at 578. 
741 Ibid., Miss Emma Nicholson at 578. 
742 CDPA 1988, section 29(4)(b). 
743 CDPA 1988, section 29(4A). 
744 As inserted on 31.10.2003 by The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 
(S.I.2003/2498), reg. 15(1) (with regs. 31-40). 
745 CDPA 1988, section 50(BA)(1). This section reflects Article 5(3) of the Information Society 
Directive. 
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Society Directive, but appears to cause more confusion than clarity. As Onslow and 
Jamal argue, the section is a riddle: “if the loading and running has to be licensed in the 
first place, then art.5(3) serves no purpose. If the loading and running for testing does 
not have to be licensed in the first place, then why refer to a licence at all.”746  
Nevertheless section 17(2) has expanded the reach of copyright747 and restricts the act 
of storing a work in an electronic form.748 This analysis demonstrates that the clause was 
originally introduced with a substantial lack of computer and copyright knowledge and 
the justifications for the clause were not entirely thought through.749 In defence of the 
legislators, the use of computers at the time of drafting was limited.750 It is unlikely that 
they ever could have foreseen the developments in technology that were to follow.751 
However, their lack of awareness for these limitations is the true criticism to be made. 
As Viscount Coville optimistically concluded the clause “probably will work”752 and did 
not expect any unforeseen consequences: “there will not be a nasty lacuna in the legal 
protection.”753  
Furthermore, the strong influence of stakeholders’ interests was also evident from the 
analysis. Support for the policy to continue in the CDPA 1988 was given by the industry 
and Miss Nicholson had a particularly strong influence as an industry representative 
within the debate.754 The discussions were dominated by members with interests in 
industry and there appeared to be little consideration for the public interest at this 
stage.755 
Since 2001 temporary copying has been recognised at European level as an act that 
requires a copyright holder’s permission.756 The reproduction right under Article 2 of the 
																																								 																				
746 Onslow R. and Jamal I., Copyright Infringement and Software Emulation - SAS Inc v World 
Programming Limited Case Comment (2013) 35(6) European Intellectual Property Review, pp. 
352-356, pp. 354-355. 
747 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (London: 
Butterworths Law; 2011) 3.123. 
748 CDPA 1988, section 17(2). 
749 Hansard, Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Bill, HL Deb 05 June 1985 vol 464 
cc823-9, Lord McIntosh at 825. 
750 Ibid., Viscount Colville at 824. 
751 Football Association Premier League Ltd and others v QC Leisure and others [2008] EWHC 
1411 Ch, Kitchin J at 232: “I entertain some doubt as to whether those who framed the CDPA 
ever contemplated that displaying an image on a television screen amounts to copying.” 
752 Hansard, Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Bill, HL Deb 05 June 1985 vol 464 
cc823-9, Vicount Colville at 827. 
753 Ibid., Vicount Colville at 828. 
754 Hansard, Copyright, Designs and Patents Bill [Lords] HC Deb 28 April 1988 Vol 132 cc525-
99. 
755 Ibid. 
756 Information Society Directive. It is beyond the scope of this study to consider in detail the 
development of the Information Society Directive. Needless to say, it is relevant to mention at 
this point that this is currently a policy upheld and enforced at European level. 
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Information Society Directive required member states to “provide the exclusive right to 
authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any 
means and in any form, in whole or in part.”757 Therefore, the protection of temporary 
copying is also now a requirement under European Law. 
The chapter now turns to consider how judges have applied these statutory notions, in 
order to determine the meaning of the clause through the Courts interpretation.  
 
The Application and Interpretation of Infringement by Storage: 
An Analysis of the Relevant Case Law 
 
The cases addressed in this section are considered in chronological order to 
demonstrate how the meaning of infringement by storage has developed over time. In 
doing so this section will clarify the current state of the law in relation to storage, within 
the context of understanding how the meaning has developed. The focus of the analysis 
is how judges have determined the facts of the case in relation to the internet and 
thereafter how they have mapped section 17(2) onto the circumstances of the case.  
This chapter seeks to demonstrate the development of the meaning and interpretation 
of storage through the case law. Therefore the judgements where the meaning was 
defined, discussed or changed are explained in detail, although the knowledge and 
understanding of the full case law landscape is acknowledged and drawn upon where 
appropriate. 
In order to begin this analysis all of the relevant cases were collated. Firstly, it was found 
that there have been more than 90 cases that have referenced section 17 since the 
CDPA 1988 came into force.758 Within those cases there were more than 200 references 
to storage, made in 47 different cases.759  
A reading of these 47 cases showed that some cases were completely irrelevant to the 
context of this investigation, as ‘storage’ is a word with more than one meaning. These 
cases were excluded from the analysis. In addition, many cases only mentioned section 
																																								 																				
757 Ibid., Article 2. 
758 The CDPA 1988 received Royal Assent on 15 November 1988. 
759 These figures were obtained by the researcher through searching Westlaw and Lexis Library 
databases for cases referring to section 17 CDPA 1988. The judgements from these cases 
were then uploaded to Nvivo – a qualitative software analysis program. Using the software, the 
researcher was able to trace every mention of the word ‘storage’ in any case which the word 
appeared. This analysis for this chapter was completed by 20/12/2015.  
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17(2) in passing or referring to the CDPA 1988 in general and no discussion of its 
meaning or application took place. These cases were also excluded. This left 25 cases 
of relevance, of which there were over 50 judgements, all of which were read by the 
researcher.  
Of these cases, four were identified as the most significant in the development of the 
meaning of reproduction by way of storage by electronic means. These cases are Ocular 
Sciences,760 EasyInternetCafe,761 Navitaire762 and Meltwater.763 In these cases the judge 
gave particular consideration to the interpretation and meaning of section 17(2), whereas 
the majority of the other cases simply applied it without addressing the meaning.  
These cases demonstrate the development of the meaning of copyright infringement 
under section 17(2) over a significant period of time; taking place in 1996,764 2003,765 to 
2010.766 The first two cases focus on the meaning of storage, the third case focuses on 
the meaning of electronic means. The fourth and final case demonstrates the culmination 
of the development of the law in this area, considering all aspects of section 17(2) CDPA 
1988. These cases are discussed in detail below. 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
760 Ocular Sciences Ltd and Another v Aspect Vision Care Ltd and Others (First Action); 
Geoffrey Harrison Galley v Ocular Sciences Ltd (Second Action) [1997] R.P.C. 289. 
761 Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Limited, Sony Music Entertainment Inc., Polydor Limited, 
UMG Recordings Inc., Virgin Records Limited v Easyinternetcafe Limited [2003] EWHC 62 (Ch). 
762 Navitaire Inc v EasyJet Airline Company Limited, Bullet Proof Technologies Inc. [2003] 
EWHC 3487 (Ch). 
763 The Newspaper Licensing Agency Limited, MGN Limited, Associated Newspapers Limited, 
Express Newspapers Limited, Guardian News and Media Limited, Telegraph Media Group 
Limited, Independent Print Limited v Meltwater Holding BV, Meltwater News UK Limited, Public 
Relations Consultants Association Limited [2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch). 
764 Ocular Sciences Ltd and Another v Aspect Vision Care Ltd and Others (First Action); 
Geoffrey Harrison Galley v Ocular Sciences Ltd (Second Action) [1997] R.P.C. 289. 
765 Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Limited, Sony Music Entertainment Inc., Polydor Limited, 
UMG Recordings Inc., Virgin Records Limited v Easyinternetcafe Limited [2003] EWHC 62 (Ch); 
Navitaire Inc v EasyJet Airline Company Limited, Bullet Proof Technologies Inc. [2003] EWHC 
3487 (Ch). 
766 The Newspaper Licensing Agency Limited, MGN Limited, Associated Newspapers Limited, 
Express Newspapers Limited, Guardian News and Media Limited, Telegraph Media Group 
Limited, Independent Print Limited v Meltwater Holding BV, Meltwater News UK Limited, Public 
Relations Consultants Association Limited [2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch). 
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Case Law Analysis: Section 17(2) CDPA 1988 
 
Storage as a Verb: The Act of Storing in Ocular Sciences v 
Aspect Vision Care 
 
In 1996 in the case of Ocular Sciences767 Mr Justice Laddie made the first significant 
judgement that considered the meaning of “reproducing the work in any material form. 
This includes storing the work in any medium by electronic means.”768 In particular this 
case considered the application and meaning of storing the work. 
In this matter, the plaintiffs alleged the infringement of their contact-lens design program 
through reproduction and storage by electronic means.769 The defendants conceded to 
reproduction but not to copying by storing; arguing that being in storage is insufficient to 
amount to storage within the meaning of the CDPA 1988 [emphasis added].770 
Thus, Justice Laddie considered the nature of the infringing act required to amount to 
copyright infringement in this context.771 He emphasised that ‘act’ is a verb; a ‘doing-
word’ that requires action taken by the alleged infringer: “the statute gives the copyright 
proprietor the exclusive right “to do” certain “acts”. Those acts include “to copy”. The 
copyright is infringed by a person who “does” any of those acts…in relation to a 
substantial part of the work. Furthermore, the concept of activity is consistent with the 
subsequent subsections in section 17.”772 
This interpretation suggested the need for a conscious and deliberate action by a person 
in order to constitute an infringement, as opposed to automatic copying by the computer 
system. Therefore, through this interpretation Justice Laddie appeared to take a literal 
reading of the law and an external perspective of the application of section 17(2) to online 
activity.  
He went on to describe the activity of putting something into computer storage which 
creates a digital copy of the work, from a technology perspective.773 For example, he 
described the technical function of storing such as by magnetic floppy disk or hard drive. 
																																								 																				
767 Ocular Sciences Ltd and Another v Aspect Vision Care Ltd and Others (First Action); 
Geoffrey Harrison Galley v Ocular Sciences Ltd (Second Action) [1997] R.P.C. 289. 
768 CDPA 1988, section 17(2). 
769 Ibid., Justice Laddie at 417. 
770 Ibid., Justice Laddie at 417. 
771 Ibid., Justice Laddie at 418. 
772 Ibid., Justice Laddie at 418. 
773 Ibid., Justice Laddie at 418. 
119	
	
He then used this technological basis to apply the CDPA 1988 wording of ‘storing in any 
medium by electronic means’ to confirm that copying by magnetic storage constitutes 
reproduction in a material form.774 This represented an external perspective by 
considering the technical function on the hardware and software.  
Justice Laddie concluded that in order to infringe by storing a work, an action must have 
been performed by the infringer; that action being retrieving the work out of storage or 
saving it to storage.775 He supported this by highlighting the distinction between being in 
possession of a floppy disk which was not of itself an infringement; whereas using the 
disk to retrieve the data out of storage could be.776 The facts of the case were such that 
it was clear that the defendants had altered the program in question. Justice Laddie 
inferred from this that once the change had been made, the program would have been 
saved and that amounted to the act of storing and thus an infringement of copyright.777 
This case demonstrated the judge taking a literal reading of the law and an external 
perspective when determining the facts of the case as he considered the technical 
process of copying by storage, specifically on a floppy disc.778 In his application of the 
law he took a literal reading of section 17(2) in order to support his decision.  
In relation to the meaning of storage Justice Laddie interpreted the CDPA 1988 to grant 
a copyright holder the exclusive right to do certain acts, therefore infringement is an act 
performed without permission. He described infringement by storage as when a person 
saves a work or retrieves it from storage without permission.779 Hence, at this stage, 
storage of a work could be described as a verb. Subsequently this concept of storage as 
a verb was developed further in the case of EasyInternetCafe780 to include an involuntary 
action; thus, an involuntary verb, discussed in the following section. 
		
	
	
																																								 																				
774 Ibid., Justice Laddie at 418. 
775 Ibid., Justice Laddie at 418. 
776 Ibid., Justice Laddie at 418. 
777 Ibid., Justice Laddie at 418. 
778 Ibid., Justice Laddie at 418. 
779 Ibid., Justice Laddie at 418. 
780 Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Limited, Sony Music Entertainment Inc., Polydor Limited, 
UMG Recordings Inc., Virgin Records Limited v Easyinternetcafe Limited [2003] EWHC 62 (Ch) 
as per Justice Peter Smith. 
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Storage as a Voluntary Verb: Sony Music v EasyInternetCafe 
 
The meaning of storing the work under section 17(2) CDPA 1988 was again considered 
in 2003 by The Honourable Mr Justice Peter Smith in the matter of Sony Music v 
EasyInternetCafe.781  
In this case the judge was asked to consider the lawfulness of a CD burning service 
made available by an internet café.782	At EasyInternetCafe customers could download 
files from the internet and save them onto a private directory on the café’s server, 
identified by reference to the personal ID of the customer.783 The customer could then 
request a member of EasyInternetCafe staff to download the files from their ‘private area’ 
on the server onto a CD.784 
The defendant’s evidence, which was accepted by the judge,785 was that staff were 
prohibited from looking at the contents of any files, unless the customer agreed.786 In 
addition, the log-on process displayed a significant number of copyright infringement 
warnings to customers.787 
The then Mr Richard Arnold QC argued for the defence that the circumstances were 
comparable to a situation where A sends an infringing copy of a literary or artistic work 
to B by fax or email; the copy is made by B's machine but the person who caused it to 
be made was A.788 Therefore, the person who did the restricted act was A, and not B.789 
He drew a similar analogy with an Internet Service Provider (ISP) whose computer stored 
an infringing copy being transmitted from A to B, but was not responsible for that act of 
copying.790 
Mr Arnold anticipated that the claimants would argue that the situation was different 
because the defendant’s employee operated the machine so there had been human 
intervention.791 However, he argued that this made no difference because the files were 
anonymous and therefore the human being was an automaton.792 To demonstrate this, 
																																								 																				
781 Ibid. 
782 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 1. 
783 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 6. 
784 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 7. 
785 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 8. 
786 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 8. 
787 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 8. 
788 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 31. 
789 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 31. 
790 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 31. 
791 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 32. 
792 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 32. An automaton is a moving mechanical device made in 
imitation of a human being. 
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he drew a further analogy where A asks a blind person B to photocopy a piece of paper, 
which contains a copyright work; the blind person had no knowledge of what was being 
copied and acts as an automaton carrying out A's instructions.793 
Mr Arnold’s argument built upon the reasoning set out in the Ocular Science794 matter 
discussed above. As did Justice Laddie, Mr Arnold interpreted the CPDA 1988 to require 
an act of infringement as a verb, whereby the infringer physically does something. Arnold 
used this argument on its head to suggest that his clients were not guilty as the act was 
done blindly or in a robotic, unconscious manner.795 Arnold’s arguments were 
metaphoric, using offline similes in attempt to map copyright law onto new technologies. 
This approach is a clear example of using the internal perspective.  
However, the judge in this matter, the Honourable Mr Justice Peter Smith, did not accept 
Arnold’s arguments, for two reasons.796 Firstly, the liability for infringement under section 
17 is strict so there is no defence for copying without knowledge.797  
Though, importantly, he did distinguish between copying without knowledge and 
involuntary copying: “Obviously, when strict liability is pushed to its boundaries absurd 
results can arise. It would be absurd if the recipient of a fax over which he has no control 
could be said to be infringing it merely because his machine is the one that prints the 
transmission. Generally, the owner of a fax machine cannot stop material being sent. He 
is an involuntary copier. The same occurs in relation to the Internet Service Provider.”798  
The judge used the idea of a fax machine as a skeumorph to understand how the law 
relates to ISP liability, also using an internal perspective in the application of copyright 
law. However, in his case comment, Garnett disagreed with the judge’s arguments, 
stating that “there is no potential absurdity. In both these cases the recipient is not an 
involuntary copier: he is not a copier at all. The copier is the person who is the proximate 
cause of the copy being made, which in each case is the sender. The rule of strict liability 
can sometimes produce harsh results but not, it is suggested, absurd ones since the 
question is always: who is the copier?”799 
																																								 																				
793 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 32. 
794 Ocular Sciences Ltd and Another v Aspect Vision Care Ltd and Others (First Action); Galley 
v Ocular Sciences Ltd (Second Action) [1997] R.P.C. 289. 
795 Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Limited, Sony Music Entertainment Inc., Polydor Limited, 
UMG Recordings Inc., Virgin Records Limited v Easyinternetcafe Limited [2003] EWHC 62 (Ch) 
Justice Peter Smith at 32. 
796 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 37. 
797 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 33. 
798 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 33.  
799 Garnett K., The Easyinternetcafe Decision Case Comment (2003) 25(9) European 
Intellectual Property Review, pp. 426-427, p. 426. 
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Nevertheless, on this first point relating to strict liability, the judge stated that the decision 
to keep the information confidential was voluntary.800 To expand, he used the analogy of 
a high street printer who photocopies a PhD thesis that contained infringing material, he 
would not know this, but he would still be liable.801 The judge concluded that to accept 
the arguments of Mr Arnold would be to introduce a mens rea defence where none was 
available.802 
The second reason that the judge disagreed with Mr Arnold’s argument was in relation 
to the analogy, described above, of the blind person making an infringing photocopy 
without knowledge. The judge rebutted Arnold’s argument by stating that if a blind person 
was asked to copy something without taking precautions to check whether or not the 
matter potentially infringed copyright, he could not see how that would avoid the strict 
liability of infringement.803 
The judge found that on the evidence, the material was downloaded in an unauthorised 
way by the customers804 and having rejected the defence argument, EasyInternetCafe 
were liable.805  
In relation to the Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives, this judgement took 
a literal reading of the law and rejected Arnold’s internal perspective when determining 
the facts of the case. The scope of infringement by storage was defined to include 
copying without knowledge, however the judge did suggest that there would not be 
liability for involuntary copying.806  
On the other hand, the judge and counsel both used analogies in order to support their 
arguments for how the law should apply to this situation; this metaphorical approach is 
in line with the internal perspective. 
Ritchie’s case comment argued that the potential copying by a passive third party ISP, 
or fax machine, and that of the defendants is essentially the same.807 She stated that 
“the difference in the acts carried out in each case can be viewed as only a matter of 
																																								 																				
800 Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Limited, Sony Music Entertainment Inc., Polydor Limited, 
UMG Recordings Inc., Virgin Records Limited v Easyinternetcafe Limited [2003] EWHC 62 (Ch) 
Justice Peter Smith at 35. 
801 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 35. 
802 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 35. 
803 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 36. 
804 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 25. 
805 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 37. 
806 Ibid., Justice Peter Smith at 33. 
807 Ritchie M., Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd v Easyinternetcafe Ltd January 28, 2003 
(2003) 14(6) Entertainment Law Review, pp. 155-156, p. 156. 
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scale and automation, in terms of the volume of data processing/copying carried out, 
and in each case profits are intended to be made from the service.”808 
This case developed the meaning of infringement by way of storage to exclude 
involuntary copying. Although strict liability applied and no mens rea was introduced, 
the judge found that it was relevant that the action was voluntary. In the next key 
judgement that considered the meaning of section 17(2) CDPA 1988, the focus moved 
from the meaning of storage to the meaning of reproduction in any material form.  
 
Reproducing in Any Material Form: The Software Dilemma in 
Navitaire v EasyJet 
 
Subsequently, in the case of Navitaire v EasyJet809 the meaning of section 17(2) CDPA 
1988 continued to develop. Unlike the previous cases, the focus of this matter was on 
reproducing the work in any material form.810 In this case the claimants argued that their 
airline booking software; OpenRes,811 was infringed by the defendant’s software; 
eRes,812 which replaced its own as the booking service for Easy Jet Airways.813 
In the first instance Mr Justice Pumfrey was asked to strike out the allegations of 
infringement on the grounds that the allegations were so incoherent that they were 
untriable.814 However, Pumfrey found	 that there was a legitimate case for trial.815 He 
resolved that there was no dispute that the actual code in the eRes had no resemblance 
to that of OpenRes.816 On the other hand he stated that “from the user’s point of view”817 
the eRes system operated in the same way as OpenRes.818 For example, the functions 
available to the user, the screens which were displayed to the user, the steps which the 
user took to book a passenger onto a flight and clear a credit card payment.819 The 
applicants gave examples of this by way of ‘walk-throughs’ which followed a customer 
																																								 																				
808 Ibid., p. 156. 
809 Navitaire Inc v EasyJet Airline Company Limited, Bullet Proof Technologies Inc. [2003] 
EWHC 3487 (Ch). 
810 CDPA 1988, section 17(2). 
811 Navitaire Inc v EasyJet Airline Company Limited, Bullet Proof Technologies Inc. [2003] 
EWHC 3487 (Ch) Mr Justice Pumfrey at 2. 
812 Ibid., Mr Justice Pumfrey at 3. 
813 Ibid., Mr Justice Pumfrey at 2. 
814 Ibid., Mr Justice Pumfrey at 1. 
815 Ibid., Mr Justice Pumfrey at 47. 
816 Ibid., Mr Justice Pumfrey at 4. 
817 Ibid., Mr Justice Pumfrey at 5. 
818 Ibid., Mr Justice Pumfrey at 5. 
819 Ibid., Mr Justice Pumfrey at 6. 
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through the system who books and purchases a ticket, is checked in and then boards a 
flight.820 
It was argued that the functional structure of the OpenRes system was copied by 
eRes.821 Pumfrey acknowledged that the coding of the programs were different but that 
the outcome on the screen, from the user’s perspective, appeared the same.822 To 
support this, the analogy of taking the plot of a book was used.823 Pumfrey explained that 
“in the same way that copyright subsisting in a literary work may be infringed by a change 
in medium in which all that is taken is the plot, so also, it is said, may the copyright in 
computer software be infringed when the functional structure of the code is appropriated 
by writing different code which, put crudely, works in the same way.”824 
Pumfrey acknowledged that an allegation of infringement of copyright is fact-sensitive.825 
As was discussed in chapter 2, the law is contingent on the facts and the facts are 
contingent on the perspective.826 
Stokes argued that Pumfrey took the correct approach in balancing the stakeholder’s 
interests: “The judge was signalling that it is not the place of copyright law to protect the 
functionality produced by running code where the code has itself not been copied… 
Whilst this decision will alarm some in the IT industry, it is submitted that in this case the 
judge got the balance right.”827 
On the other hand, Heritage and Jones argued that the decision left software developers 
vulnerable: “It appears that competitors can now copy the general “look and feel” of a 
program's function and “business logic” with relative confidence, provided they do not 
have access to the original program's source code.”828 
From the perspective of the Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives, he 
therefore considered there to be no similarities from an external perspective, but many 
																																								 																				
820 Ibid., Mr Justice Pumfrey at 31. 
821 Ibid., Mr Justice Pumfrey at 7. 
822 Ibid., Mr Justice Pumfrey at 7. 
823 Ibid., Mr Justice Pumfrey at 8. 
824 Ibid., Mr Justice Pumfrey at 7. 
825 Ibid., Mr Justice Pumfrey at 8. 
826 Kerr O. S., The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal, 
pp. 357-405, p. 362. See chapter 2, Part 1. 
827 Stokes S., The Development of UK Software Copyright Law: From John Richardson 
Computers to Navitaire (2005) 11(4) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, pp. 129-
133, p. 133. 
828 Heritage M. and Jones P., The End of "Look and Feel" and the Invasion of the Little Green 
Men? UK Copyright and Patent Protection for Software After 2005 (2006) 12(3) Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review, pp. 67-70, p. 69. 
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from an internal perspective. Taking the internal perspective in this matter, determined 
that the screen displayed for the user could be copyright infringement.  
Nevertheless, the case proceeded to trial before Mr Justice Pumfrey,829 who eventually 
decided that the claim could not be substantiated.830 He explained that whilst he was 
impressed by the amount of programming effort that went into the display of every lay 
out on the screen, the defendants manipulated the data in a different way and displayed 
it in a different way; therefore, this did not amount to substantial part.831 Therefore, 
Pumfrey utilised the literal approach, steering away from a purposive approach such as 
the mischief rule. For example, it could have been argued that the mischief the regulation 
sought to remedy was the copying of work and the new website achieved a copy of the 
original, albeit with different coding.  
Whilst this case was fundamentally about copyright infringement in computer software, 
it is relevant to this chapter for two reasons. Firstly, in its application of section 17(2) 
CDPA 1988 the threshold of ‘reproducing in any material form’ was not reached despite 
the similarities of interface and functionality when the coding behind the scenes was 
original.  
Secondly, this was an important decision in relation to how the Courts considered both 
the technical function and user perspective. The case highlighted examples of analogies 
used to understand how copyright can be mapped onto new technological 
circumstances. The analogy supported the applicant’s claim originally, however, as the 
matter proceeded to trial, Mr Justice Pumfrey took a very technical approach. He 
considered closely the coding and technical process of creating the software, on which 
basis, he found that there had been no copyright infringement.  
The discussion now turns to the final key case in the analysis of section 17(2) CDPA 
1988, which brings together all the elements discussed so far of infringement by 
reproducing a work in any material form, including storage. 
 
																																								 																				
829 Navitaire Inc v EasyJet Airline Company Limited, Bullet Proof Technologies Inc. [2004] 
EWHC 1725 (Ch). 
830 Ibid., Mr Justice Pumfrey at 321. 
831 Ibid., Mr Justice Pumfrey at 321. 
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The Culmination of Section 17(2) in the Meltwater Saga: 
Reproduction in any Material Form by Storing work as a Cache 
Copy  
	
Meltwater in the First Instance: The Inapplicable 
Exception Under Section 28A CDPA 1988 
	
In 2010 the meaning and application of section 17(2) CDPA 1988 culminated in the 
matter of Meltwater.832 In this case Mrs Justice Proudman considered if the receivers833 
of a news service provided by Meltwater834 required a licence from the rights holders.835 
The applicants836 claimed that without a licence the end-users of Meltwater’s service 
infringed their copyright because “by receiving and reading Meltwater News the end user 
will be making a copy of it.”837 Moreover, they argued that by clicking on the link to the 
article the end-user would make a further copy of the article.838  
Proudman agreed that when an end-user received an email containing Meltwater News, 
a copy was made on their computer and remained there until deleted.839 Further, when 
the end-user viewed Meltwater News via the website on-screen, another copy was made 
on end-user’s computer.840 Thus, she stated that this was more likely than not to infringe 
copyright.841  
The defendants sought to rely on the exception set out in section 28A CDPA 1988, which 
required the following to be achieved:842  
1. The act must be temporary, 
																																								 																				
832 The Newspaper Licensing Agency Limited, MGN Limited, Associated Newspapers Limited, 
Express Newspapers Limited, Guardian News and Media Limited, Telegraph Media Group 
Limited, Independent Print Limited v Meltwater Holding BV, Meltwater News UK Limited, Public 
Relations Consultants Association Limited [2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch). 
833 Ibid., at 4: The third defendant was the Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd who 
represented the interests of its members who are UK public relations providers using the 
Meltwater News service. 
834 Ibid., at 3: The first defendant was Meltwater, who provided a commercial media monitoring 
service called ‘Meltwater News’ to business customers online. 
835 Ibid., Mr Justice Proudman at 6 and 22. 
836 Ibid., at 1: The first claimant was the Newspaper Licensing Agency Limited and the other 
claimants are publishers of national newspapers and are shareholder members of NLA. 
837 Ibid., Justice Proudman at 45.1. 
838 Ibid., Justice Proudman at 45.2. 
839 Ibid., Justice Proudman at 101. 
840 Ibid., Justice Proudman at 101. 
841 Ibid., Justice Proudman at 103.  
842 Ibid., at 106 Justice Proudman set out the requirements which were established by the CJEU 
in  Infopaq International AS v Danske Dagblades Forening (Case C-5/08) 16 July 2009 at 54. 
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2. It must be transient or incidental, 
3. It must be an integral and essential part of the technological process, 
4. The sole purpose of the process must be to enable a transmission network 
between third parties by an intermediary or the lawful use of the work or protected 
subject matter, and 
5. The act must have no independent economic significance.843  
 
The Court added that the act of making the temporary and transient copy must not 
exceed what is necessary for the proper completion of the technological process844 and 
that the storage and deletion must not be dependent on human intervention; it must be 
automated.845 
The defendants in the Meltwater846 case argued that the user’s actions were incidental 
to browsing and therefore fell within the exception.847 They relied on recital 33 of the 
Information Society Directive which permitted “acts which enable browsing as well as 
acts of caching to take place.”848 
Proudman clarified that the purpose of the exception was to ensure that the incidental 
storage of copies of a work on, for example, intermediate computer servers between a 
web-server and the computer running a web-browser used by an end-user would be 
exempt.849 The test was whether the temporary reproduction had no “independent 
economic significance.”850 This meant that any act of reproduction that in effect was a 
“consumption of the work,”851 including temporary copying into memory in order to use 
or access such works, required the permission of the right holder.852 
																																								 																				
843 Ibid. 
844 Infopaq International AS v Danske Dagblades Forening (Case C-5/08) 16 July 2009 at 61-
64. 
845 Ibid., at 61-64. 
846 The Newspaper Licensing Agency Limited, MGN Limited, Associated Newspapers Limited, 
Express Newspapers Limited, Guardian News and Media Limited, Telegraph Media Group 
Limited, Independent Print Limited v Meltwater Holding BV, Meltwater News UK Limited, Public 
Relations Consultants Association Limited [2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch) 
847 Ibid., at 107. 
848 Ibid., at 107 referring to Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society, recital 33. 
849 Ibid., at 108. 
850 Ibid., at 108 referring to Kitchin J in Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure 
[2008] EWHC 1411(Ch) at para 241-2 who provided that “the opinion of the Economic and 
Social Committee (of September 9, 1998) on an early draft of the Directive explained the 
purpose of the exception as follows…The test is whether the temporary reproduction has no 
independent economic significance.” 
851 Ibid., Justice Proudman at 109. 
852 Ibid. Justice Proudman at 109. 
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Therefore, the exception was concerned only with incidental and transient copies which 
had no value in themselves and any copy which was a consumption of the work, whether 
temporary or not, required the permission of the copyright holder.853 Proudman stated 
that “a person making a copy of a webpage on his computer screen will not have a 
defence under s. 28A CDPA simply because he has been browsing.”854 
The judge found that the exception was inapplicable in the present case855 and as a 
result, the end-users infringed the applicant’s copyright when receiving and using the 
Meltwater service.856 She stated that “the whole point of the receipt and copying of 
Meltwater News is to enable the end user to receive and read it. Making the copy is not 
an essential and integral part of a technological process but the end which the process 
is designed to achieve. Storage of the copy and the duration of that storage are matters 
within the end user's control.”857 Thus, the exception cannot be used to legitimise copies 
made in the course of browsing.858  
Hobson criticised the judgement, arguing that it created uncertainty and illustrated an 
inconsistency in the application of the law of copyright infringement.859 He doubted the 
expertise of the judge, highlighting that the case had not been listed before one of the 
four specialist IP judges in the Chancery Division.860  
Hart appeared to be more understanding of Proudman’s approach but nevertheless also 
disagreed with her decision: “Piracy greatly concerned Proudman J	who felt that the 
exception cannot have been intended to legitimise all copies made in the course of 
browsing as otherwise users would be permitted to watch pirated films and listen to 
pirated music…	 However viewing and watching protected works are not restricted 
copyright acts.”861 
Evidently, the case proceeded to the Court of Appeal on the basis of what resulted from 
Proudman’s judgement would require double-licensing.862 To support this argument the 
																																								 																				
853 Ibid., Justice Proudman at 109. 
854 Ibid., Justice Proudman at 109. 
855 Ibid., Justice Proudman at 112. 
856 Ibid., Justice Proudman at 148. 
857 Ibid., Justice Proudman at 109. 
858 Ibid., Justice Proudman at 110. 
859 Hobson A., Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Meltwater Holdings BV (2011) 22(3) 
Entertainment Law Review, pp. 101-104, p. 101. 
860 Ibid., p. 101. 
861 Hart M., The Legality of Internet Browsing in the Digital Age (2014) 36(10) European 
Intellectual Property Review, pp. 630-639, p. 633. 
862 The Newspaper Licensing Agency Limited, MGN Limited, Associated Newspapers Limited, 
Express Newspapers Limited, Guardian News and Media Limited, Telegraph Media Group 
Limited, Independent Print Limited v Meltwater Holding BV, Meltwater News UK Limited, Public 
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second defendants (PRCA) used the analogy of the press clippings agency; who require 
a licence from the publishers to make ‘hard’ copies but do not require a licence to receive 
and read them.863 The PRCA, thus argued that Meltwater’s licence should encompass 
copies made when received and read by the end-user.864 
In relation to the section 28A CDPA 1988 exception argument put forward by PRCA865, 
the Court of Appeal agreed with Proudman J and further commented that “the acts of 
reproduction are those occasioned by the voluntary human process of accessing that 
webpage.”866 
The Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with Proudman J and her original 
judgement.867 However, the Court did consider Proudman to have gone too far in her 
declaration and clarified that it is not the case that every recipient and/or user of 
Meltwater News would inevitably infringe the copyright so as to require a licence or 
consent from the publisher.868  
The concept of “voluntary human process”869 builds on the comments found in the above-
mentioned cases of Ocular Sciences870 and EasyInternetCafe.871 The case law so far 
has shown the Courts finding that by the ‘act’ of ‘accessing’ a webpage, which by the 
inherent technical process makes a copy in the computer’s memory, a user can infringe 
copyright. This appears consistent in light of the fact that storage of the work in a 
computer memory has been found to constitute material form.872 However, did this 
extend the scope of reproduction too far? 
 
																																								 																				
Relations Consultants Association Limited [2011] EWCA Civ 890, Before: The Chancellor of the 
High Court and Lord Justice Elias, Judgement: Lord Justice Jackson at 6. 
863 Ibid., Lord Justice Jackson at 6. 
864 Ibid., Lord Justice Jackson at 6. 
865 See obiter, p. 107. 
866 The Newspaper Licensing Agency Limited, MGN Limited, Associated Newspapers Limited, 
Express Newspapers Limited, Guardian News and Media Limited, Telegraph Media Group 
Limited, Independent Print Limited v Meltwater Holding BV, Meltwater News UK Limited, Public 
Relations Consultants Association Limited [2011] EWCA Civ 890, Lord Justice Jackson at 35. 
867 Ibid., Lord Justice Jackson at 48. 
868 Ibid., Lord Justice Jackson at 48. 
869 Ibid., Lord Justice Jackson at 35. 
870 Ocular Sciences Ltd and Another v Aspect Vision Care Ltd and Others (First Action); Galley 
v Ocular Sciences Ltd (Second Action) [1997] R.P.C. 289. 
871 Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Limited, Sony Music Entertainment Inc., Polydor Limited, 
UMG Recordings Inc., Virgin Records Limited v Easyinternetcafe Limited [2003] EWHC 62 (Ch). 
872 Bainbridge D.. I, Legislation: The Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act (1986) 
49(2) The Modern Law Review, pp. 214-224, p. 218. 
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Meltwater in the Supreme Court: Referring to the CJEU 
	
The matter went before the Supreme Court in February 2013,873 which recognised that 
this appeal raised some important questions	about “the application of copyright law to 
the technical processes involved in viewing copyright material on the internet.”874 
The Supreme Court also stated that viewing or reading is not an act of infringement: “A 
person who reads a pirated copy of a protected book or views a forgery of a protected 
painting commits no infringement.”875 This statement appears to contradict the case law 
analysed above, which stated that accessing unlawful content was an infringement. 
However, the difficulty with the statement given by the Supreme Court is that it is an 
analogy. They use the example of reading a book or viewing a painting, which is not 
infringement, per se.876 However, when a person views or reads a book or a painting 
online, a copy is made in the memory of the computer. This exemplifies the tension 
between applying offline concepts online. The difference between reading online is 
significantly different to reading offline.  
Stokes and Reeves highlight the disadvantage of attempting to apply copyright law to 
modern technology by using a skeumorph, or offline metaphor in this way: “…it begs a 
lot of questions. Not least, why the Supreme Court felt so strongly that a web page should 
be equated to a printed book?	A printed book has limited circulation. A web page can 
receive millions of hits. And this case was about the commercial use of copyrighted 
material where the rights owners were willing to offer licences to end users.”877 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that as part of the ordinary technical process of the 
internet, temporary copies are made at several stages.878 They described in detail the 
technical process of ‘caching’, whereby copies are made without downloading, noting 
																																								 																				
873 Ocular Sciences Ltd and Another v Aspect Vision Care Ltd [2013] UKSC 18, before Lord 
Neuberger , President Lord Kerr Lord Clarke Lord Sumption Lord Carnwath, Judgement Given 
on 17 April 2013 by Lord Sumption (With Whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke and 
Lord Carnwath Agree). 
874 Ibid., Lord Sumption at 1. 
875 Ibid., Lord Sumption at 1. 
876 The act of reading or viewing does not create a copy of the work, per se. It could be argued, 
for the sake of highlighting the obscurity in the parallel argument, that a copy is made in the 
memory of the person’s brain who is viewing or reading. This is not a tangible, or necessarily a 
retrievable or sustainable copy; but these are not required in order to constitute “material form” 
as explained above. 
877 Stokes S. and Reeves S., UK Supreme Court Decides Web-Browsing Doesn't Infringe 
Copyright But Nevertheless Refers the Matter to the CJEU: PRCA Ltd v The NLA (2013) 24(5) 
Entertainment Law Review, pp. 174-176, p. 175. 
878 Ocular Sciences Ltd and Another v Aspect Vision Care Ltd [2013] UKSC 18 as per Mr 
Justice Laddie at 2. 
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that “it is a universal feature of current internet browsing technology.”879 The Supreme 
Court stated that these copies, along with the display of the work on the screen, are an 
incidental consequence to using a computer online and sets out to consider if these 
copies constitute infringement.880  
Sumption J took an internal perspective by considering the experience of the user. 
Furthermore, he found that the technical function that occurred in order to facilitate this 
experience was irrelevant. In doing so he disagreed with the approach taken by 
Proudman. As Hart explained: “Unlike Proudman J, who considered that the making of 
the copy was the objective of the end-user, Lord Sumption stressed that the end-user in 
this case does not set out to make a copy of the web page and that, unless he chooses 
to download or print it, his objective is simply to view the material.”881 
Nevertheless, the Court recognised that the issues at hand had a transnational 
dimension and resolved to refer to the European Union for guidance.882 The referral 
questioned whether acts of reproduction need to be temporary, transient or incidental 
and an integral part of the technological process, taking into consideration that copies 
are made in the ordinary use of the internet.883 
 
Meltwater in the CJEU: Moving Away From the UK 
Approach 
	
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) were satisfied that the temporary 
cache copying of material online met the five requirements of the exception, as set out 
above and addressed in the first instance by Proudman J. The CJEU confirmed that on-
screen copies and cached copies made by an end-user in the course of viewing a 
website satisfied the conditions that those copies must be temporary, that they must be 
transient or incidental in nature and that they must constitute an integral and essential 
																																								 																				
879 Ibid., Mr Justice Laddie at 2. 
880 Ibid., at 2. 
881 Hart M., The Legality of Internet Browsing in the Digital Age (2014) 36(10) European 
Intellectual Property Review, pp. 630-639, p. 635. 
882 The Newspaper Licensing Agency Limited, MGN Limited, Associated Newspapers Limited, 
Express Newspapers Limited, Guardian News and Media Limited, Telegraph Media Group 
Limited, Independent Print Limited v Meltwater Holding BV, Meltwater News UK Limited, Public 
Relations Consultants Association Limited [2011] EWCA Civ 890, Lord Justice Jackson at 38. 
883 Ibid., Lord Justice Jackson at 38. 
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part of a technological process and that they may therefore be made without the 
authorisation of the copyright holders.884  
In its reasoning the CJEU steered away from the UK understanding of voluntary copying 
by the act of accessing discussed above. Instead, the CJEU stated that on-screen copies 
and cached copies are created and deleted by the technological process885 and therefore 
it was irrelevant that the process was “activated by the internet user.”886 This reasoning 
encompassed both the internal and external perspectives. Firstly, the Court considered 
the technical function of the process, taking the external perspective. Ultimately, they 
acknowledged the user experience as prevailing, as the copying was made irrelevant to 
them by the technical process.  
This decision has been considered as the prevailing of a “common sense.”887 As a result, 
the CJEU avoided “potentially causing irreparable damage to the operation of the 
internet in Europe.”888 Therefore, it appears that the CJEU has offered the UK some relief 
from the restrictions of the overly technical approach taken in the case law. However, 
the implications of the Meltwater decision remain to be seen.889 
 
The Verdict on Reproduction by Storage 
 
Overall, the above case law analysis suggests that unlawful use can take many forms, it 
is a broad concept 890 and it is applied strictly.891 In light of this, copyright law appears to 
																																								 																				
884 Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd and others v Meltwater Holding BV and others (Case C-
360/13) 5 June 2014, [2014] A.C. 1438, President of Chamber: Bay Larsen L., Judges: Safjan 
M., Malenovský J., Prechal A., Jürimäe K., Advocate General: M Szpunar M. at 63. 
885 Ibid., at 29. 
886 Ibid., at 30. 
887 Baker A., EU Copyright Directive: does internet browsing require copyright licences? Public 
Relations Consultants Association Ltd v Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd (C-360/13) (the 
Meltwater case) Case Comment (2014) 25(7) Entertainment Law Review, pp. 257-261 at p. 
261. 
888 James S., And Breathe... You Can Continue Browsing the Internet, as The CJEU Hands 
Down its Decision in PRCA v NLA (2014) 20(6) Computer and Telecommunications Law 
Review, pp. 169-171, p 169. 
889 Baker A., EU Copyright Directive: does internet browsing require copyright licences? Public 
Relations Consultants Association Ltd v Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd (C-360/13) (the 
Meltwater case) Case Comment (2014) 25(7) Entertainment Law Review, pp. 257-261 at p. 
261. 
890 Indicii Salus Ltd. (In Receivership) v Garu Paran Chandrasekaran, Vanessa 
Chandrasekaran, Ssaneva Security Technologies [2007] EWHC 406 (Ch) as per Mr Justice 
Warren at 25. 
891 Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Limited, Sony Music Entertainment Inc., Polydor Limited, 
UMG Recordings Inc., Virgin Records Limited v Easyinternetcafe Limited [2003] EWHC 62 (Ch) 
at 33. 
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have developed from protecting copying of works to restricting the use of and access to 
copyright works.892 
So far, this chapter has demonstrated examples of cases which suggested that 
accessing copyright work can be an infringement, such as Lord McIntosh suggested in 
the process of drafting the CDPA 1988: “it is the accessing of the work which makes the 
act relevant to copyright restrictions.”893 
Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria argued that the approach taken by the UK Courts was 
“surely to defy common sense …[because]… machines do not infringe copyright; only 
persons do.”894 They justify this argument with the analogy of copying by hand as the 
person is “doing it…he whose hand guides the pen, and not he who happens to be the 
owner of the paper.”895 They recognised that the wording of the act does not identify the 
person who is responsible for the act and whilst there is no defence for being unaware, 
it does not mean that a person can be liable for an act he did not perform.896 
Nevertheless, as the case law analysis has demonstrated, strict liability has been applied 
by the UK Courts as to find liability where copying was made automatically by a machine 
without the requirement for knowledge. The Honourable Mr Justice Peter Smith made a 
distinction between copying without knowledge and involuntary copying,897 however, the 
subsequent case law essentially found that any person using a computer could be said 
to be taking a voluntary action by viewing, accessing, using a work via a computer.898 
Although, Lessig would argue that this is not a bad thing, and is indeed the future of 
copyright regulations: “Copyright law has got to give up its obsession with 'the copy.' The 
law should not regulate 'copies' or 'modern reproductions' on their own. It should instead 
regulate uses--like public distributions of copies of copyrighted work--that connect 
directly to the economic incentive copyright law was intended to foster.”899 
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895 Ibid., 14.14 
896 Ibid., 14.14 
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However, this approach was retracted to some extent by the CJEU in the Meltwater900 
case. It remains to be seen if the UK Courts will take on board the distinction in the 
reasoning made in order to reach this conclusion.901 
In relation to the Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives; the analysis 
demonstrated that both judges and counsel used both the internal and external 
perspectives in their interpretation and application of copyright law. In particular, the 
external perspective was used to understand the technical function of the network or 
process in question. On the other hand, a metaphorical approach was often taken to 
map the law onto the circumstances of the case; applying the law to old offline concepts 
to justify how it should apply to the new technology online.  
The case of Navitaire v EasyJet902 in particular demonstrated clearly the uncertainty and 
inconsistency in the law that transpires as a result of the changing of perspective. In the 
first instance, Justice Pumfrey took an internal perspective in favour of the applicants, 
he stated that the works were the same “from the user’s point of view.”903 However, his 
final decision took the external perspective as he recognised that the interface of the 
software was the same but the technical process behind the interface was different and 
therefore no copying had taken place.904 
Further, the Meltwater905 case also amplified how taking a purely external perspective, 
by only considering the technical function of the process can lead to obscure copyright 
law that encompasses all activity online. This also demonstrates the limitations of taking 
a purely literal approach, which can lead to absurdities.  However, the CJEU was able 
to take both the internal and external perspective to bring the law back into balance.906  
As mentioned, this chapter now turns to consider the case law that considers section 
17(6) CDPA 1988 in order to determine how the judges interpret and apply this part of 
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the regulation online. This ascertains the meaning of this subsection and in particular, if 
the take internal or external perspective is taken when applied to cases of online 
infringement. 
Case Law Analysis: Section 17(6) CDPA 1988 
	
Transient and Incidental Copying  
 
The chapter now moves to consider section 17(6) of the CDPA 1988 which states that: 
“copying in relation to any description of work includes the making of copies which are 
transient or are incidental to some other use of the work.”907 
Chapter 3 established that the purpose of this subsection was to restrict the loading or 
storing of a computer program908 so that incidental copying in the course of running a 
computer program, or viewing a work stored in a computer database, was a restricted 
act of copying.909 As a result loading or running a computer program constitutes 
reproduction.910  
This section will now consider some of the key cases which determine the meaning of 
subsection 17(6).911 The case selection and methodology was the same as for the above 
section; all of the relevant cases were collated by reference to section 17 CDPA 1988. 
These cases were searched for the terms ‘transient’ and ‘incidental’ which provided 122 
references within 29 cases. The 29 cases were read by the researcher and the most 
relevant are analysed below to demonstrate the Court’s interpretation and application of 
section 17(6) CDPA 1988. In particular four cases were identified as the most significant 
																																								 																				
907 CDPA 1988, section 17(6). 
908 The WIPO Copyright Treaty specifies that the reproduction right set out in Art 9 of the Berne 
Convention fully apply to the digital environment. It also specifies that the storage of a protected 
work in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a reproduction within the meaning of Art 
9 of the Berne Convention. 
909 Hansard, Copyright, Designs and Patents Bill [H.L.], HL Deb 29 March 1988 Vol 495 cc607-
96, Lord Mattistone 647. 
910 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. Also Trading As Sony Computer 
Entertainment Inc. (A Company Incorporated Under The Law Of Japan), Sony Computer 
Entertainment Europe Limited, Sony Computer Entertainment UK Limited v Gaynor David Ball, 
Gary Edmunds, Boris Baikov, Ina Sorokovich, Igor Tiporov, K Shashkov, Stepan Gvozdeff 
[2004] EWHC 1738 (Ch), as per Justice Laddie at 17: “playing of an unauthorised copy of a 
PS2 game or a ‘foreign’ authentic game on a PS2 console involves copying a substantial part of 
the copyright work into RAM and, questions of licence aside, amounts to infringement.” 
911 The case selection and methodology is the same as above for storage. The search terms 
used were ‘transient’ and ‘incidental’ this provided 122 references in 29 cases. 
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in the development of the meaning of transient and incidental copying, namely Cantor 
Gaming,912 R v Higgs913 and Gilham.914 
In these cases, the judge gave particular consideration to the interpretation and meaning 
of section 17(6). As with the previous section, these cases are addressed in 
chronological order so as to demonstrate the development of the section over time. The 
first case in particular sees the Court demonstrate the limitations of taking the external 
perspective too far in relation to running a computer program. The second and third 
cases see the discussion and development of transient copying in the Random Access 
Memory (RAM) and on screen. Finally, the fourth case builds on the first three, to 
consider the technical process of RAM, demonstrating how taking a purely literal and 
external perspective can lead to absurdity.  
 
The Limitations of Taking the External Perspective to 
Understand Transient Copying: Cantor Gaming Ltd v 
GameAccount Global 
	
In 2007, transient copying was considered in the case of Cantor Gaming.915 In its 
application of the law the Court took an external perspective. It explained in detail the 
technical process which took place when a program was “executed by a computer”916 to 
create copies from a hard drive into the computer’s memory.917 The Court went further 
to explain that the copies made inside the computer were expressed in “machine code 
rather than high level programming language”918 which were constantly being copied and 
recopied as the computer performed logical operations.919 Therefore, the Court 
recognised that it was not possible to say, with any confidence, precisely what transient 
reproduction would occur.920 The best they could say with any confidence was that it was 
																																								 																				
912 Cantor Gaming Limited v Gameaccount Global Limited [2007] EWHC 1914. 
913 R v Higgs [2008] EWCA Crim 1324. 
914 Christopher Paul Gilham v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 2293. 
915 Cantor Gaming Limited v Gameaccount Global Limited [2007] EWHC 1914, Before: Mr 
Daniel Alexander Q.C. sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge (Chancery Division). Whilst the 
case primarily concerned breach of contract, where the defendant’s actions fell outside the 
contract and the claimants argued that this was an infringement of their copyright. 
916 Ibid., Mr Daniel Alexander Q.C at 39. 
917 Ibid., Mr Daniel Alexander Q.C at 39. 
918 Ibid., Mr Daniel Alexander Q.C at 39. 
919 Ibid., Mr Daniel Alexander Q.C at 39. 
920 Ibid., Mr Daniel Alexander Q.C at 94. 
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“highly likely” that in the circumstances, the work would have been partially or completely 
copied.921 
It is suggested that this is an example of how taking the external perspective too far can 
result in confusion. The Court recognised the technical function of the network and 
considered in detail how the computer makes copies. However, their justification is 
limited by their understanding of the functioning of a computer. Once they reach this 
point they can only say that it is highly likely the computer made copies but cannot 
support this by continuing with the external perspective.  
In making their decision, the Court considered that under UK copyright law, infringement 
by copying is a broad concept and that this is consistent with EU law922 which states that 
the permanent or temporary reproduction of a computer program is the exclusive right 
of the copyright holder.923 Therefore, despite the uncertainty, they found that on the 
balance of probabilities, at least some of the applicant’s work would have been copied.924 
In this matter, the Court took an external perspective to determine the facts of the case. 
However, they were unable to continue with this perspective in order to use the technical 
process as evidence to support substantial copying. Therefore, the Court determined 
that copying had occurred simply on balance that it probably did.  
The subsequent case also demonstrates the Court taking an external perspective. In this 
matter, the Court determined that transient and incidental copying encompass copying 
on the RAM of a computer or game console.  
 
Random Access Memory as Transient Copying: R v Higgs 
 
In 2008, in the matter of R v Higgs,925 Mr Higgs ran a business selling modchips,926 fitting 
modchips to customers' computer games consoles and selling games consoles which 
he had already fitted modchips in to.927 The case against Mr Higgs was not the playing 
																																								 																				
921 Ibid., Mr Daniel Alexander Q.C at 94. 
922 Referring to the Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of 
Computer Programs, Article 4. 
923 Cantor Gaming Limited v Gameaccount Global Limited [2007] EWHC 1914 at 81. 
924 Ibid., Mr Daniel Alexander Q.C at 94. 
925 R v Higgs [2008] EWCA Crim 1324. 
926 A mod-chip (a modification chip) is a small electronic device used to alter or disable artificial 
restrictions of computers or entertainment devices. Modchips are mainly used in videogame 
consoles, but also in some DVD or Blu-ray players. 
927 R v Higgs [2008] EWCA Crim 1324 as per Jacob LJ at 2. 
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of pirated material,928 but that by selling the modchips and modified consoles he 
encouraged and exploited a market for pirate games.929 
This case is relevant here for three key reasons. Firstly in considering section 17(6) in 
detail, Mr	Macdonald for the Crown highlighted to the Court that the language of the 
CDPA 1988 was not exactly the same as that in the Directive: 
“Directive: Designed to prevent or restrict acts, in respect of works or other 
subject-matter, which are not authorized by the rightholder.  
UK Act: Prevention or restriction of acts that are not authorised by the copyright 
owner of that work and are restricted by copyright. 
The UK Act adds the words "and are restricted by copyright.”930 
Mr MacDonald suggested that the words that were not in the Directive should be 
disregarded, which would have the effect of a wider meaning.931 However, the Court did 
not appreciate the inconsistency,932 and disagreed with Mr MacDonald, stating that the 
“the words add nothing.”933 The Court went on to explain that “when speaking of "acts 
which are not authorised" it is implicit that one is considering only acts which need 
authorization, i.e. acts which are otherwise restricted. To "authorise" a man to do 
something he is free to do anyway - something which needs no authority - is a 
meaningless concept.”934 
This is interesting in light of the previous analysis which highlighted the significance of 
word choice in the drafting of legislation.935 This demonstrates that a literal reading of 
the law can lead to inconsistencies when the law has been transposed from an EU 
Directive using different wording. The reason for this change in the wording is unknown 
although this is a common characteristic of UK implementation of EU Directives.936 Whilst 
there may have been a reason behind the change, Jacob LJ did not appreciate it in this 
																																								 																				
928 Ibid., Jacob LJ at 11. 
929 Ibid., Jacob LJ at 12. 
930 Ibid., Jacob LJ at 31. 
931 Ibid., Jacob LJ at 31-32. 
932 Ibid., Jacob LJ at 31 and concluding at 32: “the UK draftsman was merely making explicit 
that which was implicit in the Directive - and indeed in the original 1966 Treaty obligations.” 
933 Ibid., Jacob LJ at 32. 
934 Ibid., Jacob LJ at 32. 
935 See Chapter 3. 
936 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (London: 
Butterworths Law; 2011) 17.7: “as we have come to expect the wording of s 20 of the CDPA 
1988 as amended by the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003, is not the same as 
that of art 3 of the Information Society Directive.” See chapter 5 for further discussion on this 
point.  
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case, as he stated: “Why, oh why do statutory draftsman persist in trying to gloss 
Directives which are specific about what is to be implemented?”937 Nevertheless, Jacob 
LJ argued that the draftsmen’s only intention could have been to make clearer the same 
meaning expressed in the Directive: “The UK draftsman was merely making explicit that 
which was implicit in the Directive - and indeed in the original 1966 Treaty obligations.”938 
This interpretation follows the golden rule discussed in chapter 1, where Jacob LJ is 
determining that although the specific words are different, the meaning intended by those 
words are the same.  
Secondly, Jacob LJ stated, albeit obiter, that that the making of transient copies of 
copyright material into a RAM was a restricted act.939 The Court recognised that Mr 
Justice Laddie had held in Sony Entertainment v Ball940 that a transient copy in a games 
console was an infringing copy of a work and that the facts of the case in hand were 
“near identical to those in this case, that there was infringement.”941In these 
circumstances, the Court explained, even a single frame of a cinematograph film could 
constitute infringement.942 Therefore, the playing of a pirate game on a console would 
also be an infringement. This shows the Court taking a purely external perspective which 
resulted in a broad application of copyright law that effectively encompasses all online 
activity.  
However, in Mr Higgs's case, the prosecution failed to put forward any evidence relating 
to whether or not his modchip enabled a transient copy.943 This left the Court unable to 
uphold the conviction against Mr Higgs as they had not seen any evidence in this case 
that a transient copy was made. Jacob JL described Mr Higgs as a "fortunate man"944 in 
this regard, stating that if the legislation had been less complex and/or the Crown had 
considered the details of copyright law to a greater extent, the case would have been 
proved on the basis that merely playing a pirated game involved making a copy in the 
console.945  
																																								 																				
937 R v Higgs [2008] EWCA Crim 1324 as per Jacob LJ at 31. 
938 Ibid., Jacob LJ at 32. 
939 Ibid., Jacob LJ at 9. 
940 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. Also Trading As Sony Computer 
Entertainment Inc., Sony Computer Entertainment Europe Limited, Sony Computer 
Entertainment Uk Limited v Gaynor David Ball, Gary Edmunds, Boris Baikov, Ina Sorokovich, 
Igor Tiporov, K Shashkov, Stepan Gvozdeff [2004] EWHC 1738 (Ch). 
941 R v Higgs [2008] EWCA Crim 1324, as per Jacob LJ at 10. 
942 Ibid., Jacob LJ at 9 referring to Spelling Goldberg v BPC Publishing [1981] RPC 225. 
943 Ibid., Jacob LJ at 29. 
944 R v Higgs [2008] EWCA Crim 1324 as per Jacob LJ at 36. 
945 Ibid., at 36. 
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Nevertheless, this case demonstrated that Courts taking an external perspective and 
determining that transient and incidental copying encompassed copying on the RAM of 
a computer or game console. This point was recognised and relied upon in the following 
case discussed below.  
 
Displaying Images Shown on the Screen as Infringement: 
Gilham  
 
Subsequently, in 2009, the restricted act of transient copying in the RAM of a games 
console was developed further in the matter of Gilham.946 In this case the Court of 
Appeal947 considered in detail how the technical process of copying a work into the RAM 
of a computer console and whether this amounted to a substantial part of the work.  
The Court considered that in the matter of R v Higgs,948 Jacob LJ had stated that copying 
into RAM would be infringement of copyright.949 Indeed, it was proved in the present 
case that during the playing of a game from a counterfeit DVD, data was copied into the 
RAM of the games console.950 
However, the appellant in this case argued that although there was such copying, it did 
not represent at any one time the whole or a substantial part of the game’s data on the 
DVD, and therefore did not amount to the copying of a substantial part of the work.951 
																																								 																				
946 Christopher Paul Gilham v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 2293 Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) before Lord Justice Stanley Burnton Mr Justice Penry Davey and Mrs Justice Sharpe 
DBE, 9 November 2009. 
947 Ibid., at 18 and 30. It was noted that in the first instance the appellant had been convicted of 
copyright infringement by a jury – as this case had been brought under criminal proceedings. 
However, the Court stated that this was not appropriate: “We repeat with emphasis what Jacob 
LJ said in Higgs about the trial of cases involving recondite issues of copyright law before a jury. 
Cases that, for example, involve determination of difficult questions whether a copy is of a 
substantial part of a copyright work, can and should be tried in the Chancery Division before 
specialist judges.” See further; Sharp C. and Smith J., The Interplay Between Civil and Criminal 
IP Litigation in the UK (2012) 7(8) Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice, pp. 573-
579. 
948 R v Higgs [2008] EWCA Crim 1324 as per Jacob LJ. 
949 Christopher Paul Gilham v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 2293 Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) before Lord Justice Stanley Burnton Mr Justice Penry Davey and Mrs Justice Sharpe 
DBE. 
950 Christopher Paul Gilham v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 2293, as per Lord Justice Stanley 
Burton at 16. However, the expert evidence explained that when a game is played on a console 
using a counterfeit DVD, the RAM in the console will copy a very small amount (less than 3 per 
cent) of the whole of the counterfeit DVD at any one time, but it cannot be predicted what data 
will be being copied and then overwritten in the RAM at any time because that depended on the 
way that the game is played. 
951 Ibid., Lord Justice Stanley Burton at 17. 
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The Court could not wholeheartedly agree with Jacob LJ’s decision, as Lord Justice 
Stanley Burton stated: “…Jacob LJ's dicta would have to be decided. But the game as a 
whole is not the sole subject of copyright.”952 However, Lord Justice Stanley Burton went 
on to argue that this was irrelevant because even if the contents of the RAM of a game 
console were not a substantial copy, the image displayed on screen would be.953 This 
was because, as he stated, “the various drawings that result in the images shown on the 
television screen or monitor are themselves artistic works protected by copyright. The 
images shown on the screen are copies, and substantial copies, of those works.”954 He 
even went on to explain that the images need not have been an exact copy of the artistic 
work because the software may move the image, but none-the-less would be 
recognisable.955 He supported this argument by stating that when the ‘pause’ button on 
a game console is pressed956 what is shown on screen constitutes an image that is a 
copy of an artistic work generated by the digital data in RAM.957 
He also referred958 to the judgement of Kitchin J in the Football Association Premier 
League case959 where he doubted that “those who framed the CDPA ever contemplated 
that displaying an image on a television screen amounts to copying. However, s.17 must 
be construed in the light of the Directive and, despite my reservations, I have reached 
the conclusion that it is indeed this broad.”960 Kitchin had supported his decision by 
drawing on a much earlier case961 which held that the defendants infringed the copyright 
subsisting in race cards by showing them on television monitors in their shops.962 
The defence argued that as display on a screen could not be a substantial copy of a 
copyright work, as it only appeared for an instant. However, the Court found this to be 
irrelevant, as section 17(6) expressly provided that a transient copy is a copy,963 adding 
that the fact that players do not normally pause the game is immaterial.964 
																																								 																				
952 Ibid., Lord Justice Stanley Burton at 24. 
953 Ibid., Lord Justice Stanley Burton at 25. 
954 Ibid., Lord Justice Stanley Burton at 24. 
955 Ibid., Lord Justice Stanley Burton at 24.  
956 Ibid., at 25. 
957 Ibid., at 25. 
958 Ibid., at 26. 
959 Football Association Premier League Ltd and others v QC Leisure and others [2008] EWHC 
1411 Ch. 
960 Ibid., as per Kitchin J at 232. 
961 Bookmakers Afternoon Greyhound Services v Wilf Gilbert (Staffordshire) Ltd [1994] FSR 
723, as per Aldous J (a decision under the Copyright Act 1956). 
962 Football Association Premier League Ltd and others v QC Leisure and others [2008] EWHC 
1411 Ch, as per Kitchin J at 232. 
963 Christopher Paul Gilham v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 2293 Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) as per Lord Justice Stanley Burton at 27. 
964 Ibid., Lord Justice Stanley Burton at 25. 
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To some it was considered “common sense”965 that the playing of an illegally created 
game or DVD on a games console should be copyright infringement on the basis that it 
made a copy of at least a substantial part of the game whether in the RAM, or on the 
screen even though it only exists at any one time for a fraction of a second.966 Therefore, 
the judgement went beyond the literal reading of the words in the statute, in order to 
remedy the mischief it intended to address by restricted this act, in line with the mischief 
rule discussed in chapter 1. In this regard, the judgement was considered “welcome 
news for copyright owners in the digital age.”967 Ormerod argued that the Court’s 
approach in this case was “entirely right.”968 Although Massey, noted that the Court 
seemed to skip over the point, as mentioned above, when not ruling in relation to the 
RAM copying: “It seems a shame, however, that the Court of Appeal did not rule, as 
opposed to merely comment, on Mr Gilham's “little and often” defence which after all was 
the focus of the case at trial. This would have taken Sony v Ball up a notch and set Jacob 
L.J.'s dicta in stone.”969 
In relation to the Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives, it is clear that in this 
matter the Court used the external perspective when determining the facts of the case 
by considering the technical process of the RAM and the game console. However, when 
they then attempted to map these circumstances onto the relevant copyright law, in this 
literal manner, it appears that it did not fit. The difficulty was that, as the analysis 
demonstrated, ‘common sense’ assured them that playing a counterfeit game should be 
illegal but they were unable to find a way within the external perspective to justify this. 
This demonstrated the limitations on taking a literal approach in interpreting the law. As 
a result, the judges took a purposive approach in order to achieve the intended outcome, 
or the mischief that the legislation aimed to remedy.  
As a result, the judge turned to the internal perspective, and considered that the user 
could see the images on the screen, therefore the display of the copyright work was 
																																								 																				
965 Massey R., R. v Gilham (Christopher Paul) - Pirates Beware! Transient Copying to RAM is 
Sufficient for Infringement of Copyright (2010) 21(3) Entertainment Law Review, pp. 107-108 at 
p108. 
966 Ibid. 
967 Ibid.  
968 Ormerod D., R. v Gilham: Copyright - Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 s.296ZB 
(2010) 5 Criminal Law Review, pp. 407-409, p. 408. 
969 Massey R., R. v Gilham (Christopher Paul) - Pirates Beware! Transient Copying to RAM is 
Sufficient for Infringement of Copyright (2010) 21(3) Entertainment Law Review, pp. 107-108 at 
p108. 
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infringement.970 Although, the Court still struggled to justify this as a reason for 
infringement, suggesting that the image was “generated by the digital data in RAM.”971 
Therefore, this case clearly exemplified the tensions that occur when attempting to map 
copyright law onto new technologies. Further, it demonstrated the difficulties that can 
occur when taking the external perspective too far, the law becomes too narrow and 
specific and defied common sense. This analysis has identified that in these 
circumstances the Courts appear to be fumbling for a justification to bring the law back 
in line with its purpose, as the external perspective, and lack of awareness thereof, had 
failed to accommodate the intention of the law. Interestingly, the Court finally used the 
internal perspective to find their way to infringement in these circumstances, taking a 
purposive approach to remedy the mischief.  
 
The Verdict on Transient Copying 
 
Overall the case law analysis in this section has demonstrated that the law in relation to 
section 17(6) is broad and encompasses activity such as display of the work on a 
screen.972  
Whilst the drafters of the law may have had specific circumstances in mind, the law has 
been developed to encompass new technological developments which could not have 
been envisaged.973 
Generally, the judges appear to take an external perspective when considering the law 
of transient copying. This is consistent with the drafting of the subsection, as established 
in chapter 3. However, particularly in the final case, the limitations of this approach were 
demonstrated.  
The challenges of applying the law from this perspective can result in the law going much 
further than originally intended, for example, to include display of a copyright work 
instead of merely a copy of a copyright work. At its extreme this approach can lead to 
results that appear to disregard common sense. For example, Laddie, Prescott and 
Vitoria argued that with this reasoning reading a newspaper over somebody’s shoulder 
																																								 																				
970 Christopher Paul Gilham v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 2293, as per Lord Justice Stanley 
Burton at 25. 
971 Ibid., Lord Justice Stanley Burton at 25. 
972 Christopher Paul Gilham v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 2293. 
973 Football Association Premier League Ltd and others v QC Leisure and others [2008] EWHC 
1411 Ch, as per Kitchin J at 232. 
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could be infringement by ‘electronic means’ because ‘electronic’ could include actuated 
by electro-magnetic or electro-chemical energy and light is a form of electromagnetic 
energy.974 Laddie explained that an image of the page is formed on the retina of the eye, 
and through neurons transmitted in the brain a person will experience the conscious 
sensation of viewing the page; by way of biochemical processes are actuated by 
electrochemical energy, which is then stored in the brain. This interpretation leads to an 
absurdity in the law: “All this reasoning is uncontroversial in scientific terms, but totally 
absurd all the same.”975 
 
Conclusion 
 
As detailed at the beginning of this chapter, section 17(2) was first envisaged by Viscount 
Coville who argued that it was necessary to protect a work stored on a computer in case 
this was the only copy on which a creator could rely.976 A reading of the relevant case 
law demonstrated that in 27 years since the enactment, in over 90 cases that referred to 
this section, not one was applied in these circumstances. This does not mean that the 
section is necessarily redundant. It does, however, demonstrate that Viscount Coville’s 
justification for the introduction of the law was unfounded. The circumstances within 
which he envisaged the section being of use, never occurred. This is not to say that the 
law should be restricted to the circumstances envisioned at the time of drafting, or that 
the committee debates constitute law. However, considering the history of the 
development of the legislation is helpful in unearthing the mysteries of why the law 
appears as it does. It also provides helpful context for understanding purposive 
interpretations of the law, such as by way of the mischief, golden or Pepper v Hart rules.  
Analysis of the case law which interpret these subsections of the CDPA 1988 revealed 
four main tensions in the application of copyright law online. Firstly, the chapter 
demonstrated that over time the legal definition of storage and transient copying has 
developed as the technological developments have occurred, for example 
encompassing activity such display of a copyright work.977 This is to be expected in light 
of technological developments of course, and could be argued to be a strength of the 
																																								 																				
974 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (London: 
Butterworths Law; 2011) 14.12. 
975 Ibid., 14.12. 
976 Hansard, Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Bill, HL Deb 05 June 1985 vol 464 
cc823-9, Viscount Colville of Culross at 824. 
977 Christopher Paul Gilham v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 2293 Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) at 27. 
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drafting that it encapsulates circumstances never envisaged at the time of drafting. 
However, this approach can lead to the law going too far. Moreover, as this development 
has occurred in the Courts and not in the statutory law, it may have gone under the radar. 
As demonstrated in chapter 3, this will cause challenges for legislators in the future, as 
it is unlikely stakeholders will support new policy that leaves them worse off.978 
Secondly, it was seen that judges spent a long time going into great detail on establishing 
the technical function or process of the computer program or technology in question. The 
judges spend pages explaining each technical step that the process takes, often relying 
on expert evidence provided to the Court, clearly taking an external perspective. Some 
judges even went further to include an explanation not only of the program or system at 
hand, but also the technical function of a computer in general. For example, in the IBCOS 
Computers979 case Mr Justice Jacob stated: “computers only work in binary code, a code 
made up of 0's and 1's. So all data held in a computer or held on a computer storage 
device (such as a RAM, disc, or tape) must be so coded.”980 However, the use of 
technologically specific justifications for decisions can lead to restrictions in the law that 
are contrary to common sense. It can also lead the Court down a road of no return 
whereby they are seen to switch to the internal perspective without awareness or 
coherence in order to allow the law to fulfil its intended purpose. This shows that in these 
cases, the law is insufficient to allow the judges to take a purely literal reading without 
creating an absurdity. This, therefore, encourages judges to lean towards a more 
purposive interpretation of the law in order to, for example, remedy the mischief that it 
intended to deal with.  
Thirdly, another drawback of this approach is that similar cases are bought before the 
Court and the legal application has to be considered all over again because of a slight 
technical difference between the program, or system, in question. As Lord Penrose 
stated in the Beta Computers981 case “the case is concerned with one type of software 
only and one form of contractual relationship for supply. It would be misleading to 
generalise.”982 Furthermore, in the cases of R v Higgs, the judge referred back to Sony 
Entertainment v Ball983 and stated that “on facts near identical to those in this case… 
																																								 																				
978 See Chapter 3; Litman J., Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books; 2006) p. 23. 
979 IBCOS Computers Ltd. and Another v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance [1994] F.S.R. 
275. 
980 Ibid., as per Mr. Justice Jacob at 285. 
981 Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd v Adobe Systems [1996] S.L.T. 604. 
982 Ibid., as per Lord Penrose at 608. 
983 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. Also Trading As Sony Computer 
Entertainment Inc. (A Company Incorporated Under The Law Of Japan), Sony Computer 
Entertainment Europe Limited, Sony Computer Entertainment Uk Limited v Gaynor David Ball, 
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The only factual difference is that, unlike this case, it was asserted that transient copying 
into the console took place - and the Defendant so admitted.”984 
Fourthly, the judges and counsel, tend to use analogue, offline, or historical analogies to 
understand and apply the law of copyright to the new technology. As discussed in 
chapter 2, this is one way in which people, and the law, can process and deal with the 
development of new technologies. However, the difficulty of using this approach is that 
at times, the skeumorph does not accurately portray the technological circumstance. 
Finally, from this analysis it has emerged that the relationship between section 17(2) and 
17(6) is indeed very thought-provoking. The cases appear to overlap or, at least, be 
interconnecting the two sections. The majority of cases that fully engage with section 
17(2) also engage with section 17(6). This may be due to the circumstances of the cases 
being brought to Court. There are some cases that clearly demonstrate that storage on 
a computer can be over time, whereas, transient copying is only temporary copying. 
Although the more recent case law focuses more on the temporary storage within the 
Random Access Memory (RAM) of a computer, or a server. Transient copying is the 
temporary storage of a work, so there is a clear overlap. 
This chapter completes the analysis of copyright infringement by way of copying as 
applied to online activity, through the lens of the Framework for Constructing Digital 
Perspectives. This investigation first considered the development of the statutory law, 
considering the context within which the law was created. This analysis revealed the long 
and complex development of the CDPA 1988 which in turn created long and complex 
legislation.985 Moreover, the law was clearly influenced by human factors such as lack of 
copyright knowledge,986 lack of understanding of the technology987 and the competing 
stakeholder interests.988  
In considering the details of section 17 CDPA 1988 the analysis looked closely at each 
subsection. This revealed that as one of the main goals in the law reform was to simplify 
																																								 																				
Gary Edmunds, Boris Baikov, Ina Sorokovich, Igor Tiporov, K Shashkov, Stepan Gvozdeff 
[2004] EWHC 1738 (Ch). 
984 R v Higgs [2008] EWCA Crim 1324 as per Jacob LJ at 10. 
985 Merkin R., Richards Butler on Copyright, Designs and Patents: The New Law (London: 
Longman; 1989) pp. 1-2. See discussion in Chapter 3, historical statutory analysis. 
986 Hansard, Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Bill, HL Deb 05 June 1985 vol 464 
cc823-9, Lord McIntosh at 825. 
987 Hansard, Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Bill, HL Deb 05 June 1985 vol 464 
cc823-9, Viscount Colville of Culross at 824. 
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the legislation,989 many of the subsections were restatements of the previous act, 
meaning that much of the law applied to modern technology dates back to 1956.990 From 
this subsections 17(2) and 17(6) CDPA 1988 were identified as relevant to the issue of 
online copyright infringement.  
The statutory analysis identified that the legislator appeared to intend the law to be 
drafted from an external perspective, focusing on addressing new technology and the 
use of technological terminology. Nevertheless, evidence of the internal perspective was 
found in the wording of the law.  
Thereafter the case law relating to sections 17(2) and 17(6) was considered in order to 
determine how the judges interpreted and applied the law to cases of online copyright 
infringement. This analysis highlighted the tensions created in the application of 
copyright law to the internet in view of the fact that there are two different ways in which 
online activity can be perceived.  
The thesis now continues the examination of online copyright infringement by 
considering the law relating to communication to the public. The analysis is undertaken 
using the same methodology and therefore the structure that follows in chapters 5 and 
6 mirrors that of chapters 3 and 4.  
 
  
																																								 																				
989 Whitford Committee Report: Copyright and Designs Law, Report of the Committee to 
Consider the Law on Copyright and Designs (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office; 1977) 
Cmnd 6732, para 16. 
990 For example subsections 17(4) and 17(5) CDPA 1988, see chapter 3 case law analysis. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The CDPA 1988 and its Application to Online Activity: An Analysis of 
Digital Copyright Infringement by way of Communication to the Public 
 
“The single biggest problem in communication is the illusion that it has taken 
place.” 
George Bernard Shaw 
 
Introduction 
So far, the Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives has been established and 
applied to copyright infringement by way of copying in chapter 3 which looked at the 
development of the statutory law and chapter 4 which analysed the relevant case law. 
As highlighted in chapter 3, it is important to understand why and how the development 
of the law occurred.991 Therefore, as explained in the chapter 2, the method of applying 
the Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives is applied by first considering the 
historical development of the law. This chapter moves to applying the Framework to 
copyright infringement by way of communication to the public.  
In considering the legal drafting, the thesis analyses the historical context of the statutory 
law, in particular considering the meaning of the words chosen by the drafters to reflect 
the policy. As highlighted in chapter 1, analysing statutory law in a historical and 
purposive context is important in order to ascertain the intended meaning of the law. This 
allows the investigation to address whether the law achieves its intended purpose.  
This chapter seeks to understand how this new right of communication was developed 
in order to inform a detailed statutory analysis of the law. Communication to the public 
has been instrumental in the development of jurisprudence relating to online copyright 
infringement as Rizzuto argued: “The meaning of the concept of communication to the 
public is of fundamental importance in determining the circumstances in which the rights 
and protections accorded to copyright holders by European Union law are infringed.”992 
The right to control the communication of the work is considered as one of the most 
controversial and contentious developments in copyright law. This development is 
																																								 																				
991Broom H., A Selection of Legal Maxims: Classified and Illustrated (London: The Lawbook 
Exchange; 1864). 
992 Rizzuto F., The European Union law Concept of Communication to the Public and the 
Protection of Copyright in Electronic Transmissions (2012) 18(6) Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review, pp. 179-197, p. 179. 
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significant to the future of copyright as it exemplifies the application of copyright 
regulation onto online activity.993 As Keane argued “the right of communication to the 
public…lies at the heart of modern copyright law”994 and it is therefore central to the 
investigation of this thesis. 
This chapter therefore, first looks at the historical development of the communication 
right, considering the context of the current statutory law in order to understand the 
intention behind it. This analysis highlights the influenced of the Berne Convention995 and 
EU regulation on the development of broadcasting rights into what has become 
communication to the public.  
Thereafter, in light of this context, a detailed analysis of section 20 of the CDPA 1988 is 
undertaken in order to establish the statutory meaning of communication to the public. 
The discussion focuses on the key elements of the right including the public and 
electronic transmission. As Keane highlighted there are many unanswered questions as 
to what constitutes a ‘communication’ and indeed who are the ‘public’ particularly in the 
virtual world of the internet.996 The Framework for Constructing Digital Perspective is 
applied where relevant to determine if the internal or external perspective was taken in 
the drafting of the regulation and what the impact of each perspective has on the law. 
The third element of the method, the analysis of the case law takes place in the 
subsequent chapter 6.  
As stated in chapter 2, the methodology has its foundations in doctrinal analysis and 
builds on this with a holistic approach in considering the circumstances of the 
implementation. As a product of its time, this is imperative for understanding why the law 
appears as it does; as it is a clear reflection of the debates, interests, and technological 
developments of the time. Therefore, providing context and understanding to inform the 
research.  
 
																																								 																				
993 Haque H., Is the Time Ripe for Another Exclusive Right? A Proposal (2008) 30(9) European 
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994 Keane B., Ill Communication? The Concept of a Communication to the Public Under EU 
Copyright Law (2013) 24(5) Entertainment Law Review, pp. 165-171, p. 165. 
995 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886, as amended 28 
September 1979. Hereafter Berne Convention. 
996 Keane B., Ill Communication? The Concept of a Communication to the Public Under EU 
Copyright Law (2013) 24(5) Entertainment Law Review, pp. 165-171, p. 165. 
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The Origin of the Communication Right 
This section considers the first appearance of the communication right, looking at the 
International and European influences in order to bring a deeper understanding to the 
analysis of the UK law and considers the development to become the restricted act of 
communication to the public.  
 
The Evolution of Communication to the Public: The 
Strange Case of Radio-Diffusion 
There was no communication right when the CDPA 1988 was first enacted. The closest 
equivalent was the right to prevent broadcasting or inclusion of a work in a cable 
programme service.997 The communication right was introduced into the CDPA 1988 by 
the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003.998 
The origins of communication to the public are found in the development of the copyright 
holders’ right to restrict performance of his work. The recognition that authors should be 
paid for the communication of their works to the public was an extension of the 
performance right onto modern communication systems.999 As Mysoor stated it “goes to 
show how distinctly the right of communication to the public is conceptualised from the 
right of public performance.”1000  
The right was established in Article 11bis(1) of the Berne Convention, as the Advocate 
General Sharpston stated: "The history of Article 11bis(1) … can be seen as a series of 
attempts to enhance protection of authors’ rights in the light of technological 
developments. The author’s right to authorise a performance of his dramatic or musical 
work had been granted from the outset in 1886.”1001 
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The first appearance of a communication right was in the 1928 Rome revision of the 
Berne Convention.1002 Previously, at the Berlin Revision, the Convention only included 
Article 11 which stipulated that the Convention applies to public representation of 
dramatic works and public performance of music works.1003 Whilst the Rome revision 
introduced the concept, which provided that: “(1) Authors of literary and artistic works 
shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the communication of their works to the 
public by radio-diffusion.”1004 However, it was not developed at this stage, as the WIPO 
Guide, which the European Court has explained is “without being legally binding, 
nevertheless assists in interpreting [the Berne] Convention”1005 stated, it was: “Slightly 
muddled in its terms, the text was like broadcasting itself—in its infancy.” 1006  
Interestingly, the word ‘radio-diffusion’, is not a word in English but ‘radiodiffusion’ is a 
word in French. The text was originally drafted in French and then translated into English. 
In French, the word ‘radiodiffusion’ refers to the emission of signals through of 
electromagnetic waves. Furthermore, the word ‘radiodiffusion’ translates directly into 
English as ‘broadcasting’. But, the translators evidently did not translate the word 
radiodiffusion into broadcasting and decided instead to leave us with the word 
radiodiffusion. Although, the WIPO Guide suggested that radio-diffusion was a synonym 
of broadcasting: “communication to the public by radio-diffusion [which was, at that time, 
a synonym of ‘broadcasting.’]”1007 
Nevertheless, this demonstrates the impact of the process of transposing regulation from 
international levels into UK law.  
 
																																								 																				
1002 Berne Convention 1886, as amended by The Rome Act 1928. 
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The Berne Convention: Regulating Radio and Television 
Offline Transmissions and Broadcast 
As previously identified, the transposing and translating of International and European 
documents into UK legislation is something of a controversy.1008 This is significant as it 
highlights the impact of international legislative drafting and the difficulties thereof. 
Thereafter, during the Brussels revision of 1948 the right was more fully considered in 
order to take account of the various ways and techniques by which it might be 
exploited.1009 The Brussels revision consolidated the previous developments and 
provided authors with the right to authorise communication by way of three separate 
acts: 
“(i) the broadcasting of their works or the communication thereof to the public by any 
other means of wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or images; 
(ii) any communication to the public by wire or by rebroadcasting of the broadcast of the 
work, when this communication is made by an organization other than the original one; 
(iii) the public communication by loudspeaker or any other analogous instrument 
transmitting, by signs, sounds or images, the broadcast of the work.” 1010 
The Berne Convention did not provide a definition of communication to the public as 
such. However, judges have been seen to distinguish between the different types of 
act.1011 In particular, in the FAPL cases1012 the CJEU treated the three acts as different 
forms of communication to the public.1013 Furthermore, in his Opinion, the Advocate 
General suggested the third act may not amount to communication to the public at all.1014 
																																								 																				
1008 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (London: 
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Bergström revealed that this provision “raised the most ardent discussion, and its 
interpretation has made more ink flow than any other rule formulated at the Brussels 
Conference.”1015 
The Brussels revision took the scope of Article 11bis(1)(ii) back to ‘rebroadcasting’ of the 
broadcast of the work. In the WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention1016 Article 11bis was 
titled ‘right to broadcast’, which included radio and television. The Guide stated that “what 
matters is the emission of signals.”1017 Thereby, the rights holder had the exclusive right 
to emit the signal that carried their work, to authorise the communication of the broadcast 
to the public by wire or otherwise, and by loudspeaker or on a television screen.1018 
No changes were made to Article 11bis by the Stockholm Act 1967 despite the United 
Kingdom proposing two changes. Firstly, the UK proposed deleting the condition in 
paragraph (3) that ephemeral recordings should be made by the broadcasting 
organisation “by means of its own facilities.”1019 Secondly, it was proposed that the right 
of recording be restricted to cases where ‘for technical or other reasons, the broadcast 
cannot be made at the time of the performance of the work.’1020 Nevertheless, all the 
proposals were withdrawn at the session of the Committee which discussed Article 
11bis.1021  
Later the Paris Act 19711022 amended the word radio-diffusion to broadcasting in Article 
11bis(1)(i).1023 It also broadened the scope of 11bis(1)(ii) from ‘any communication to the 
public by wire or by rebroadcasting of the broadcast of the work’ to ‘any communication 
to the public, whether over wires or not, of the radiodiffusion of the work’1024 [emphasis 
added]. The WIPO guidance stated that the Stockholm and Paris amendments were not 
changes in the law, but merely, a more suitable English translation.1025 
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Ultimately, the Convention was understood to restrict the mischief of “carrying of content 
to a different place with or without using wires, regardless of the distance separating the 
origin and the designation.”1026 The WIPO Guidance specifically stated that the ultimate 
aim of Article 11bis was to give the rightsholder the exclusive right to authorise to 
broadcast his work and to restrict the listening or seeing of unauthorised broadcasts by 
the eyes and ears of unpaying costumers.1027 However, the Paris Act 1971 was still 
considered to cover the right of communication to the public “incompletely and 
imperfectly through a tangle of occasionally redundant or self-contradictory provisions.” 
1028 
Ricketson and Ginsburg raised concerns that the right covers ‘push’ technologies, where 
the broadcast or wired transmission is from the transmitting entity to passive 
recipients.1029 However, the WIPO Guidance stated that Article 11bis was matter of 
transmission intended to be received by the general public: “The idea of transmission to 
the public is all important. Amateur radio and television communications are 
excluded.”1030 
The purpose of the right consolidated under the Berne Convention was clearly to protect 
the offline communication of their work through broadcast. As the guidance said, Article 
11 allowed for the regulation of television and radio broadcasts, as well as through 
loudspeakers such as in a café, restaurants, tea rooms, hotels, shops, trains and 
aircrafts.1031 Hague argued, in light of this that “the communication right conferred by 
Berne Convention became obsolete in the context of new technology.”1032 The words 
chosen in legislative drafting defines the ability of that regulation to remain fit for purpose. 
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The application of these rights to an online context has a very different effect, because 
online digital transmission differs from the traditional categories in many ways.1033  
These rights evidentially required implementation into Europe, which came in the form 
of the Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission Directive.1034 On 21 February 
1990 in a Communication to the Council and Parliament on Audio-Visual Policy, the 
Commission stated that the law required updating in order to respond to technological 
developments in satellite and television: “The entire audio-visual sector is being shaken 
up by constant innovations in terms of new technologies, particularly the new generation 
of satellites and the development of high definition television.”1035 Accordingly, in order 
to draft a proposal for a new Directive,1036 the Discussion Paper ‘Broadcasting and 
Copyright in the Internal Market’ activated the process of consultation.1037 The most 
important feature for the Council by unanimity - with France abstaining - related to the 
issue of communication to the public by satellite.1038 
The Satellite Directive 1993 provided that communication to the public by satellite 
required “the act of introducing, under the control and responsibility of the broadcasting 
organization, the programme-carrying signals intended for reception by the public into 
an uninterrupted chain of communication leading to the satellite and down towards the 
earth.”1039 
Schwarz and Hansen argued that it was therefore crucial that the programme-carrying 
signals must be intended for public reception.1040 In the case of Lagardère1041 the CJEU 
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explained that: “A comparison of the wording of the various language versions of that 
provision, in particular the English (‘programme-carrying signals intended for reception 
by the public’), the German (‘die programmtragenden Signale, die für den öffentlichen 
Empfang bestimmt sind’), the Spanish (‘las señales portadoras de programa, destinadas 
a la recepción por el público’) or the Dutch version (‘programmadragende signalen voor 
ontvangst door het publiek’), shows that it is the signals which must be intended for the 
public and not the programmes that they carry.”1042 
Murray stated that the Satellite Directive filled the gap in the law relating to cross-border 
broadcasting and dealt with the “problems raised respectively by satellite broadcasting 
and cable retransmission.”1043 However, McKnight commented that although the wording 
of the UK law may have had to change in order to implement the act of communication 
to the public by satellite that occurred where the chain of communication commenced, 
the amendment was not, in practice, likely to require broadcasters to change their 
copyright licensing practices substantially.1044 
Therefore, whilst the Berne Convention and the Satellite Directive introduced the 
concepts of communication to the public into UK law, at this point it was only in relation 
to broadcasting and not yet challenged by online technologies.  
This analysis was important in the development of this chapter as the contextual and 
historical development of the law enables a better understanding of why the law appears 
as it does today. In these circumstances, it has been demonstrated that the law of 
communication to the public, although relatively new, has rapidly and dramatically 
developed. At this stage communication only related to offline technologies. It is shown 
in the next section how this was later expanded to include online technologies. This is 
important in relation to the internal and external perspectives because it could explain 
why particular perspective was taken, not as a conscious choice but merely as a 
development of extending existing law to apply to online technologies. This 
demonstrates the impact of attempting to apply to law created in response to offline 
technologies to the internet. 
The following section continues to examine the development of communication to the 
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public regulation, in particular the development of the regulation at international and 
European level. The international nature of communication to the public is evident in this 
section and the influence of other countries is taken into consideration in order to fully 
appreciate the context and development of the regulation.  
 
Updating Communication for the Digital Age: Applying the Law 
to Online Activities through The WCT and The InfoSoc Directive  
As mentioned, following the development of new digital online technologies it was clear 
that the rights established under the Berne Convention needed to be updated.1045 In 
1995 at the Fifth Session of the International Bureau of WIPO, the USA submitted a 
comment that the Berne Convention failed to recognise the right of digital 
transmission.1046 Subsequently, Australia argued that the Berne Convention was 
fragmented and made a proposal that would update this enable the inclusion of digital 
transmission.1047 At the Sixth Session the US proposed that digital transmission would 
be covered by the right of communication to the public, were transmission would not 
result in a copy.1048 Finally in the Seventh Session the delegation of the Commission of 
the European Council presented a proposal for a broad communication right; extending 
the Berne Convention to cover digital transmission.1049 
Thereafter, the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty1050 rationalised and synthesised protection 
by establishing full coverage of the communication right for all protected works of 
authorship.1051 The intention was to provide a technology-neutral right.1052 Thus the 
technical means by which the communication was made is irrelevant, in order that any 
future technical development be included within the provision.1053 The aim of the WCT 
was to address the new forms of communication offered by the internet. Referring to the 
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provisions of the Berne Convention set out above, the WCT granted authors of literary 
and artistic works the exclusive right of authorising any communication to the public of 
their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of 
their works in such a way that members of the public could access them from a place 
and at a time individually chosen by them.1054 Article 8 of the WCT also extended the 
scope of the communication right that was provided under the Berne Convention, in that 
it now applies all kinds of works.1055  
Therefore, the WCT significantly expanded the subject matter coverage of the Berne 
Convention’s communication to the public right.1056 Although in the agreed statement 
adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on Article 8 it was clarified that the purpose of the 
provision was not to include the facilities for enabling communication: “It is understood 
that the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication 
does not in itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne 
Convention.”1057 
Furthermore, during the discussions at the Diplomatic Conference in 1996, Australia 
proposed a technical amendment through the words ‘wire or wireless means’ rather than 
just ‘making available.’1058 It was argued that this change was needed to clarify that the 
right did not cover a display right.1059  
Reinbothe and Von Lewinski argued that the provision was an attempt at filling the gaps 
and adapting communication to the digital age.1060 In particular, the right was framed in 
a way that gave it a unique status as a new general right for creators, including the more 
specific right of making a work available to the public from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by the public in question.1061 The specific right of ‘making available’ 
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was intended to regulate on-demand digital transmission.1062 However, as mentioned, 
the intention was to provide a technology-neutral right1063 to encompass any future 
technical developments.1064 
These updates where implemented in European law by way of the 2001 Information 
Society Directive.1065 Whilst the Directive also avoided specifying a definition of 
communication to the public, the scope of protection granted by the right was elaborated 
upon in the recitals. Recital 23 stated that the right should be understood in a “broad 
sense”1066 and it covered “any such transmission or retransmission of a work to the public 
by wire or wireless means.”1067 Furthermore, recital 25, stated that all right-holders 
should have the “exclusive right to make available to the public copyright works or any 
other subject-matter by way of interactive on-demand transmissions.”1068 
The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the proposal for the Copyright Directive 
stated that: “The expression ‘communication to the public’ of a work covers any means 
or process other than the distribution of physical copies … If, at any point of a 
transmission or at the end of a transmission the work is communicated to the public, 
including through public display on screen, each such communication to the public 
requires authorisation of the author.”1069  
Furthermore, Article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive did not begin with the same 
Without Prejudice provision as Article 8 of the WCT. Mysoor argued that as a result the 
CJEU are subsequently able to adopt an interpretation of the Directive that is not true to 
the words of the WCT.1070 He therefore maintained that this demonstrated how 
dispensing with the historical context in the implementation of the Directive has resulted 
in a skewed interpretation.1071 Ross and Livingstone argued that this approach went 
																																								 																				
1062 Reinbothe J. and Von Lewinski S., The WIPO Treaties 1996 (London: Butterworths; 2002) 
p.108. 
1063 Ibid., p. 105. 
1064 Ibid., p. 109. 
1065 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society. 
1066 Ibid., recital 23. 
1067 Ibid., recital 23. 
1068 Ibid., recital 25. 
1069 Proposal for a Directive on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Information Society, Brussels, 10.12.97, COM 97 (628) p. 25. 
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beyond the Berne definition of communication to the public, in particular the reference to 
interpreting the right in a broad sense.1072 
The Explanatory Memorandum also referred to the agreement made during the WIPO 
Diplomatic Conference whereby the act of offering a work on a publicly accessible 
website, prior to its actual transmission, would be captured by ‘making available’, 
irrespective of whether any person actually accesses the work.1073 Again, this is a clear 
development in the scope of the meaning of the right from that in the Berne convention, 
which as stated above, emphasised the importance of the public receiving the work.  
The CJEU has since stated that the concept of a communication to the public is the same 
across all the directives and should be given the same meaning in accordance with “the 
European Union legal order and its coherence.”1074 This meaning was considered to be 
broad and systematic to uphold the right of communication to the public.1075 
Neither the WCT 1996, nor the Directive 2001/29 provided a definition of communication 
to the public. The first definition of communication to the public appeared in the WIPO 
Phonogram and Performance Treaty, which stated that: “Communication to the public of 
a performance or a phonogram means the transmission to the public by any medium, 
otherwise than by broadcasting, of sounds of a performance or the sounds or the 
representations of sounds fixed in a phonogram. For the purposes of Article 15, 
communication to the public includes making the sounds or representations of sounds 
fixed in a phonogram audible to the public.”1076 The definition did not define the words 
‘transmission’ and ‘public’ and therefore it remains vague.1077 
Hugenholtz argued that the law at International and European level is still unclear, for 
example he stated that “both the WCT and the Directive leave open the question of 
whether the making available of protected works over the internet is a unitary restricted 
																																								 																				
1072 Ross A. and Livingstone C., Communication to the Public: Part 1 (2012) 23(6) 
Entertainment Law Review, pp. 169-173, p. 170. 
1073 Proposal for a Directive on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Information Society, Brussels, 10.12.97, COM 97 (628) p.26. 
1074 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure (C-403/08 and 429/08) [2012] All 
E.R. (EC) 629, at 188. The meaning of communication to the public by way of interpretation of 
the courts will be analysed in detail in the following chapter. 
1075 Keane B., Ill Communication? The Concept of a Communication to the Public Under EU 
Copyright Law (2013) 24(5) Entertainment Law Review, pp. 165-171, p. 170; see also Bonadio 
and Santo, Communication to the Public in FAPL v QC Leisure and Murphy v Media Protection 
Services (C-403/08 and C-429/08) (2012) 4 European Intellectual Property Review, pp. 277-
279. 
1076 WIPO Phonogram and Performance Treaty 1996, Article 2(g). 
1077 Ross A. and Livingstone C., Communication to the Public: Part 1 (2012) 23(6) 
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act, or, a series of restricted acts performed individually by the owner of the website, the 
service provider (host) and the access provider.”1078 
However, Dixon and Hansen argued that the right is broad and beneficial for rights 
holders: “Regardless of the manner or medium in which a protected work is accessed, 
authors would continue to enjoy the right to control economically meaningful exploitation 
of their works in the digital world.”1079 
This section has demonstrated the development of the communication right from 
regulating offline broadcast to online activity. Laddie argued that whilst the right to 
broadcast may not be considered a new right in itself, the right to make the work available 
to the public by electronic transmission, in such a way that members of the public may 
access it from a place and at a time individually chosen by them, would be.1080 
The analysis has shown that the law was advanced in response to digital technologies 
from the right to regulate offline broadcasting to encompass online activities. In 
developing the law, the right to restrict communication to the public is broad and vague.  
The development of the law at this stage, could be said to take an external perspective 
due to the use of technology related terms within the drafting of the law; for example by 
‘wire or wireless means.’1081 Furthermore, the internal perspective was explicitly not 
included; for example when it was clarified that the right did not cover display.1082 This 
seems natural in light of the fact that the law developed from an offline regulation and at 
the time of drafting online technologies, activities and behaviours where still considered 
novel and not yet advanced. 
This discussion now turns to consider the transposing of communication to the public 
into the UK law and thus undertakes a statutory analysis of section 20 of the CDPA 1988.  
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1080 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (London: 
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1081 WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, Article 8. 
1082 Summary of Minutes of Main Committee II in Records of the Diplomatic Conference on 
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The Challenges of Transposing EU Directives into UK 
Legislation: The Impact of the Process 
The Information Society Directive1083 was transposed into UK law by way of the Copyright 
and Related Rights Regulations SI 2003/2498, which came into force on 31 October 
2003. However, the wording of section 20 CDPA 1988 did not replicate that of Article 3 
of the Information Society Directive, for example Article 3(1) referred to communication 
by wire or wireless means.1084 In contrast, section 20 of the CDPA 1988 stated that 
communication to the public may occur by electronic transmission.1085  
The content of the EU Directive was considered somewhat vague1086 and as a result 
political compromise and debate was required in the drafting of the Regulations. 
Implementation theory1087 stresses three important considerations1088 when analysing 
the transposition of the law. Firstly, the institutional factors, taking into consideration the 
number and strength of decision points required in the process,1089 secondly, the political 
and policy agendas1090 and thirdly, the substantive factors that concern the nature of the 
objective pursued.1091 These factors are borne in mind in as the discussion now 
considers the transposing of the EU Information Society Directive into UK law. This 
analysis provides context and understanding of how the law became as it did by 
highlighting the tensions that are faced in the process of transposing EU Directives into 
UK law.  
Firstly, in relation to the institutional factors, the involvement of Member States in the 
formation of EU Law cannot be forgotten. However, Page argued that the legislative 
output of the UK remained largely unaffected by EU membership.1092 Furthermore, it has 
																																								 																				
1083 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
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1084 Information Society Directive, Article 3(1). 
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1086 Dimitrakopoulos D. G., The Transposition of EU Laws Post-Decisional Politics and 
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Dashed in Oakland (California; University of California Press: 1984). 
1088 Dimitrakopoulos D. G., The Transposition of EU Laws Post-Decisional Politics and 
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been observed that there can be pressure on the officials who transpose EU law into UK 
regulation to mitigate, or defeat, unwanted consequences of EU law.1093  
Ramsey argued that the implementation of directives has been extremely onerous for 
the UK, as drafters have experienced difficulty in coping with the volume of Directives 
adopted by the European Commission.1094 Moreover, in the UK the issues regarding 
transposition are considered technical, and drafters are often administration officials, not 
lawyers.1095 Ramsey stated that the characteristics of EU directives are stylistically and 
functionally different from UK legislation, which creates problems for the drafters.1096 
Drafters must ensure that the implementing legislation achieves the directive's objectives 
and attempt to do this by elaborating the Directive into a common law style.1097 Laddie, 
Prescott and Vitoria note the variation of UK Law transposed from EU Directives.1098 
The Information Society Directive used the words “by wire or wireless means”1099 but the 
UK drafters replaced these words with “by electronic transmission.”1100 It has been 
suggested that this was because the term ‘wire’ had English historical connotations of 
telegraphy.1101 Larusson suggested that the drafter should have used the words ‘by 
electronic means’ instead, which he argued, were more passive and could have avoided 
the current uncertainty.1102 Copy-out1103 is a solution, which proposes to overcome the 
issues over-implementation and under implementation of EU law. Copy-out means to 
take the words as they appear in the Directive. The technique is described as “simply 
refers to or literally adopts the same, or virtually the same, language as the directive 
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itself.”1104 However, Ramsey submitted that copy out not only creates new legal problems 
but that it does not answer the problems of lack of time, over-implementation and under-
implementation which it was designed to address.1105 A copy-out approach could result 
in problems for example when the EU Directive uses a word that has a different meaning 
in UK law.  
Understanding why the language of the law changes in the transposition of the EU 
Directive into UK law is important in understanding what new meaning may be invoked 
from the revised words. Without this knowledge, the change in words are not always 
appreciated; for example as Jacob LJ stated: “Why, oh why do statutory draftsman 
persist in trying to gloss Directives which are specific about what is to be 
implemented?”1106 In determining meaning from this change Jacob LJ concluded that the 
draftsmen must have been attempting to make the same meaning expressed in the 
Directive clearer: “The UK draftsman was merely making explicit that which was implicit 
in the Directive.”1107 
The explanatory notes it stated that the regulations implement the Information Society 
Directive with the view to harmonise (among other things) the right to communication to 
the public.1108 Thus the Regulations redefined section 20 of the CDPA 1988, granting an 
exclusive right to the copyright owner to control the broadcasting of their work and 
provided greater certainty that the copyright owner had the right to control any 
communication to the public by electronic transmission, including by means of a 
broadcast, but also in respect of the making available to the public of works in such a 
way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually 
chosen by them.1109 
Prior to the 2003 Regulations it was debatable whether transmissions over the internet 
in the course of downloading a webpage would amount to communication to the 
public.1110 Subsequently, the Regulations clearly provided the copyright holder with the 
exclusive right to control any electronic communication to the public.1111 Haque argued 
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that this expanded the copyright holders rights too far, allowing them control over the 
individual.1112 Moreover, Koelman argued that this extended copyright law to new levels 
not seen before: “An action against non-commercial individual access to, or consumption 
of a work, constitutes a revolution in copyright law, which traditionally covers acts related 
to commercial exploitation performed by potential competitors rather than acts carried 
out by individual end users.”1113  
On the other hand, Gillen recognised that the new right to communication was designed 
to fill the gaps in the other provisions and that it was clear that this new right went further 
than the performance right, where it was usually expected that the public will be present, 
allowing communication to occur at any place or time of the receiver's choosing.1114  
This section has demonstrated the challenges that arise in the implantation of European 
law, in particular from the Information Society Directive to the 2003 Copyright 
Regulations. In doing so, it has set out the impetus of the law and the development and 
consolidation of the new right for copyright holders. The analysis revealed that the 
original intention of the right was to enable copyright holders to control the television and 
radio broadcast of their work. Subsequently, it attempted to encapsulate on-demand 
television broadcasts accessed at a different time or place by the user.  
At this stage, the external perspective appeared to take precedent in the drafting of the 
law, revealed by the use of technological terminology and in light of the fact that the law 
developed from regulating offline activities. As the law developed to encapsulate online 
activities the perspective remained. In addition, it was demonstrated that the law 
developed as a response to new technologies1115 and therefore the law was drafted in a 
technologically specific manner, despite the intention for it to remain technologically 
neutral.1116 
In light of the above, this chapter now moves on to consider the wording of 
communication to the public as it now appears in section 20 CDPA 1988.  
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An Analysis of Section 20 of the CDPA 1988: Infringement 
Communication to the Public 
As mentioned, there is no statutory definition of communication to the public per se. 
Herein lies the first challenge of this regulation. This new right granted copyright holders 
the power to govern the use of copyright-protected content online and therefore, it is 
imperative that a clear understanding of what constitutes an act of communication online 
is established.  
As stated, the Information Society Directive stated that the right of communication to the 
public should be interpreted in a broad sense covering all communication to the public 
not present at the place where the communication originates.1117 This was confirmed by 
Kitchin in ITV Broadcasting Ltd v TV Catch Up Ltd1118 taking the view that the right of 
communication to the public was to be interpreted broadly, covering all communication 
to the public not present where the communication originates.1119 
It was recognised that this is a highly contentious area1120 and that the concept of 
communication to the public is uncertain.1121 The challenges that arise in the process 
transposing the right1122 raised questions about whether the current set of rights is 
sufficient or appropriate.1123  
Therefore, the discussion now turns to a consideration of the key elements of the right 
to communication as per section 20 CDPA 1988 in order to decipher the meaning of the 
right, before applying the internal and external perspectives. In particular, this section 
considers in detail the wording of the statutory law in relation to three key elements of 
the right; the categories, the public and electronic transmission. As mentioned the 
analysis of the case law that relates to section 20 CDPA 1988 follows in the next chapter.  
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[2007] ECDR 2 at 36. 
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Communicating Subject Matter: Section 2(1) CDPA 1988 
Section 20(1) of the CDPA 1988 stated that communication to the public of the work is 
an act restricted by the copyright in (a) literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works, (b) 
sound recordings, film, or (c) broadcasts. This suggested that the question of whether a 
particular act constitutes a communication to the public may depend on the nature of the 
copyright work under consideration. This is relevant to the current investigation as the 
internal and external perspective of the internet have a dramatic effect on the 
categorisation of works online. From the external perspective, it could be argued that all 
types of work online, or on a computer, are all files of some technical description. From 
this perspective, it does not matters what form of art the file holds, such as a film or a 
song, it is simply digital data. On the other hand, the internal perspective would view the 
different types of work as they are consumed by the experience of the listener or reader 
or watcher, and therefore categorisation of works is relevant. 
This highlights a tension in the way that the law has been applied to online activities. For 
example, according to the CJEU, although a graphic user interface of a computer 
program can be protected by copyright, television broadcasting of the graphic user 
interface will not constitute communication to the public of that work.1124 The CJEU 
justified this on the basis that the television viewers received the graphic user interface 
solely in a passive manner, without the possibility of intervening.1125  
Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria argued that the difference between a graphic interface and 
a television broadcast was that the user could not interact with a television broadcast.1126 
They submitted that insofar as a graphic user interface consisted of graphics in addition 
to interactivity these aspects of the work are communicated to the public.1127 
One key issue with the separation of works into categories in the modern digital age is 
that the distinction between the characteristics of each type of work is becoming more 
and more blurred. The main problem with defining copyright holders control around 
technological boundaries is that technological developments are resulting in the overlap 
of such categories, which ultimately leads to greater confusion in the meaning of the law. 
For example, as a result of Smart Television technology, it is now possible for television 
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broadcast to be interactive. For example, a viewer can select different cameras to watch 
or interact with the broadcast through the internet or social media, on the television 
itself.1128 
A second example demonstrating this point is the use gaming techniques in the 
development of non-gaming contexts such as webpages to mimic the characteristics of 
games. Games and game technologies are increasingly transcending the traditional 
boundaries of their medium.1129 Deterding et al. explained that: “Recent years have seen 
a rapid proliferation of mass-market consumer software that takes inspiration from video 
games. Usually summarized as gamification.”1130 They define gamification as the use of 
game elements for purposes other than their normal expected use1131 and argued that 
this emerging phenomena warrants new concepts and research.1132 The aim is to retain 
visitors on the website for longer, for example by using reward techniques.1133 For 
example, website developers have been inspired by gaming to develop an application 
which stores the memory representation of what is displayed on the html1134 page and 
then executes codes to draw elements on the page, checking against the Virtual 
Document Object Model (DOM)1135  to match up the display.1136 This application 
minimises the need for redrawing and therefore costs of resources are reduced.1137 
From an external perspective, the technology behind the website mimics that of a game 
and therefore suggests that the website be regulated as such. However, from an internal 
perspective the experience of the product is as a webpage. This highlights that 
developing software engineering in this way clearly blurs the boundaries between 
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different types of copyright material.1138 As such, if technology continues to develop in 
this manner, attempting to regulate online activity by defining categories of works could 
become redundant.  
The discussion now turns to consider the second key element of the statutory analysis 
of communication to the public; that is the meaning of ‘the public.’ 
 
Communication to the Public, Section 20 CDPA 1988: 
Who Are The Public? 
As mentioned, there has been no clear definition of the meaning of the public in the 
statutory law. This an intentional avoidance in the drafting, for example as the Report on 
the Seventh Session stated: “The need to define the notion of public had been 
successfully avoided.”1139 
However, it is argued that most national laws have struggled, and continue to find it 
difficult, to formulate a clear meaning as to the ‘in public’ requirement.1140 It is argued 
that this has become a challenge in light of the internet and copyright1141 and that the 
lack of clarity has left many questions open in critically important areas concerning 
copyright in the digital networked world.1142 Mysoor argued new technologies have 
created a stronger need for the communication right to be clearer: “The numerous 
possibilities of communication enabled by new technology also highlight the need for a 
clearer understanding of terms such as communication and public.”1143 
It was previously considered that that the access of information online was not to the 
public, but to a private individual.1144 As the WIPO Guide stated that the opposite of public 
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was private and therefore private communication would not constitute communication to 
the public: “The Convention does not provide a definition of the concept of ‘public’, either 
as an adjective or as a noun. It is, however, quite obvious that, as regards the adjective 
‘public’, it is the opposite of the adjective ‘private’ and, thus, what may not be 
characterized as ‘private’ is supposed to be regarded ‘public.’”1145 For example, Article 8 
WCT excluded family members, but included school or company intranet as public 
communications.1146 
However, Haque argued that the distinction between public and private communication 
was blurred, creating confusion on a technological level.1147 For example, The meaning 
of ‘the public’ in relation to communication of copyright work has been held by the CJEU 
to make no distinction between the making available in the private context of a hotel 
room and in public areas in the hotel. The Court suggested that the important question 
was whether a new section of the public sees or hears the work.1148 
Therefore, when applying the concept of public online, even though there may be only 
one person accessing the information, he or she is classed as the public.1149 Arezzo 
agreed that as generally users would receive the communication within the privacy of 
their own homes, the notion of the public in this context appears peculiar.1150 However, 
some case law has suggested that it is not the economic relevance of the user but the 
cumulative effect1151 created by the number of people who could simultaneously, or in 
succession, access the work.1152 
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Glossary Of Copyright And Related Rights Terms (Switzerland: World Intellectual Property 
Organization; 2003) p. 69. 
1146 Reinbothe J. and Von Lewinski S., The WIPO Treaties 1996 (London: Butterworths; 2002) 
p. 111. 
1147 Haque H., Is the Time Ripe for Another Exclusive Right? A Proposal (2008) 30(9) European 
Intellectual Property Review, pp. 371-378. 
1148 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA [2007] 
ECDR 2 at 41. 
1149 Frame R., The Protection and Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights on the Internet: 
The Way Forward for the Music Industry (1999) 4 Intellectual Property Quarterly, pp. 443-470, 
p. 443. 
1150 Arezzo. E, Hyperlinks and Making Available Right in the European Union - What Future for 
the Internet After Svensson? (2014) 45(5) International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law, pp. 524-555, p. 534. 
1151 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL [2006] 
E.CR. I-11519, C-306/05 at 39. 
1152 Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso [2012] Case C‑135/10 at 87. 
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Nevertheless, it is argued by many that this is an exceptionally wide interpretation of 'the 
public' which gives the words virtually no meaning at all.1153 For example, the meaning 
of the words ‘in public’ in relation to section 19 of the CDPA 1988 have been interpreted 
with far narrower scope. Indeed, it has been suggested that some limitation must be 
imposed for example by excluding family and close friends.1154  
The CJEU have also specified that the public must be a ‘new public’, meaning a public 
which was not taken into account by the authors of the protected works when they 
authorized their use by the communication to the original public.1155 This could be seen 
to reflect the original wording, as stated above, of granting the copyright holders control 
of any ‘rebroadcasting’. Thus, when this communication is made by an organization other 
than the original one1156 and thereby, to a new public. 
In relation to the Framework of Digital Perspectives it is not possible to be certain of a 
perspective in the statutory law where the aim has been to avoid defining meaning. The 
term ‘public’ has been deliberately left vague for the Court’s interpretation. However, it 
is interesting to consider the notion of the public as opposed to private individual. As 
stated, from an offline perspective the distinction between these two audiences is clear, 
however, when applying this to the online environment it is confused by technology that 
allows many individual users to access a work at any one time. From an external 
perspective, this would be difficult to consider as a public as technically the people are 
individually accessing the work in a private setting. However, from an internal 
perspective, it could be suggested that together the individuals form an online community 
which constitute a public.  
Nevertheless, the legislature has made it clear that the issue of defining the public was 
better left to the Courts.1157 Therefore, the concept of the ‘public’ will be address in more 
																																								 																				
1153 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (London: 
Butterworths Law; 2011) 17.13. 
1154 Opinion of the Advocate-General in Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España 
(SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA [2007] Bus. LR 521 at 64. See also Reinbothe J. and Von 
Lewinski S., The WIPO Treaties 1996 (London: Butterworths; 2002) Commentary to art 8 WCT, 
at para 21. 
1155 Football Assoc Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure (C-403/08); Karen Murphy v Media 
Protection Services Ltd [2012] 1 C.M.L.R. 29 C-429/08 at 197. See also, Airfield NV and Canal 
Digitaal BV v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (Sabam) (C-
431/09) and Airfield NV v Agicoa Belgium BVBA, judgement of the Court, Third Chamber, 13 
October 2011, joined cases C-431/09 and C-432/09, 2011 ECR I-09363, at 76. 
1156 The Berne Convention 1886 as amended 1979, Article 11bis.  
1157 Hansard, HL,	Debates of the CDPA 1988 Bill 5th ser., col.268 (2 November 1988). 
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detail in the following chapter which considers the case law relating to communication to 
the public.  
This discussion now turns to the final consideration of the statutory analysis of 
communication to the public; that is the meaning of ‘electronic transmission’. 
 
Communication to the Public by Electronic Transmission: 
Section 20(2) CDPA 1988 
	
Section 20 of the CDPA 1988 granted the copyright holder the right to control 
communication to the public by 'electronic transmission'. Arezzo argued that the 
identification of the legal concept of communication to the public with the technical notion 
of transmission of the work is crucial to properly understanding the contours of this 
right.1158 
As mentioned, the words ‘electronic transmission’ did not appear in Article 3 of the 
Information Society Directive. The reason for this change may have stemmed from the 
fact that ‘by wire’ had historical connotations to telegraphy.1159 However, Larusson 
argued that the draftsmen should have used the more passive ‘by electronic means’.1160 
Nevertheless, it appeared that the intention of these words remained to ensure that the 
communication right restricted the communication of a copyright work to a public not 
present at the place where the communication originated.1161  
However, the term ‘electronic transmission’ does not necessarily suggest that the 
members of the public are not present at the time of transmission. For example, Laddie, 
Prescott and Vitoria suggested the example of a transmission by loudspeaker as a form 
of electronic communication where the public may be present at the place where the 
communication originates.1162 Nevertheless, they suggested that section 20 must only 
																																								 																				
1158 Arezzo. E, Hyperlinks and Making Available Right in the European Union - What Future for 
the Internet After Svensson? (2014) 45(5) International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law, pp. 524-555, p. 532. 
1159 Larusson H. K., Uncertainty in the Scope of Copyright: The Case of Illegal File-Sharing in 
the UK (2009) 31(3) European Intellectual Property Review, pp. 124-134, p.126. 
1160 Larusson H. K., Uncertainty in the Scope of Copyright: The Case of Illegal File-Sharing in 
the UK (2009) 31(3) European Intellectual Property Review, pp. 124-134, p.126. 
1161 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure (No.2) [2008] FSR 32 as per	Mr 
Justice Kitchin at 261, in line with Recital 23 of the Information Society Directive.  
1162 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (London: 
Butterworths Law; 2011) 17.12. 
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be interpreted to mean forms of communication where the public is not present where 
the communication originated.1163 
Another controversial uncertainty in the wording of the CDPA 1988 was that there 
appeared to be no requirement that any transmission actually takes place before 
infringement can occur. Particularly, in relation to the making available of the work, which 
may only require that members of the public could access it.1164 In light of this, the 
communication right differs significantly from the other rights granted to copyright holders 
where infringement implies an actual exploitation or enjoyment of the work. Conversely, 
the right of communication to the public has been interpreted as covering acts of 
transmission not followed by any actual enjoyment of the work.1165 
This interpretation has been confirmed by the CJEU which explicitly stated that 
transmission simply involved an act of intervention which made the work available to the 
public in such a way that the persons forming the public may access it: what mattered 
was that the work was put in a position to be potentially accessed by the public at 
large.1166 
In applying the Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives it is clear that the words 
‘electronic transmission’ fall within the external perspective as it applies to the 
technological function of the hardware and software involved in the communication of 
the copyright work. In analysing the intention of the right, again the external perspective 
was taken in order to create a new right to deal specifically with a technological 
development of television and radio broadcast.  
However, statutory law does not clarify the meaning of the ‘electronic transmission’ and 
therefore this is also considered in the following chapter; whereby the judges 
interpretation of the statutory law is analysed in the relevant case law.  
 
																																								 																				
1163 Ibid. 
1164 Caddick, N., Davies G. and Harbottle G., Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell; 2016) paras 7-116. 
1165 Arezzo. E, Hyperlinks and Making Available Right in the European Union - What Future for 
the Internet After Svensson? (2014) 45(5) International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law, pp. 524-555, p. 532. 
1166 Mediakabel BV v Commissariaat voor de Media, judgement of the Court, Third Chamber, 2 
June 2005 (case C-89/04) 2005 ECR I-4891, at para 30; Lagardère Active Broadcast v Société 
pur la Perception de la remuneration Équitable (SPRE) and Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von 
Eistungsschutzrechten MBH (GVL), judgement of the Court, Third Chamber (case C-192/04) 
2005 ECR I-07199, at para 31. 
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Conclusion 
The historical analysis of the development of the right to communication revealed that 
original purpose of the right was to allow copyright holders to control television and radio 
broadcasts. However, the scope of the right expanded dramatically over the course of 
its development through international, European and UK legislation.  
The statutory analysis revealed that despite the importance of this right being defined, 
there was no clear definition of the boundaries or meaning of communication to the 
public. As Mysoor argued, the numerous possibilities of communication enabled by new 
technology highlight the need for a clearer understanding of terms such as 
communication and public.1167  
As a result, the right of communication to the public has struggled to find a predictable 
interpretation1168 and the potential scope of communication is unlimited. The scope of 
the right widened quickly and dramatically, particularly in light of new technological and 
behaviour developments. This right now allows copyright holders to essentially control 
any communication of their work.1169 In 1999 Russell Fame predicted that “the internet 
is a new and as yet, a relatively unregulated medium for communication.”1170 However, 
with the development of the right to communication, this would suggest that it’s possible 
for rights-holders’ to control everything on the internet.  
In relation to the Framework of Digital Perspectives originally, at the stage of the Berne 
Convention there was a suggestion of an internal perspective as the guidance discussed 
the need for the work to be received by the eyes or ears of a person.1171 However, it 
appeared that the scope of the right has extended so far that the making available of the 
work is enough to constitute communication and therefore only the potential to access 
the material is needed, no eyes or ears necessarily receive it. As the ALAI Report stated 
																																								 																				
1167 Mysoor P., Unpacking the Right of Communication to the Public: A Closer Look at 
International and EU Copyright Law (2013) 2 Intellectual Property Quarterly, pp. 166-185, p. 
167. 
1168 Ibid., p. 167. 
1169 Gillen M., File-Sharing and Individual Civil Liability in the United Kingdom: A Question of 
Substantial Abuse? (2006) 17(1) Entertainment Law Review, pp. 7-14, p. 11: Arguing that the 
new right addresses the latest challenges to copyright; “making available is the essence of file-
sharing.” 
1170 Frame R., The Protection and Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights on the Internet: 
The Way Forward for the Music Industry (1999) 4 Intellectual Property Quarterly, pp. 443-470, 
p. 443. 
1171 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Guide to the Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris 1971 (WIPO: Geneva; 1978). p. 68. 
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the making available right covers all kinds of on-demand access “whether or not the 
access results in a retention copy.”1172 
Thereafter, the analysis demonstrated that the statutory law took on an external 
perspective due to the use of technology related terms within the drafting. Furthermore, 
the internal perspective was explicitly not included; for example, when Australia clarified 
that the right did not cover display.1173 This perspective appeared to be a consequence 
of the fact that the law developed from an offline regulation. The regulation surrounding 
communication to the public clearly highlighted the tensions that arise when attempting 
to apply laws created for specific analogue technological purposes onto activity 
conducted online. This was highlighted in the analysis by drawing attention to the 
problem of regulating different types of copyright materials online. 
As demonstrated, much of the statutory law in relation to communication to the public 
was deliberately broad and vague, with the intention that further clarification be defined 
through the Courts.1174 This leads the Courts towards a purposive interpretation as the 
literal meaning of the words used were deliberately ambiguous. As such, the next 
chapter looks into this controversial matter deeper, by making an analysis of the case 
law which interpret and apply the statutory regulation. 
  
																																								 																				
1172 Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale (ALAI), Report and Opinion on the Making 
Available and Communication to the Public in the Internet Environment - Focus on Linking 
Techniques on the Internet, available at http://www.alai.org/en/assets/files/resolutions/making-
available-right-report-opinion.pdf Point (i). 
1173 Summary of Minutes of Main Committee II in Records of the Diplomatic Conference on 
Certain Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Questions, (Geneva: WIPO; 1996) para 307. 
1174 Hansard, HL, Debates of the CDPA 1988 Bill 5th ser., col.268 (2 November 1988). 
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Chapter 6 
	
An analysis of EU and UK Jurisprudence Relating to Communication to the 
Public 
“To send my rhymes out to all nations…I’ve got the ill communications.” The Beastie 
Boys 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter’s 3 and 4 focused on the right of reproduction, as the fundamental restricted act 
of copyright. Subsequently the previous chapter 5 and this chapter 6 focus on 
communication to the public. In order to do this, chapter 5 addressed the statutory law 
and this chapter addresses the case law. 
It is necessary to consider these two types of infringement in light of the overarching 
context of this thesis; the internet. This is because traditionally reproduction was the key 
right afforded to copyright holders. However, in recent years, communication to the 
public has become of equal importance due to its ability to restrict use of copyright 
materials without actual copying or performance. This has therefore been utilised by 
copyright holders in applying the law to the internet. As Depreeu highlighted: “Unlike the 
reproduction right these rights protected the ‘immaterial exploitation’ of copyright works. 
Traditionally the reproduction right has drawn more attention but this seems to be 
changing. Rightly so: in an increasingly immaterial ‘information society’, the importance 
to the right of communication to the public can hardly be underestimated.”1175 
Furthermore, Keane stated: “The right of communication to the public has been 
transformed from a relatively peripheral right to one which is taking centre stage for the 
protection of works.”1176 
At first glance, it might appear that communication to the public, being a more recent 
form of copyright protection that is used to protect works online might have cleared up 
some of the challenges faced in applying reproduction online. However, as highlighted 
in the previous chapter, the definition of communication to the public is a highly 
																																								 																				
1175 Depreeu S., The Variable Scope of The Exclusive Economic Rights in Copyright (The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law; 2014) p. 245. 
1176 Keane B., Ill Communication? The Concept of a Communication to the Public Under EU 
Copyright Law (2013) 24(5) Entertainment Law Review, pp. 165-171, p.170. 
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contentious, grey area1177 and its meaning is uncertain.1178 
As technologies continue to develop it has become difficult to determine what constitutes 
a communication for the purposes of copyright infringement online.1179 
Therefore, this chapter first considers what is meant by communication in light of the 
internet. Livingstone theorised that the internet has changed communication as a 
concept; as it allowed much more interaction between people. He stated: “What’s new 
about the internet may be the combination of interactivity with those features which were 
innovative for mass communication – the unlimited range of content, the scope of 
audience reach and the global nature of communication.”1180 Thus the internet has 
essentially created an extension to communication as a concept.1181 In many respects, 
the internet can be understood as a tool for communication.1182 As a result, regulating 
communication online could potentially regulate all online activity. It is, therefore, 
essential that the perimeters of communication to the public for the purposes of copyright 
infringement online are clearly defined. This analysis revealed that the internet is 
considered itself a mass medium for communication and the interactivity which the online 
technology provides has transformed the concept of communication. In light of copyright 
infringement, communication to the public could therefore potentially be incredibly 
broad.1183 
An analysis of the UK case law relating to communication to the public was then 
undertaken. This analysis compared the case law before and after the 2003 
Regulations1184 that amended section 20 of the CDPA 1988 from a broadcasting right to 
a right of communication to the public. The analysis revealed four key findings. Firstly, 
that since the Regulations there has been an increase in the use of this section. 
Secondly, before the Regulations the disputes took place between copyright holding 
																																								 																				
1177 Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The 
European Economic And Social Committee And the Committee of the Regions; Towards a 
Modern, More European Copyright Framework (2015) Brussels, 9.12.2015 COM (2015) 626, 
p.10. 
1178 Ibid., p. 9. 
1179 Depreeu S., The Variable Scope of The Exclusive Economic Rights in Copyright (The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law; 2014) p. 265. 
1180 Livingstone S., New Media, New Audiences? (1999) 1(1) New Media and Society, pp. 59-
66, p. 65. 
1181 McQuail D., McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory (London: Sage Publications Ltd; 2011) 
p. 139. 
1182 Berners-Lee T., Weaving the Web: The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World 
Wide Web (New York: Harper Business; 2000) 36. 
1183 Ross A. and Livingstone C., Communication to the Public: Part 1 (2012) 23(6) 
Entertainment Law Review, pp. 169-173, p. 170. 
1184 Copyright and Related Rights Regulations SI 2003/2498. 
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companies, however, subsequently the majority of disputes took place between 
copyright holding companies and individuals. Thirdly, the copyright works subject to 
dispute has increased in scope, and finally, the most successful cases were brought by 
copyright holding companies.  
The analysis also considered the European Court’s interpretation of communication to 
the public, as it is the CJEU that determines the interpretation and meaning of the 
Directives which are implemented by the UK Courts when applying national law. 1185 
Analysis of the case law thus considers in detail the key terms in defining communication 
to the public, namely what the Courts have defined ‘communication,’ ‘electronic 
transmission’ and ‘the public.’ 
The analysis of the CJEU jurisprudence revealed that there is no definition of 
communication as such, but that it always involves electronic transmission. However, 
this leads to uncertainty as electronic transmission is also not defined. The discussion 
then considers how the CJEU case law has been applied in the UK case law, through 
an analysis of the application of communication in UK Courts.  
In particular it is clear that whilst the understanding of the internet as a medium of 
communication is an internal perspective, the drafting of the law is made from an external 
perspective. This tension is clearly highlighted in the application of the law. Whilst the 
judges often take considerable time to explain and understand the technical function of 
the online activity in their reasoning, ultimately the decision is taken from an internal 
perspective – that a copyright work is accessed without authorisation. This also contrasts 
with the approach taken in applying reproduction online.1186 
This chapter seeks to establish three key points. Firstly, that the nature of the internet 
as a communication device is understood from an internal perspective, which contrasts 
with the external drafting of copyright law. Secondly, to consider the impact of the 
communication to the public regulation, in particular comparing the cases before and 
after the introduction of the law.1187 Thirdly, how the judges interpret and apply the law 
																																								 																				
1185 ITV Broadcasting Limited, ITV 2 Limited, ITV Digital Channels Limited, Channel Four 
Television Corporation, 4 Ventures Limited, Channel 5 Broadcasting Limited, ITV Studios Ltd v 
TVCatchup Ltd (in administration), TVCatchup (UK) Limited, Media Resources Ltd (a Mauritian 
company) v The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Virgin Media Ltd [2015] 
EWCA Civ 204 as per Lord Justice Kitchin at 86. 
1186 See chapter 4, where whilst both perspectives where taken, the external perspective was 
more commonly applied.  
1187 As introduced by the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations SI 2003/2498. 
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of communication to the public to online activity, looking particularly at their use of the 
internal and external perspectives.  
 
What Does ‘Communication’ Mean Within the Context of the 
Internet? 
The first section of this chapter considers what is meant by communication in light of 
online technologies and how copyright infringement by way of communication to the 
public fits in with this understanding.  
The Oxford English Dictionary definition of communication is “the imparting or 
exchanging of information by speaking, writing, or using some other medium…a letter or 
message containing information or news.”1188 It is a late middle English word that 
originates from Old French comunicacion and Latin communicatio(n-)1189 which stems 
from the verb ‘communicare’ which means “to share.”1190 
This is significant in light of the internet, which has been considered to facilitate the 
sharing economy. Internet technologies allow instant interaction and communication of 
an unlimited range of content to a global audience.1191 The internet therefore, created an 
extension to communication as a concept.1192 Furthermore, Kalyanaraman and Sundar 
identified that “one of the unique features of the World Wide Web as a mass medium lies 
in the fact that message sources are indistinct from message receivers.”1193 This 
suggests not only an extension but a transformation in the meaning of communication 
altogether. 
The creation of the internet was based on the idea of communication.1194 When designing 
the World Wide Web, Tim Berners-Lee specified that his goal was to link information so 
that it could be available to people around the world, he explained that “the art was…to 
allow one computer to talk to another, in such a way that when all computers everywhere 
																																								 																				
1188 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/communication  
1189 Ibid.  
1190 Ibid. 
1191 Livingstone S., New Media, New Audiences? (1999) 1(1) New Media and Society, pp. 59-
66, p. 65. 
1192 McQuail D., McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory (London: Sage Publications Ltd; 2011) 
p. 139. 
1193 Kalyanaraman S. and Sundar S., Portrait of the Portal as a Metaphor: Explicating Web 
Portals for Communication Research (2008) 65(2) Journalism and Mass Communication 
Quarterly, pp. 239-256, p. 239. 
1194 Berners-Lee T., Weaving the Web: The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World 
Wide Web (New York: Harper Business; 2000). 
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did it, the system would thrive…There was no central computer ‘controlling’ the Web, no 
single network on which these protocols worked, not even an organisazation anywhere 
that ‘ran’ the Web. The Web was not a physical ‘thing’ that existed in a certain ‘place.’ It 
was a ‘space’ in which information could exist.”1195 
According to communication theory the internet is considered a mass communication 
medium, characterised as a medium of interconnectedness, accessible to individuals as 
communicators, for both mass and personal communication.1196 James Carey proposed 
an understanding of communication as transmission; a theory of communication that 
centralises culture as a key feature in communication and society. He defined 
communication as “a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired 
and transformed.”1197 Therefore, it can be understood that the internet, is not a place or 
a thing, but a medium for communication that has expanded the concept of 
communication as it facilitates the ability to share anything to anyone at any time.  
As explained, understanding the internet in this way, as a medium for communication, is 
to take the internal perspective. Conceptualising the technical functions of the hardware 
and software connections that create the internet as a medium for sharing or 
communicating information, is simply a metaphorical cognitive process within the human 
mind that gives meaning to this otherwise seemingly abstract concept.  
However, in contrast the statutory law defined the parameters of copyright infringement 
by communication to the public online using the external perspective. This is 
demonstrated by section 20(2) of the CDPA 1988 which stated its meaning as 
“communication to the public by electronic transmission.”1198 This was confirmed by the 
CJEU in the case of TV Catchup:1199 “The author’s right of communication to the public 
covers any transmission or retransmission of a work to the public not present at the place 
where the communication originates, by wire or wireless means, including 
broadcasting.”1200 
Therefore, in order to determine the application of the restricted act of communication to 
the public, the next section undertakes a consideration of the case law referring to 
section 20 CDPA 1988.  
																																								 																				
1195 Ibid., p. 36. 
1196 McQuail D., McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory (London: Sage Publications Ltd; 2011) 
p. 41. 
1197 Carey J., Communication as Culture (Boston: Unwin Hyman; 1988) p. 23.  
1198 CPDA 1988, section 20(2). 
1199 ITV Broadcasting Ltd v TV Catchup Ltd [2013] C-607/11. 
1200 Ibid., at 23. 
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The UK Law Relating to Communication to the Public 
In order to assess the meaning of communication to the public within the context of UK 
copyright law, all the cases referring to section 20 of the CDPA 1988 where collated and 
analysed.1201 There were 43 UK cases that referenced section 20 of the CDPA 1988, 
which were separated into cases that took place before the 2003 Regulations1202 (pre-
regulation cases) and after the 2003 regulations (post-regulation cases). These cases 
were analysed and compared in order to demonstrate the impact of the Regulations. 
Thereafter a thorough analysis of the post-regulation cases is undertaken in order to 
consider the interpretation and application of the law by the judges, particularly 
considering the internal and external perspectives. 
 
The Pre-Regulation Case Law 
As explained in the previous chapter, before the Information Society Directive1203 was 
transposed into UK law by way of the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations SI 
2003/2498, which came into force on 31 October 2003, section 20 was understood as a 
restriction on broadcasting. Therefore, analysis of these cases would not contribute to 
understanding communication to the public and as a result cases before 2003 were 
excluded from the content analysis.  
However, prior to the exclusion of these cases a comparative analysis was undertaken, 
the results of which are now discussed. There were only six cases brought under section 
20 CDPA 1988 prior to the 2003 regulations. These were: 
1. Phonographic Performance Ltd v Candy Rock Recording Ltd 2000 WL 
3310421204 
2. IPC Magazines Ltd v MGN Ltd [1998] F.S.R. 4311205 
3. Shetland Times Ltd v Dr Jonathan Wills and Another [1997] F.S.R. 6041206 
																																								 																				
1201 The same methodology used for chapter 4 was mirrored here. This part of the analysis was 
completed by 30/04/2016. 
1202 Copyright and Related Rights Regulations SI 2003/2498, which updated the CDPA 1988 in 
order to transpose communication to the public into UK legislation.  
1203 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society. 
1204 Phonographic Performance Ltd (PPL) appealed the Copyright Tribunal decision on 10th 
November 1998, against Candy Rock Recording Limited, a background music dubbing 
company. 
1205 The plaintiff was the publisher of Woman magazine and the defendant was the publisher of 
The Sunday Mirror newspaper. 
1206 The pursuers own and publish The Shetland Times, a newspaper which carries local, 
national and international news. The defenders provide a news reporting service. 
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4. Film Investors Overseas Services SA and Another v The Home Video Channel 
Ltd [1997] E.M.L.R. 3471207 
5. The Association of Independent Radio Companies Ltd (Airc) and Another v 
Phonographic Performance Ltd and the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(Intervener) [1994] R.P.C. 1431208 
6. British Broadcasting Corporation v British Satellite Broadcasting Ltd [1992] Ch. 
1411209 
Every case involved a large or medium sized company in the field of either publication 
or broadcasting. Section 20 was not used to claim infringement against an individual. 
Equally, it was never invoked by creators of content, as such, but in each case the 
claimant was a copyright holding corporation.  
 
The Post-Regulation Case Law 
	
The key findings of the post-regulation cases are summarised in the table below: 
Key 
C:  Corporation (copyright holding corporations, collecting societies1210 and a 
charity1211) 
ISP:  Internet Service Provider (these cases related to s97a injunctions to block 
websites) 
I: Individual (including Newzbin, which was created by 3 individuals) 
 
																																								 																				
1207 The plaintiffs claim to own the copyright of a number of films. The defendants operate a 
television broadcast service. 
1208 The original applications were made by 76 independent radio companies holding licences to 
broadcast and the defendants, Phonographic Performance Ltd (PPL). 
1209 This involved a copyright infringement claim brought by the British Broadcasting 
Corporation against British Satellite Broadcasting for the use of the BBC's broadcasts of 
international football matches played in Italy in June and July 1990 in the course of the World 
Cup finals. 
1210 E.g. Performing Right Society Ltd v B4U Network (Europe) Ltd [2012] EWHC 3010 (Ch). 
1211 David Hoffman v Drug Abuse Resistance Education (UK) Ltd [2012] EWPCC 2. 
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 Case Name Party Work Outcome 
1.  Polydor Ltd v Brown [2005] EWHC 3191 (Ch) C v I  Music Applicant C 
2.  Union des Associations Europeennes de Football 
(UEFA) v Briscomb [2006] EWHC 1268 (Ch); [2010] 
EWHC 1066 (Ch) 
C v I Football 
Match 
Applicant C 
3.  Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd 
[2007] EWHC 3091 (Admin) 
C v I Football 
Match 
Applicant C 
4.  Football Association Premier League Ltd, NetMed 
Hellas SA, Multichoice Hellas SA v QC Leisure 
(David Richardson), AV Station Plc, Malcolm 
Chamberlain, Michael Madden, Sanjay Raval, David 
Greenslade, S.R. Leisure Ltd, Phillip George Charles 
Houghton, Derek Owen [2008] EWHC 1411 (Ch) 
C v I Football 
Match 
Referred to CJEU 
5.  Alan Grisbrook v MGN Ltd, Scottish Daily Record 
and Sunday Mail Ltd, Syndication International Ltd 
[2009] EWHC 2520 (Ch); [2010] EWCA Civ 1399 
I v C Photographs Defendant C 
6.  Alan MacKie t/a 197 Aerial Photography v Nicola 
Askew, Largsholidaylets.Co.UK 2009 WL 2392381 
I v I  Photographs Applicant I 
7.  ITV Broadcasting Ltd, ITV 2 Ltd, ITV Digital 
Channels, Channel 4 Television Corporation, 4 
Ventures Ltd, Channel 5 Broadcasting Ltd v TV 
Catch Up Ltd [2010] EWHC 3063 (Ch); [2011] 
EWHC 2977 (Pat) 
C v I TV Programs Referred to CJEU 
8.  Media C.A.T. Ltd v A – H [2010] EWPCC 017; Media 
C.A.T. Ltd v Malcolm Adams, Katherine Taylor, 
Hooper, Mitchell Chance, Miss Gonzalles Romeo, 
Mark Jimack, Miss Maria Shewan, Keith Wood, 
William Wickam, Sean Allen, Christopher Beck, Dave 
Cundall, Danny Cowan, Glyn Bentley, Pana Begum, 
Peter Armitage, Allan Billington, James Bryant, Julia 
Abbott, Christopher Birkett, M Brunt, Gareth Bacon, 
Wayne Bacon, Michelle McGlade, Elaine Cox, David 
Bick [2011] EWPCC 006 
C v I Pornography Applicant C 
9.  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, Universal 
City Studios Productions LLLP, Warner Bros. 
Entertainment Inc., Paramount Pictures Corporation, 
Disney Enterprises Inc., Columbia Pictures Industries 
Inc. v Newzbin Ltd [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch); [2011] 
EWHC 2714 (Ch) 
C v I Film Applicant C 
10.  Union of European Football Associations v Euroview 
Sport Ltd [2010] EWHC 1066 (Ch) 
C v C Football 
Match 
Referred to CJEU 
11.  Football Dataco Ltd, The Scottish Premier League 
Ltd, The Scottish Football League, PA Sport UK Ltd 
v Sportradar GmbH, Sportradar AG [2010] EWHC 
2911 (Ch); [2011] EWCA Civ 330 
C v C Football 
Match 
Referred to CJEU 
12.  Performing Right Society Ltd v B4U Network 
(Europe) Ltd[2012] EWHC 3010 (Ch) 
C v C Music Applicant C 
13.  David Hoffman v Drug Abuse Resistance Education 
(UK) Ltd [2012] EWPCC 2 
I v C Photograph Applicant I 
14.  Golden Eye (International) Ltd, Ben Dover 
Productions, Celtic Broadcasting Ltd, Easy on the 
Eye, DMS Telecoms Ltd, Gary Baker, Harmony 
Films Ltd, Justin Ribeiro DOS Santos t/a Joybear 
Pictures, Orchid MG Limited, Kudetta Bvba, RP 
Films Ltd, Sweetmeats Productions t/a S.M.P., Sll 
Films Ltd, Terence Stephens t/a One Eyed Jack 
Productions v TelefÓnica UK Ltd v Consumer Focus 
[2012] EWHC 723 (Ch); [2012] EWCA Civ 1740 
C v 
ISP 
Pornographic 
film 
Applicant C 
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15.  Dramatico Entertainment Ltd, EMI Records Ltd, 
Mercury Records Ltd, Polydor Ltd, Rough Trade 
Records Ltd, Sony Music Entertainment UK Ltd, 
Virgin Records Ltd, Warner Music UK Ltd, 679 
Recordings Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd, 
British Telecommunications plc, Everything 
Everywhere Ltd, Talktalk Telecom Group plc, 
TelefÓnica UK Ltd, Virgin Media Ltd [2012] EWHC 
268 (Ch) 
C v 
ISP 
Music Applicant C 
16.  Paramount Home Entertainment Ltd, Sony Pictures 
Home Entertainment Ltd, Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Company Ltd, Universal Pictures (UK) Ltd, 
Warner Bros. Entertainment UK Ltd, Disney 
Enterprises Inc v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd, British 
Telecommunications Plc, Everything Everywhere 
Ltd, Talktalk Telecom Ltd, Telefónica UK Ltd, Virgin 
Media Ltd [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch); [2014] EWHC 
937 (Ch) 
C v 
ISP 
Film Applicant C 
17.  Emi Records Ltd, Infectious Ltd, Liberation Music Pty 
Ltd, Polydor Ltd, Simco Ltd, Sony Music 
Entertainment UK Ltd, Universal Music Operations 
Ltd, Virgin Records Ltd, Warner Music UK Ltd, Wea 
International Inc v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd, 
British Telecommunications plc, Everything 
Everywhere Ltd, Talktalk Telecom Group plc, 
Telefónica UK Ltd, Virgin Media Ltd [2013] EWHC 
379 (Ch) 
C v 
ISP 
Music  Applicant C 
18.  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, Universal 
City Studios Productions LLP, Warner Bros. 
Entertainment Inc., Paramount Pictures Corporation, 
Disney Enterprises, Inc, Columbia Pictures 
Industries, Inc. v SKY UK Limited, British 
Telecommunications plc, EE Ltd, Talktalk Telecom 
Limited, Virgin Media Ltd [2015] EWHC 1082 (Ch) 
C v 
ISP 
Film  Applicant C 
19.  Football Association Premier League Ltdv British Sky 
Broadcasting Limited, British Telecommunications 
Plc, Everything Everywhere Limited, Talktalk 
Telecom Limited, TelefÓnica UK Limited, Virgin 
Media Ltd[2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch) 
C v 
ISP 
Football 
Match 
Applicant C 
20.  Football Association Premier League Ltd v Anthony 
William Luxton, Barclays Bank Ltd [2014] EWHC 253 
(Ch) 
C v I Football 
Match 
Applicant C 
21.  1967 Ltd, Dramatico Entertainment Ltd, Infectious 
Music Ltd, Liberation Music PTY Ltd, Simco Ltd, 
Sony Music Entertainment UK Ltd, Universal Music 
Operations Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd, British 
Telecommunications plc, EE Ltd, Talktalk Telecom 
Ltd, Virgin Media Ltd [2014] EWHC 3444 (Ch) 
C v 
ISP 
Music Applicant C 
22.  Omnibill (PTY) Ltd v EGPSXXX Ltd (in liquidation), 
Mr Robert Ashley Carter [2014] EWHC 3762 (IPEC) 
C v I Photograph Applicant I 
23.  Ultrasoft Technologies Ltd v Hubcreate Ltd [2016] 
EWHC 544 (IPEC) 
C v C Software Defendant C 
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Comparing the Pre-Regulation Cases With Post-
Regulation Cases 
	
In order to compare the nature of claims brought under the amended section 20 CDPA 
1988 following the 2003 regulation,1212 the cases were read, categorised and counted to 
determine (1) the number of judgements, (2) the parties involved, (3) the copyright work 
subject to the claim and (4) the successful party. The characteristics of the pre-regulation 
cases are explained in the footnotes to the list above. The characteristics of the post-
regulation cases are displayed in the table above. The results of this analysis revealed 
four main findings.  
Firstly, the number of cases rose dramatically following the Regulations. As mentioned 
from 1988 to 2003, over a period of 15 years, only 6 cases were brought under section 
20 of the CDPA 1988. However, following the Regulations, from 2003 to 2016, over a 
period of just 13 years, there have been 37 cases invoking section 20 CDPA 1988. This 
demonstrates that section 20 CDPA 1988 has increased in importance and relevance in 
relation to online copyright infringement. 
Secondly, as mentioned, 100% of the pre-regulation cases were disputes between 
corporations. The 37 post-regulation judgements represent 23 unique disputes (as the 
cases included appeals). Of these 23 disputes, 9 cases were brought by corporations 
against individuals, only 4 disputes occurred between corporations and 7 actions were 
brought against ISPs by corporations. Therefore, this demonstrates that before the 
Regulations cases were only between corporations and not against individuals or ISPs, 
however, subsequently since 2003 this dynamic has dramatically changed. This is 
significant in the context of this thesis as it suggests that the impact of the internet and 
online technologies has changed the way in which copyright regulation is utilised.  
Thirdly, the type of copyright works subject to the disputes of the pre-regulation cases 
were: 1 football match, 2 news related media, 1 pornographic film and 2 musical works. 
In contrast the copyright works subject the post-regulation disputes were 7/23 football 
matches, 5/23 musical works, 4/23 photographs, 3/23 films, 2/23 pornographic films, 
1/23 TV program and 1/23 computer software. This demonstrates an expansion in the 
range of copyright works being subject to dispute since the Regulations.1213  
																																								 																				
1212 Copyright and Related Rights Regulations SI 2003/2498. 
1213 Ibid. 
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Fourthly, the outcomes of the post-regulation cases demonstrate that the most 
successful applicant was corporations. All cases brought by corporations were either 
successful or referred to the CJEU. In fact, on only one occasion did a defendant 
succeed, and this was in the only case brought by an individual against a corporation. 
Therefore, the success rate of claims under communication to the public is extremely 
high, particularly for corporations. 
Overall, the post-regulation cases were dominated by applications against ISPs (7/23), 
brought by corporations to block infringing websites. There was a 100% success rate for 
cases bought under these circumstances. In fact the only successful cases brought by 
individuals related to photographs, in all instances, used on the defendant’s website 
without permission. Although, only 2 out of 3 of cases under these circumstances were 
successful.  
The analysis now turns to consider the post-regulation cases in detail, together with  the 
CJEU case law in order to determine the  application and interpretation of communication 
to the public. 
	
Analysis of Post-Regulation Cases: Communication to the 
Public in the CJEU and UK Courts 
 
As mentioned above, once the pre-regulation cases had been excluded from the data 
set, 37 judgements remained (from 23 disputes). The judgements were uploaded to the 
qualitative data analysis software Nvivo in order to be organised and coded, using the 
same methodology as in chapter 4. This analysis assisted in the understanding of the 
body of case law, it allowed for the categorising, counting and content analysis of the 
judgements. However, it did not replace the need for critical analysis by the researcher. 
As such, all relevant cases were read and coded manually. Therefore, whilst this chapter 
emphasises the most significant cases where the judges went into detailed explanation 
as to what is meant by communication to the public, it also draws on the other cases 
where relevant. 
Furthermore, communication to the public differs from reproduction in that it was 
developed more recently and with a clearer impact from European regulation in the form 
of the Information Society Directive and CJEU case law. As Rosati explained: “From 
recent CJEU case law it has become apparent that the InfoSoc Directive should be 
interpreted as leaving very limited (if any at all) room for independent national 
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initiatives.”1214 Therefore, this chapter takes the European case law into deeper 
consideration than in previous chapters, due to the greater influence on the meaning of 
the law within the UK. 
The discussion now turns to consider the judgements of the Courts of the CJEU in order 
to determine the interpretation of communication to the public at European level. 
Subsequently, the UK cases are considered in order to determine how these 
interpretations have been applied by the UK Courts. 
 
The Broad and Varied Principle of ‘Communication’ in the 
CJEU 
 
When interpreting and applying national law, that gives effect to an EU Directive, as is 
the case in relation to communication to the public, the UK Courts must do so in light 
of the wording and purpose of the relevant Directive.1215 The interpretation and 
purpose of the Directive is determined by the CJEU1216 and therefore it is necessary 
to first consider the EU cases in which the CJEU provided explanations as to the 
intended meaning of the Information Society Directive. The application of the CJEU 
interpretations by the UK Courts is considered thereafter. 
Generally, the communication right is understood to be infringed whenever a protected 
work is made available to the public by any means.1217 The work need only be made 
available in such a way that members of the public may access it.1218 However, the mere 
provision of physical facilities is not sufficient as to constitute communication to the 
public.1219 
As identified in the previous chapter, communication to the public should be interpreted 
																																								 																				
1214 Rosati E., Neighbouring Rights For Publishers: Are National And (Possible) EU Initiatives 
Lawful? (2016) 47(5) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, pp. 
569-594, p. 575. 
1215 ITV Broadcasting Limited, ITV 2 Limited, ITV Digital Channels Limited, Channel Four 
Television Corporation, 4 Ventures Limited, Channel 5 Broadcasting Limited, ITV Studios Ltd v 
TVCatchup Ltd (in administration), TVCatchup (UK) Limited, Media Resources Ltd (a Mauritian 
company) v The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Virgin Media Ltd [2015] 
EWCA Civ 204 as per Lord Justice Kitchin at 86. 
1216 Ibid., Lord Justice Kitchin at 86. 
1217 Sociedad General de Autores v Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA [2006] 
ECR I-11519 C-306/05 at 42. 
1218 Ibid., at 43. 
1219 Football Dataco Limited, The Scottish Premier League Limited, The Scottish Football 
League, PA Sport UK Ltd v Sportradar GmbH (a Company Registered in Germany), Sportradar 
AG (a Company registered in Switzerland) [2010] EWHC 2911 (Ch) Mr Justice Floyd at 74. 
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broadly.1220 This was confirmed by Kitchin in ITV Broadcasting v TV Catch Up1221 taking 
the view that the right of communication to the public was to be interpreted broadly. This 
included covering all communication where the public was not present at the time or 
place that the communication originated.1222 
Examples of communication to the public include distributing a television signal to the 
television sets in the hotel rooms. 1223 In this case the CJEU commented that the hotel 
was “in full knowledge of the consequences of its action, to give access to the protected 
work to its customers. In the absence of that intervention, its customers, although 
physically within that area, would not, in principle, be able to enjoy the broadcast 
work.”1224 Advocate General Sharpston explained that “the hotel owner is in the same 
situation as a third party who relays original programmes broadcast or transmitted by 
cable.”1225  
This approach was confirmed in the subsequent case of FA Premier League,1226 where 
the CJEU held that a pub owner committed an act of communication to the public by 
turning on a television in a pub, stating that the owner of the “public house intentionally 
gives the customers present in that establishment access to a broadcast containing 
protected works via a television screen and speakers. Without his intervention the 
customers cannot enjoy the works broadcast, even though they are physically within the 
broadcast’s catchment area.”1227  
However, the CJEU have also held that television broadcasting of the graphic user 
interface of a website does not constitute communication to the public of that work. 1228 
They stated that this was because the television viewers receive the graphic user 
interface solely in a passive manner, without the possibility of intervening.1229 They 
																																								 																				
1220 Directive 2001/29 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights 
in the Information Society, Recital 23; Sociedad General de Autores v Editores de España 
(SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA [2006] ECR I-11519 C-306/05 at 36. 
1221 ITV Broadcasting Limited, ITV 2 Limited, ITV Digital Channels Limited, Channel 4 Television 
Corporation, Four Ventures Limited, Channel 5 Broadcasting Limited, ITV Studios Ltd v TV 
Catchup Ltd v The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2011] EWHC 1874. 
1222 Ibid., 16 at 15, relying on Recitals 23 and 24 of the EU Information Society Directive as well 
as the CJEU's decision in Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael 
Hoteles SL [2007] ECDR 2 at 36. 
1223 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL [2006] C-
306/05E.CR. I-11519. 
1224 Ibid. at 40 and 42. 
1225 Ibid., at 53. 
1226 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure [2012] All E.R. (EC) C-403/08 and 
429/08 629. 
1227 Ibid., at 195 and 196. 
1228 Svaz softwarové ochrany Bezpečnostní Softwarová Asociace v Ministerstvo kultury [2010] 
C-393/09 at 57. 
1229 Ibid. 
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cannot use the feature of that interface which consists in enabling interaction between 
the computer program and the user.1230 
Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria argue that this reasoning is difficult to follow and that insofar 
as a graphic user interface consists of graphics, that is the appearance of the interface, 
in addition to its interactivity, suggest that in fact the work was communicated to the 
public, subject to a sufficient part of the work having been taken.1231 
In their study of EU Jurisprudence Favale, Kretschmer and Torremens found that the 
European judges initially took a strict approach to the concept of communication to the 
public.1232 Following the implementation of the Information Society Directive, the Court 
gave a broad interpretation of the concept of communication to the public.1233 For 
example in the case of SGAE1234 Court stated: “The distribution of a signal by means of 
television sets by a hotel to customers staying in its rooms, whatever technique is used 
to transmit the signal, constitutes communication to the public within the meaning of 
Article 3(1) of that directive.”1235 The judges drew from Recital 23 of Directive 2001/29 
which stated that “communication to the public must be interpreted broadly.”1236 
The study found that a narrow approach1237 was taken when the CJEU determined that 
it was not communication to the public to transmit radio signals in a dental practice,1238 
on the basis that there was no aim to obtain profit and only a limited number of people 
had access to the work.1239 This narrow approach also taken in the case of 
communication of a work in a place open to the public.1240 However, the broad approach 
was applied to retransmission of TV shows via the internet1241 and on the broadcasting 
																																								 																				
1230 Ibid. 
1231 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (London: 
Butterworths; 2011) 17.16. 
1232 Favale M., Kretschmer M. and Torremans P., Is There A EU Copyright Jurisprudence? An 
Empirical Analysis of the Workings of the European Court of Justice (2016) 79(1)  Modern Law 
Review, pp. 31-75, p. 59. 
1233 Ibid., p. 59. 
1234 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL [2006] 
E.CR. I-11519 C-306/05. 
1235 Ibid. 55.1. 
1236 Ibid., at 36. 
1237 Favale M., Kretschmer M. and Torremans P., Is There A EU Copyright Jurisprudence? An 
Empirical Analysis of the Workings of the European Court of Justice (2016) 79(1)  Modern Law 
Review, pp. 31-75, pp. 59-60. 
1238 Ibid., p. 59 referring to SCF v Del Corso [2012] C-135/10. 
1239 Ibid. p. 60. 
1240 Ibid. p. 60 referring to Circul Globus Bucuresti [2010] C-283/10 ECR I-10055. 
1241 Ibid. p. 60 referring to Bezpeĉnostn softwarová asociace Svaz softwarové ochrany v 
Ministerstvo kultury [2011] E.C.D.R. 3; [2011] F.S.R. 18 (December 22, 2010) Case C-393/09. 
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of TV signals in spa hotel rooms,1242 whilst a narrow approach was subsequently applied 
to internet links on a web page.1243  
Favale, Kretschmer and Torremens highlighted that the approach taken by the Court did 
not depend on the particular Directive or legal approaches applied within the case.1244 
Ultimately, they argued that the CJEU seem to operate a broad concept of 
communication to the public, but this concept was applied in a balanced way, taking into 
account various factors relating to the facts of the case.1245 
This overview of the CJEU case law provided an insight into the application of 
communication to the public. The CJEU jurisprudence has provided some guidance to 
what activities do or do not constitute infringement and determined that the law is applied 
broadly, although many factors are taken into consideration when determining 
infringement.1246 This is relevant in the context of this thesis as it highlights that the 
approach taken by the CJEU is inconsistent1247 and lacks clarity.1248 As the UK Courts 
look to the CJEU for guidance this uncertainty could filter down into the UK case law. 
The discussion now turns to consider the meaning of communication, as interpreted and 
applied in the UK Courts, in particular, considering online activity. 
	
The Interpretation and Application of ‘Communication’ in the 
UK Courts 
	
The UK Courts have interpreted and applied communication to the public in a broad and 
encompassing manner. It can be seen from the case law, that communication to the 
public online reaches further than that of copying. For example, in the matter of Alan 
MacKie,1249 the judge held that when the defendant uploaded photographs to her 
																																								 																				
1242 Ibid. p. 60 referring to Ochranny svaz autorsky pro prava k dilům hudebnim o.s. [2014] 
EUECJ C-351/12 OSA. 
1243 Ibid. p. 60 referring to Nils Svensson, Sten Sjögren, Madelaine Sahlman, Pia Gadd v 
Retriever Sverige AB [2014] C-466/12. 
1244 Favale M., Kretschmer M. and Torremans P., Is There A EU Copyright Jurisprudence? An 
empirical Analysis of the Workings of the European Court of Justice (2016) 79(1) Modern Law 
Review, pp. 31-75, p. 60. 
1245 Ibid., p. 60. 
1246 Ibid., p. 60.  
1247 Baggs S.,  Alexander R. and Preston E., Curtains Down on Popcorn Time: s.97A Takes 
Centre Stage (2016) 38(1) European Intellectual Property Review, pp. 56-60, p. 59. 
1248 Smith J. and Burke S., Record Companies Win First Round v The Pirate Bay in The United 
Kingdom But Pirates Remain At Large: Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting 
Ltd (2012) 34(6) European Intellectual Property Review, pp. 416-419, p. 418. 
1249 Alan MacKie t/a 197 Aerial Photography v Nicola Askew, Largsholidaylets.Co.UK 
SA1251/08. 
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website, she was “linking herself into a process of communication.”1250 In doing so the 
judge referred to the decision of Lord Drummond Young in Bonnier Media Ltd1251 who 
stated that: “The Internet should rather be viewed as a process of communication. It is, 
in essence, a system of communication which allows a verbal or graphic message to be 
set up on a computer, which may be situated anywhere in the world, and conveyed to 
another computer, which may likewise be situated anywhere in the world…The person 
who creates the website is linking himself into a process of communication, with the 
obvious intention that communication should take place by way of that process.”1252 This 
appears to suggest that intent is a factor when committing infringement by 
communication; in contrast to the previous analysis of copying which clearly stated that 
this was not a principle of copyright infringement.1253 
In the matter of Dramatico Entertainment1254	the judge found that the operators of The 
Pirate Bay website had committed copyright infringement by copying and communicating 
to the public.1255 The Pirate Bay website hosted a Bittorrent system that allowed users to 
share files, the judge stated that in doing so “they go far beyond merely enabling or 
assisting…they also purport to grant users the right to do the acts complained of.”1256 
Furthermore, in the case of Emi Records,1257 the judge concluded that users of the 
websites also infringed the claimants’ copyrights both by copying and by communication 
to the public.1258 
In order to arrive at these decisions Justice Arnold set out two key questions.1259 Firstly, 
was the copyright work communicated by electronic transmission; and secondly, was it 
																																								 																				
1250 Ibid., as per Sheriff Principal B A Lockhart at 30. 
1251 Bonnier Media Ltd v (First) Gregg Lloyd and (Second) Kestrel Trading Corporation (2002) 
Scot CS 347 as per Lord Drummond Young at 18. 
1252 Ibid., at 18. 
1253 Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Limited, Sony Music Entertainment Inc., Polydor Limited, 
UMG Recordings Inc., Virgin Records Ltd v Easyinternetcafe Ltd [2003] EWHC 62 (Ch) Justice 
Peter Smith at 35: “This to my mind is to introduce a mens rea defence when none is available.”  
1254 Dramatico Entertainment Limited, EMI Records Limited, Mercury Records Limited, Polydor 
Limited, Rough Trade Records Limited, Sony Music Entertainment UK Limited, Virgin Records 
Limited, Warner Music UK Limited, 679 Recordings Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Limited, 
British Telecommunications plc, Everything Everywhere Limited, Talktalk Telecom Group plc, 
TelefÓnica UK Limited, Virgin Media Ltd [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch). 
1255 Ibid., Arnold J at 68. 
1256 Ibid., Arnold J at 81. 
1257 Emi Records Limited, Infectious Limited, Liberation Music Pty Limited, Polydor Limited, 
Simco Limited, Sony Music Entertainment UK Limited, Universal Music Operations Limited, 
Virgin Records Limited, Warner Music UK Limited, Wea International Inc v British Sky 
Broadcasting Limited, British Telecommunications plc, Everything Everywhere Limited, Talktalk 
Telecom Group plc, Telefónica UK Limited, Virgin Media Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch). 
1258 Ibid., as per Justice Arnold at 42. 
1259 Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch) as per 
Justice Arnold at 45-70. 
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communicated to a new public which was not taken into account by the right-holders 
when authorising the distribution of the recordings.1260 Therefore in following Justice 
Arnold’s questions, this analysis now considers the meaning of ‘electronic transmission’ 
followed by the ‘new public’ in order to determine the Court’s interpretation and 
application of the law. This analysis takes into consideration both UK and CJEU case 
due to the heavy influence of the European Law on the UK regulation in this area.  
 
The First Question: Was The Copyright Work Communication 
by Electronic Transmission? 
	
Communication Requires Electronic Transmission… 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘electronic transmission’ as the “action or process 
of transmitting something” 1261 or “the state of being transmitted or a programme or signal 
that is broadcast or sent out.”1262 
However, the preparatory documents for the WCT 1996 state that “as communication 
always involves transmission, the term ‘transmission’ could have been chosen as the 
key term to describe the relevant act.”1263 This suggests that the legal drafting intended 
that the words ‘communication’ and ‘transmission’ have the same meaning. Indeed, 
Arezzo argued that the connection between communication to the public with the 
technical notion of transmission of the work is crucial to properly understand the contours 
of this right.1264 He goes on to highlight an important contrast between the reproduction 
right and the communication right, in that, as discussed in the previous chapters, 
reproduction has often required the use of the copyright work. However, communication 
																																								 																				
1260 Ibid., applying the test laid down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in Sociedad 
General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA [2006] ECR I-11519 C-
306/05; Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure [2011] ECR I-0000, [2012] Bus 
LR 1321 joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 and Airfield NV v Belgische Vereniging van 
Auteurs, Compositien en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) [2011] ECR I-0000, [2012] ECDR 3 Joined 
Cases C-431/09 and C-432/09. 
1261 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/transmission#transmission__2  
1262 Ibid. 
1263 Records of the Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighbouring Right 
Questions 206 (Vol. 1, Geneva 1996). 
1264 Arezzo E., Hyperlinks and Making Available Right in the European Union --What Future for 
the Internet After Svensson? (2014) 45(5) International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law, pp. 524–554, p. 532. 
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to the public only requires that the public may access it1265 and therefore, actual 
enjoyment of the work by the public is not necessary.1266 
Larusson argued that the word ‘transmission’ leads to uncertainty because uploaders do 
not ‘transmit’ material in the proper sense of the word when they upload material onto 
the hard drive of a computer and store it in shared folders.1267 As stated above, the 
definition of transmission requires something to be transmitted from one place to 
another. As the CJEU stated: “direct physical contact is specifically absent in the case 
of transmission”1268 and therefore the receiver “is not present at the place where the 
communication originates, that is to say, at the place of the representation or 
performance which is broadcast.”1269 
However, particularly in relation to making available, the law does not necessarily require 
that the transmission be received and therefore it is not actually a transmission: “There 
appears to be no requirement that any transmission actually takes place before the 
restricted act takes place: the restricted act is the making available of the work so that 
members of the public ‘may’ access it.”1270 
As such, in the case of Football Association Premier League1271 the Honourable Mr 
Justice Kitchin explained that communication to the public covers any such transmission 
or retransmission by wire or wireless means, including broadcasting.1272 He went on to 
determine from the wording of section 20 CDPA 1988 that this was the understanding of 
the drafters: “I also derive some comfort from the fact that this also seems to have been 
the understanding of those who framed s.20 of the CDPA. Here, it is to be noted, the 
requirement of communication to the public…has been transposed in s.20(2) to a 
definitional requirement of communication to the public as being one which involves 
electronic transmission.”1273 Kitchin’s approach demonstrates how the literal approach 
																																								 																				
1265 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA [2006] 
ECR I-11519 C-306/05. 
1266 Arezzo E., Hyperlinks and Making Available Right in the European Union - What Future for 
the Internet After Svensson? (2014) 45(5) International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law, pp. 524–554, p. 533. 
1267 Larusson H. K., Uncertainty in the Scope of Copyright: The Case of Illegal File-Sharing in 
the UK (2009) 31(3) European Intellectual Property Review, pp. 124-134, p.125. 
1268 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure [2012] All E.R. (EC) 629 C-403/08 
and 429/08 at 203. 
1269 Ibid. 
1270 Caddick, N., Davies G. and Harbottle G., Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell; 2005) para 7-116. 
1271 Football Association Premier League Limited, NetMed Hellas SA, Multichoice Hellas SA v 
QC Leisure (a trading name), David Richardson, AV Station Plc, Malcolm Chamberlain, Michael 
Madden, Sanjay Raval, David Greenslade, S.R. Leisure Limited, Phillip George Charles 
Houghton, Derek Owen [2008] EWHC 1411 (Ch). 
1272 Ibid., Mr Justice Kitchin at 285. 
1273 Ibid., Mr Justice Kitchin at 261. 
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didn’t allow the law to achieve the intended outcome. Therefore, taking a more purposive 
approach, Kitchin consider what the drafters intended the meaning to be from the words, 
in line with the golden rule discussed in chapter 1.  
Therefore, the case law has demonstrated that communication to the public requires an 
electronic transmission. The word electronic transmission, suggests an external 
perspective in that it uses technical terminology. However, the law does not necessarily 
require that the transmission be received and therefore it is not actually a transmission. 
Furthermore, there is no definition of electronic transmission. Therefore, it is necessary 
to consider how the judges have determined the meaning of electronic transmission in 
their interpretation and application of the law.  
 
…But Electronic Transmission Requires Communication 
	
Returning to the case of Dramatic Entertainment1274 where Justice Arnold established 
the two questions to be addressed in deciding if communication to the public has taken 
place.1275 As stated, the first question was whether the copyright work was 
communicated by electronic transmission.1276 Therefore it is necessary to consider the 
meaning of electronic transmission.  
In deciding this matter Justice Arnold considered electronic transmission by looking to 
the CJEU judgement in SGAE.1277 He noted that the Court stated “the transmission of 
the broadcast work to that clientele using television sets…the hotel is the organisation 
which intervenes, in full knowledge of the consequences of its action, to give access to 
the protected work to its customers. In the absence of that intervention, its customers, 
although physically within that area, would not, in principle, be able to enjoy the 
broadcast work.” 1278 
																																								 																				
1274 Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch). 
1275 Ibid., as per Justice Arnold at 45-70. 
1276 Ibid., applying the test laid down by the CJEU in Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de 
España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA [2006] ECR I-11519 C-306/05; Football Association 
Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure [2011] ECR I-0000, [2012] Bus LR 1321 joined Cases C-
403/08 and C-429/08 and Airfield NV v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Compositien en 
Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) [2011] ECR I-0000, [2012] ECDR 3 Joined Cases C-431/09 and C-
432/09. 
1277 Sociedad General de Autores v Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA [2006] 
ECR I-11519 C-306/05. 
1278 Ibid., at 42. 
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He also considered1279 the case of Football Association Premier League1280 where the 
CJEU stated that: “the concept of communication must be construed broadly, as referring 
to any transmission of the protected works, irrespective of the technical means or 
process used.”1281 
Justice Arnold then applied this understanding to the current case and determined the 
matter in hand, that the users and operators of The Pirate Bay website communicated 
the copyright works by electronic transmission.1282 He explained that this was because 
“they make the recordings available by electronic transmission in such a way that 
members of the public may access the recordings from a place and at a time individually 
chosen by them.”1283 
As the judgement does not explicitly state what an electronic transmission is, in order 
to understand why Justice Arnold came to this decision, it is necessary to look at how 
he determined the facts of the case, what actions were done by the users and 
operators of The Pirate Bay that constituted an electronic transmission. 
As part of the evidence submitted by the applicants, two expert reports by computer 
networking and security specialist were prepared.1284 Justice Arnold relied on the 
reports to explain in detail the technical function of the Bittorrent peer-to-peer protocol 
used by The Pirate Bay.1285 He summarised from the report that the purpose of the 
Bittorrent protocol was to create and distribute torrent files. This was done by enabling 
identification of a file, and the uploading and downloading of the file.1286 
The operators of The Pirate Bay Website organised a directory of content which users 
could browse and then select content to download.1287 The Bittorrent software provided 
by The Pirate Bay then allowed the user to download ‘pieces’ of the content from the 
‘swarm.’1288 However, the second expert report stated that The Pirate Bay also offered 
the option to download content through a ‘magnet link’ which connects the user either to 
a Bittorrent tracker or to the ‘swarm’ in order to obtain the torrent file rather than obtaining 
																																								 																				
1279 Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch), as per 
Arnold J at 54. 
1280 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure [2011] ECR I-0000 C-403/08 and C-
429/08. 
1281 Ibid., at 193. 
1282 Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch), as per 
Arnold J at 84. 
1283 Ibid., Arnold J at 69. 
1284 Ibid., Arnold J 19 and 24. 
1285 Ibid., Arnold J 19-29. 
1286 Ibid., Arnold J at 20. 
1287 Ibid., Arnold J at 22. 
1288 Ibid., Arnold J at 23. 
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it directly from The Pirate Bay website. Justice Arnold stated that “it is not necessary to 
go into the technical details of this. Once the torrent file has been acquired, the user can 
download the content to which it relates.”1289 
Significantly, Justice Arnold used the technical report to determine the activities of the 
users and operators of The Pirate Bay, taking the external perspective. However, he 
essentially drew a line at how far into the technical detail it was necessary to go. 
Therefore, whilst it appears prima facia that the judgement was made on the basis of 
technical function, or the external perspective, in fact on closer inspection it is not. This 
is clear because the change in the technical functioning of how The Pirate Bay website 
operated (from Bittorrent to Magnet Link) did not require further consideration. Justice 
Arnold simply determined that copyright material is uploaded and downloaded by users, 
which is facilitated by the operators.1290 This is interesting in relation to the Framework 
for Constructing Digital Perspectives as at first the external perspective is taken but it’s 
limitations are revealed by the change in technical process of the infringing website. At 
this point Justice Arnold changed to the internal perspective, taking a purposive 
approach, in order to find infringement. Ultimately, therefore, this case determined that 
uploading and downloading copyright material are acts of electronic transmission, by 
whatever technical means. 
This approach was also seen in the subsequent case of 1967 Limited.1291 In this case, 
Justice Arnold recognised the websites as also operating using Bittorrent peer-to-peer 
file-sharing protocol which enabled users to download the torrent files either from their 
websites or through a link to another website.1292 The technological manner in which the 
files were located and downloaded were seemingly irrelevant, for example, some of the 
websites used ‘crawling’ technology to gather links and did not store any files on their 
own servers.1293 Justice Arnold stated that “nevertheless, the way in which the torrent 
files (or rather the links thereto) are presented, and the underlying technology, is 
essentially the same as in the cases of the other Target Websites.”1294 In this case, 
Justice Arnold again found that the operators of the websites communicated the 
recordings by electronic transmission, as “they intervene in an active and highly material 
																																								 																				
1289 Ibid., Arnold J at 24. 
1290 Ibid., Arnold J at 68. 
1291 1967 Limited, Dramatico Entertainment Limited, Infectious Music Limited, Liberation Music 
PTY Limited, Simco Limited, Sony Music Entertainment UK Limited, Universal Music Operations 
Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Limited, British Telecommunications plc, EE Limited, Talktalk 
Telecom Limited, Virgin Media Ltd [2014] EWHC 3444 (Ch). 
1292 Ibid., Arnold J at 7. 
1293 Ibid., Arnold J at 7. 
1294 Ibid., Arnold J at 8. 
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way so as to enable users to access and to download recordings content in an easy and 
convenient way.”1295 
Burke and Smith argued that it was interesting that the users of The Pirate Bay were 
also found to be liable but that it may have little practical effect as there is questionable 
value for the right holders in pursing these individuals, other than to highlight that users 
of file-sharing websites like The Pirate Bay are infringing copyright in their own right.1296 
However, Hoy et al. argued that this decision was further encouragement to copyright 
owners as it provided “a useful roadmap for some of the hurdles that must be cleared to 
obtain such a block, and of the type and extent of evidence that the UK Courts will accept 
as sufficient to clear those hurdles.”1297 
Nevertheless, whilst the case law may be encouraging for copyright holders, the law still 
lacks clarity. As stated above, the first question to be considered if there has been an 
infringement by communication to the public is whether or not there has been a 
communication. This chapter has demonstrated the meaning of communication within 
the law is electronic transmission but that electronic transmission is not defined, other 
than to say by wire or wireless means. However, the case law has demonstrated that 
whilst the technical function of the electronic transmission is considered in the reasoning 
of the judgements, the decision is ultimately made on the concept of communication, not 
electronic transmission.  
The case law provided examples of what does and does not constitute a communication 
but, an analysis of the jurisprudence demonstrated a scattered approach with no clear 
parameters of the right to communication. What can be said is that the law is applied 
broadly, to any transmission by any means.  
The second question, as set out by Justice Arnold in the case of EMI Records1298 was 
whether the communication was made to ‘the public’. The discussion now turns to 
consider how the judges have interpreted the meaning of the public in cases of copyright 
infringement by way of communication to the public.  
																																								 																				
1295 Ibid., Arnold J at 19. 
1296 Burke S. and Smith J., Record Companies Win First Round v The Pirate Bay in the United 
Kingdom but Pirates Remain at Large: Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting 
Ltd (2012) 34(6) European Intellectual Property Review, pp. 416-419, p. 419. 
1297 Hoy R., Wilks J. and Edbrooke N., Dramatico Entertainment v BSKYB: Pirate Bay Runs 
Aground in English Waters (2012) 23(5) Entertainment Law Review, pp.151-153, p.153. 
1298 Emi Records Limited, Infectious Limited, Liberation Music Pty Limited, Polydor Limited, 
Simco Limited, Sony Music Entertainment UK Limited, Universal Music Operations Limited, 
Virgin Records Limited, Warner Music UK Limited, Wea International Inc v British Sky 
Broadcasting Limited, British Telecommunications plc, Everything Everywhere Limited, Talktalk 
Telecom Group plc, Telefónica UK Limited, Virgin Media Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch). 
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The Second Question: Was The Work Communicated to a New 
Public? 
	
The concept of ‘the public’ does not presume a physical gathering of people in the same 
place to jointly enjoy the work, but rather presupposes a fragmented notion of the 
‘public.’1299 Therefore, in order to determine the meaning of ‘the public’ the discussion 
will first consider how the EU has addressed the question in cases referred to the CJEU.  
EU jurisprudence proposed that the transmission must reach “a public which was not 
taken into account by the authors of the protected works when they authorized their use 
by the communication to the original public”1300 and be performed in such a way as to 
potentially1301 reach an indeterminate, but fairly large, number of potential viewers.1302 
What is important is not the economic relevance of the single user but the cumulative 
effect1303 created by the number of people who simultaneously, or in succession, may 
access the work.1304  
Therefore, the following section will discuss how many people are required in order to 
constitute a public, what is meant by ‘new public’ and what is required by the public in 
order to fall within the meaning of communication to the public. 
 
How Many People Make a Public? 
	
In the case of Rafael Hoteles1305 the CJEU found that the hotel guests constituted a 
‘public’ due to the large number of potential hotel guests that could benefit from the 
service.1306 This suggested that a large number of people are required to accumulate a 
																																								 																				
1299 Arezzo E., Hyperlinks and Making Available Right in the European Union - What Future for 
the Internet After Svensson? (2014) 45(5) International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law, pp. 524-554, pp. 533-534. 
1300 NV and Canal Digitaal BV v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers 
CVBA (Sabam) and Airfield NV v Agicoa Belgium BVBA (2011) joined cases C-431/09 and C-
432/09 at 76. 
1301 ITV Broadcasting Ltd and others v TVCatchup Ltd [2013] C-607/11, OJ C-123/6 at 34-36. 
1302 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL (C-
306/05) [2006] E.CR. I-11519 at 37-38; Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso 
[2012] C-135/10 at 84. 
1303 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL (C-
306/05) [2006] E.CR. I-11519 at 39. 
1304 Società Consortile Fonografici v Marco del Corso [2012] E.C.D.R. C-135/10 16 at 87. 
1305 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL [2006] 
E.CR. I-11519 C-306/05. 
1306 Ibid., at 39. 
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public. 
This was subsequently confirmed in the case of SCF v Marco del Corso,1307 which 
concerned the communication of copyright works via radio on the premises of a dentist. 
Mr del Corso, the defendant in the case, claimed that it was not communication to the 
public because his dental practice was not a public place.1308 The CJEU confirmed that 
patients attending dental appointments did not constitute a ‘public’ as “the number of 
persons is not large, indeed it is insignificant, given that the number of persons present 
in his practice at the same time is, in general, very limited. Moreover, although there are 
a number of patients in succession, the fact remains that, as those patients attend one 
at a time, they do not generally hear the same phonograms, or the broadcast 
phonograms, in particular.”1309 
In making the decision in this case the CJEU determined the meaning of communication 
to the public as “making a work, performance, phonogram or broadcast perceptible in 
any appropriate manner to persons in general, that is, not restricted to specific individuals 
belonging to a private group.”1310 Consequently, this suggests that the public should 
constitute a fairly large number of people who are “both targeted by the user and 
receptive, in one way or another, to that communication.”1311 
Alexander and Livingston argued that this decision was “troubling”1312 as it suggested 
that communication to the public was not, as was previously thought “a broad, all-
encompassing definition”1313 but “must be determined by an ‘individual assessment’ of 
all the circumstances, including the type of usage, the role of the user, the number of 
both actual and potential listeners/viewers, and whether an element of profit is 
involved.”1314 
In the more recent case of Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Ltd v Ireland1315 it was 
again confirmed that the hotel guests were a public, describing them as “an 
indeterminate number of potential listeners, insofar as the access of those guests to the 
services of that establishment is the result of their own choice and is limited only by the 
capacity of the establishment in question.”1316  
																																								 																				
1307 Ibid. 
1308 Ibid. 
1309 Ibid. 
1310 Società Consortile Fonografici v Marco del Corso [2012] E.C.D.R. C-135/10 at 77 and 89. 
1311 Ibid., at 91. 
1312 Alexander R. and Livingstone C., Communication to the Public: Part 2 (2012) 23(7) 
Entertainment Law Review, pp. 209-213, pp. 209–210. 
1313 Ibid. 
1314 Ibid. 
1315 Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Ltd v Ireland [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 29, C-162/10. 
1316 Ibid., at 41. 
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Furthermore, in the case of TV Catchup1317 the CJEU defined the term ‘public’ as 
referring to “an indeterminate number of potential recipients and implies, moreover, a 
fairly high number of persons.”1318 Therefore EU jurisprudence has suggested that there 
is not a specific number of people required in order to constitute a public, but that it is 
likely to be a high number.  
It is important to consider the application of this reasoning to the internet. From an 
external perspective, users are likely to be individuals who access the internet from a 
device, simultaneously or at different times, but on an individual basis. However, from 
an internal perspective, it might be considered that users are a community once they are 
connected online. Nevertheless, the communication is only required to potentially be 
accessed by the public and therefore, it might be suggested that any number of persons 
may access any material online. Therefore, any copyright material online could be 
subject to copyright infringement by way of communication to the public. As the CJEU 
stated in the case of Svensson:1319 “A communication made on the Internet…and 
therefore by the same technical means.”1320 This, therefore, suggests that any material 
online could potentially be subject to communication to the public, should the second 
criteria of the public also be fulfilled. 
The second criteria for the public, set out by the CJEU is that the public must be new.1321 
The meaning of ‘new public’ is therefore considered in the following section.  
 
The Unexpected Potential of the ‘New Public’ 
 
Identification of the relevant public is central to the outcome of a decision on whether a 
work has been communicated to the public.1322 Hence, it is necessary to understand how 
the Courts have determined when a public is new. 
																																								 																				
1317 ITV Broadcasting Ltd v TV Catchup Ltd [2013] C-607/11 at 32 citing Sociedad General de 
Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL [2006] E.CR. I-11519 C-306/05. 
1318 Ibid., at 37 and 38. 
1319 Nils Svensson, Sten Sjögren, Madelaine Sahlman, Pia Gadd v Retriever Sverige AB [2014] 
C-466/12. 
1320 Ibid., at 24. 
1321 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL [2006] 
E.CR. I-11519 C-306/05 at 40 and 42; Organismos Sillogikis Diacheirisis Dimiourgon Theatrikon 
kai Optikoakoustikon Ergon [2010] C-136/09 at 38. 
1322 Hoy R., Internet blocking Injunctions are Alive and Well in the Post Svensson World (2015) 
26(2) Entertainment Law Review, pp.44-47, p. 47. 
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In the case of SGAE,1323 the CJEU explained that an author authorises the broadcast of 
his work taking into account direct users. Therefore if the work reaches a larger audience 
than intended by way of an independent act of an unauthorised third party, the work is 
infringed by communication to a new public.1324 As such, a new public is “a public which 
was not taken into account by the authors of the protected works when they authorised 
their use by the communication to the original public.”1325 
In Svensson1326 the CJEU held that making copyright works available by means of a 
clickable link did not lead to the works in question being communicated to a new 
public.1327 This was because the public targeted by the initial communication consisted 
of all potential visitors to the website concerned. Since the website was not subject to 
any restrictive measures all internet users could have free access to the works.1328 The 
users who clicked the link to access the material could have also accessed the material 
directly from the original site. Therefore they could be deemed to be potential recipients 
of the initial communication and as such where part of the public taken into account by 
the copyright holders when they authorised the initial communication.1329 Therefore, 
providing clickable links on a website to works freely available on another website does 
not necessarily constitute an act of communication to the public.1330 
However the CJEU did state that this would not be the case there the link allowed users 
to circumvent restrictions put in place by the original site on which the protected work 
appeared, for example by subscription. In this event, the link would constitute an 
intervention by the link to access the works transmitted by a new public.1331 
Arezzo argued that the requirement of the works to be communicated to a ‘new public’ 
takes an extensive interpretation of the CJEU of Art. 11bis of the Berne Convention1332 
as the provision does not literally mention a ‘new public’ but takes into account the 
																																								 																				
1323 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL [2006] 
E.CR. I-11519 C-306/05. 
1324 Ibid., at 41. 
1325 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure [2012] All E.R. (EC) 629 C-403/08 
and 429/08 at [198] citing Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael 
Hoteles SL [2006] E.CR. I-11519 C-306/05 at 41. 
1326 Nils Svensson, Sten Sjögren, Madelaine Sahlman, Pia Gadd v Retriever Sverige AB [2014] 
C-466/12. 
1327 Ibid., at 25. 
1328 Ibid., at 26. 
1329 Ibid., at 27. 
1330 Ibid., at 32. 
1331 Ibid., at 31. 
1332 Art. 11bis(1)(i) of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 
September 1886, as amended 28 September 1979. 
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circumstance where a third party makes an unauthorized act of communication.1333 
Keane also recognised the particular influence of the Guide to the Berne Convention on 
the CJEU in creating this criteria.1334 
Hoy argued that the jurisprudence of the CJEU has determined that communication to 
the public will depend on the context in question and that there are several tests that a 
Court should carry out in deciding if communication to the public has taken place.1335 For 
example in 2010 the CJEU held that the TV broadcasting of a graphic user interface of 
a webpage was not communication to the public because the user could not interact with 
it, and that was the essential purpose of the webpage.1336  
Therefore, whilst the CJEU set out a number of criteria in SGAE1337 it is apparent from 
the more recent cases that it is not strictly necessary for all these criteria to be satisfied 
for there to be a public.1338 Ultimately the CJEU jurisprudence required only that the 
transmission of the work be performed by an unauthorised party in a way that can 
potentially1339 be accessed1340 by an indeterminate number of people1341 who were not 
taken into account by the original communication of the work.1342 
Nevertheless, the CJEU judgements still lack clarity in that the key terms are not defined. 
Furthermore, the approach and interpretation of the EU Law changes throughout the 
case law, thereby creating inconsistency and uncertainty as to the meaning of 
																																								 																				
1333 Arezzo E., Hyperlinks and Making Available Right in the European Union - What Future for 
the Internet After Svensson? (2014) 45(5) International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law, pp. 524–554, p. 535. 
1334 Keane B., Ill Communication? The Concept of a Communication to the Public Under EU 
Copyright Law (2013) 24(5) Entertainment Law Review, pp. 165–171, p.169. 
1335 Hoy R., Internet blocking Injunctions are Alive and Well in the Post Svensson world (2015) 
26(2) Entertainment Law Review, pp. 44-47, p. 47. 
1336 Bezpeĉnostn softwarová asociace Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury [2011] 
E.C.D.R. 3; [2011] F.S.R. 18 (December 22, 2010) Case C-393/09. 
1337 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL [2006] 
E.CR. I-11519 C-306/05: 1 must be accessible to a fairly large number of persons; 2 the public 
is "new"; and 3 the service to the public is profit-making. 
1338 Keane B., Ill Communication? The Concept of a Communication to the Public Under EU 
Copyright Law (2013) 24(5) Entertainment Law Review, pp. 165–171, p.167. 
1339 ITV Broadcasting Ltd and others v TVCatchup Ltd [2013] C-607/11, OJ C-123/6 at 34-36: “it 
is irrelevant whether the potential recipients access the communicated works through a one-to-
one connection. That technique does not prevent a large number of persons having access to 
the same work at the same time.” 
1340 Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso [2012] C-135/10 at 87. 
1341 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL [2006] C-
306/05 E.CR. I-11519 at 37-38; Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso [2012] 
C-135/10 at 84. 
1342 Airfield NV and Canal Digitaal BV v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en 
Uitgevers CVBA (Sabam) and Airfield NV v Agicoa Belgium BVBA [2011] ECR I-09363 C-
431/09 and C-432/09 at 76. 
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communication to the public.1343  
The final section of this chapter turns to consider how the UK Courts have implemented 
the law as determined by the CJEU interpretations of the law. In particular, this section 
uses the case of TV Catch Up1344 to identify the main conclusions as it exemplifies the 
interpretation of communication to the public to online activity as well as the impact of 
the CJEU on the UK Courts.  
 
Communication to the Public Online: TV Catch Up 
 
The CJEU case law has provided some guidance as to what does or does not constitute 
communication to the public. However, most of these cases refer to offline activities. As 
discussed throughout this thesis, applying the law as constructed for offline activities, 
can create tension due to the fact that the online world can be interpreted by either the 
internal or external perspectives. The case of TV Catchup1345 exemplifies this tension as 
it demonstrates the UK Court implementing the CJEU jurisprudence and applying it to 
an online situation. It is also one of the most recent cases in the UK Court, thereby taking 
into account all of the cases discussed in the previous sections.  
This case has been before the Court since 2011,1346 and most recently in 2015 before 
Lady Justice Arden, Lord Justice Kitchin and Lord Justice Underhill on appeal.1347 The 
matter involved an internet based live-stream service of broadcast television 
programmes.1348 The claimant broadcasters appealed on the basis that the judge had 
wrongly interpreted the word ‘cable’ as meaning ‘wire’ to refer only to dedicated cable 
networks operated by conventional cable programme providers and therefore excluded 
retransmissions over the internet.1349 
Lord Justice Kitchin stated from the outset that the restricted act of communication to the 
public was by wire or wireless means and that included communication via the 
																																								 																				
1343 Baggs S., Alexander R. and Preston E., Curtains Down on Popcorn Time: s.97A Takes 
Centre Stage (2016) 38(1) European Intellectual Property Review, pp. 56-60, p. 59. 
1344 ITV Broadcasting Limited, ITV 2 Limited, ITV Digital Channels Limited, Channel 4 Television 
Corporation, Four Ventures Limited, Channel 5 Broadcasting Limited, ITV Studios Ltd v TV 
Catchup Ltd v The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2011] EWHC 1874 
(Pat). 
1345 Ibid. 
1346 Ibid. 
1347 ITV Broadcasting Ltd, ITV 2 Ltd, ITV Digital Channels Ltd, Channel Four Television 
Corporation, 4 Ventures Ltd, Channel 5 Broadcasting Ltd, ITV Studios Ltd v TVCatchup Ltd (in 
administration), TVCatchup (UK) Ltd, Media Resources Ltd (a Mauritian company) v The 
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Virgin Media Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 204. 
1348 Ibid., Mr Justice Floyd at 4. 
1349 Ibid., Mr Justice Floyd at 15. 
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internet.1350 Nevertheless, the meaning of ‘wire’ and ‘cable’ was unclear and therefore 
he decided to refer to the CJEU for clarification.1351 
In making this decision, Kitchin considered the parties submissions. The applicants 
argued that the legislature drew a clear distinction between ‘wire’ and ‘cable’ and, by the 
latter, meant only traditional dedicated cable systems.1352 Whereas the defendants 
argued that there was no consistent use of the term ‘cable’ in EU law and there was no 
rational basis for such an all-purpose concept to exist.1353 Furthermore, the Secretary of 
State's position was that the term ‘cable’ had a specific technical meaning, the scope of 
which was and has always been limited to traditional cable systems which exclude the 
internet.1354 These arguments demonstrate the different outcomes possible in taking a 
literal or purposive approach.  
The applicant and the Secretary of State also argued that the term ‘cable’ was used in a 
technologically specific way that, by using the phrase “access to cable of broadcasting 
services,” the EU did not intend to provide an exception for national provisions 
concerning internet retransmissions.1355 
However, Kitchin offered his provisional view, agreeing with the defendant, that was 
unlikely that the EU intended by the use of the term ‘cable’ to exclude provisions 
concerning retransmissions falling within the scope of these exceptions but which are 
made over the internet.1356Lord Justice Underhill agreed with Kitchin that the term cable 
would likely include the internet, but that it was ultimately unclear and therefore the 
reference to the CJEU was necessary.1357 
However, Lady Justice Arden, whilst agreeing that the answer was unclear, offered a 
different opinion.1358 She argued that the word ‘cable’ was introduced to replace the word 
‘broadcasting’ with a technologically-neutral word.1359 Furthermore, that following the 
implementation of Directive 2001/29 the expression ‘cable’ had a narrower meaning and 
since there was no definition, the word could bear an ambulatory, or movable, meaning 
so that the Court could interpret the phrase in accordance with Directive 2001/29.1360 
Thus, in the absence of a definition, she suggested that Parliament intended that the 
																																								 																				
1350 Ibid., Mr Justice Floyd at 61. 
1351 Ibid., Mr Justice Floyd at 79 and 96. 
1352 Ibid., Mr Justice Floyd at 62. 
1353 Ibid., Mr Justice Floyd at 72. 
1354 Ibid., Mr Justice Floyd at 73. 
1355 Ibid., Mr Justice Floyd at 81. 
1356 Ibid., Mr Justice Floyd at 82.  
1357 Ibid., Mr Justice Floyd at 100. 
1358 Ibid., Mr Justice Floyd at 104. 
1359 Ibid., Mr Justice Floyd at 105. 
1360 Ibid., Mr Justice Floyd at 106. 
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word ‘cable’ should bear whatever meaning it had in EU law.1361 
Therefore, this case clearly demonstrated that the law in relation to communication to 
the public is unclear for a number of reasons. The meaning of the terminology used 
within the law to describe technology created clear tensions due to its ambiguity in scope. 
Ultimately this case demonstrated that the exact meaning of technological terminology 
in the law has a great impact on the application of the law to the meaning of copyright 
infringement online. This is true only when taking the external perspective. However, as 
the case law demonstrated, the Courts often made the decision based on the internal 
perspective and not the technical function of the specific technology.  
Lim and Chik suggested that that Courts are less likely to accept the legality of new 
technologies that attempt to exploit loopholes in the law. Instead they suggested that the 
judges take a results-driven, or purposive, approach in order not allowing technological 
form to trump the true 'substance' of the transmission/communication in question.1362	
Giblin and Ginsburg agreed that technological design should never determine legal 
outcome.1363 
In contrast, Efroni argued that the ramifications the extension of communication to the 
public to the internet realty has bestowed an unparalleled amount of power upon rights 
holders, beyond than anything the analogue past has ever seen.1364 
In any event, the analysis demonstrated that the law is unclear and uncertain as to how 
to apply the law to such circumstances in a consistent manner.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to investigate the meaning of online copyright infringement by 
way of communication to the public. In doing so it first considered the meaning of 
communication within the context of the internet. It was demonstrated that 
																																								 																				
1361 Ibid., Mr Justice Floyd at 106. 
1362 Lim S. C. and Chik W.B., Whither the Future of Internet Streaming and Time-Shifting? 
Revisiting the Rights of Reproduction and Communication to the Public in Copyright Law after 
Aereo (2015) 23(1) International Journal of Law and Information Technology, pp. 53–88, p. 87. 
1363 Giblin R. and Ginsburg J., We (Still) Need to Talk about Aereo: New Controversies and 
Unresolved Questions after the Supreme Court's Decision (2014) 38 Columbia Journal of Law 
and the Arts, pp. 18-22. 
1364 Efroni Z., Access Right: The Future of Digital Copyright Law (New York: Oxford University 
Press; 2011) p. 284. 
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communication theory suggests that the internet is considered a mass medium for 
communication that has transformed the scope of communication as a concept.1365  
The chapter then took a comparative look at the UK case law relating to communication 
to the public, before and after the 2003 Regulations1366 that amended section 20 of the 
CDPA 1988 from a broadcasting right to a right of communication to the public. The 
analysis revealed four key findings. Firstly, that since the regulations there has been an 
increase in the use of this section. Secondly, before the regulations the disputes took 
place between copyright holding companies, however, subsequently the majority of 
disputes took place between copyright holding companies and individuals. Thirdly, the 
copyright works subject to dispute has increased in scope, and finally, the most 
successful cases were brought by copyright holding companies.  
The analysis then turned to the CJEU’s definition of communication to the public, before 
considering how the meanings were applied by UK judges. In particular considering what 
the Courts have determined by ‘communication,’ ‘electronic transmission’ and ‘the 
public.’ 
The analysis revealed that there is no definition of communication as such, but that it 
always involves electronic transmission. This has led to uncertainty as electronic 
transmission is also not defined.  
In particular it is clear that whilst the understanding of the internet as a medium of 
communication through an internal perspective, the drafting of the law was done so from 
an external perspective. This tension was clearly highlighted in the application of the law. 
Whilst the judges often take considerable time to explain and understand the technical 
function of the online activity in their reasoning, ultimately the decision is taken from an 
internal perspective – that a copyright work is accessed without authorisation. The 
judgements demonstrate how taking a purely literal interpretation can be limited, by 
either creating absurdities or not achieving the remedy to the mischief it intended to 
address. Therefore, the judges are lead towards a more purposive approach in their 
application of the law.  
Overall, the chapter has illuminated a number of tensions in applying copyright 
infringement by way of communication to the public online, particularly in light of the 
contrasts between the internal and external perspectives. 
																																								 																				
1365 McQuail D., McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory (London: Sage Publications Ltd; 2011) 
p. 139. 
1366 Copyright and Related Rights Regulations SI 2003/2498. 
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Chapter 7 
	
Concluding the Story: The Difficulties of Applying Copyright Infringement 
Online 
“Do not worry about the wall," replied the Woodman “when we have climbed 
over it we shall know what is on the other side.” The Wizard of Oz 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter brings together the themes and conclusions of this thesis. This investigation 
has undertaken an analysis of the law in relation to copyright infringement by way of 
copying1367 and communication to the public,1368 through the lens of the internal and 
external perspectives. These concepts were developed into the Framework for 
Constructing Digital Perspectives1369 in order to be applied to the relevant statutory law 
in chapters 3 and 5, and case law in chapters 4 and 6. 
The investigation was both broad and focused in nature; the detailed content analysis of 
the wording used in statutory law and judgements was supplemented by the broader 
context of the human element in the story of online copyright infringement. It was 
determined that the human experience intercepts the development of copyright law at 
three points; in the drafting of the law, in the application of the law by the judges and in 
the cognitive interaction with new technologies by all humans.1370  
In applying the Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives to these points of 
interception, the historical context is considered by analysis of the statutory law and the 
case law, in light of the internal and external perspectives. This chapter summarises the 
main conclusions drawn from this analysis, in particular considering the effect of the 
Framework on the interpretation and application of copyright law to online activity.  
Moreover, in drawing together the conclusions and considering the analysis as a whole, 
this chapter is able to evaluate the overall picture. In doing so, it is considered that in the 
context of the internet there is a clear overlap between the meaning of ‘copying’ and 
																																								 																				
1367 See chapters 3 and 4. 
1368 See chapters 5 and 6. 
1369 See chapter 2. 
1370 As introduced in chapter 1. 
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‘communication to the public.’ This is particularly evident when considering the 
application of the law to online activity through the Framework for Constructing Digital 
Perspectives.  
Taking the External and Internal Perspectives in Copyright 
Infringement Online  
 
As mentioned, chapter 2 undertook an analysis of Kerr’s internal and external 
perspectives.1371 It was understood that the external perspective involved 
considering the technical functioning of the network in the physical world, focusing 
on the physical technology.1372 This concept of the external perspective was 
developed together with the theory of literalism.1373 It was concluded that the 
benefits of taking this perspective were that the law is specific, technologically 
accurate and could be considered as providing clarity on the legality of a particular 
technology.1374 However, taking the external perspective can also create 
challenges such as incentivising avoidance creations,1375 developing law that is 
too technologically specific that becomes quickly obsolete in the face of new 
technological developments. As Hutchinson argued “a purely literal interpretation 
can lead to the law falling short of serving its purpose.”1376 
 
On the other hand, the internal perspective involved considering the virtual reality as a 
legitimate construct in order to understand the online experience.1377 The concept of the 
internal perspective was grounded in the theory of purposivism through the devices of 
metaphor and skeumorph.1378 It was concluded that the internal approach could 
overcome some of the challenges of the external perspective, such as being so specific 
that it could not apply to new technology. As mentioned, the judges appear to lean 
towards a purposive approach, when the literal approach creates absurdities or does 
																																								 																				
1371 Kerr O. S., The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal, 
pp. 357-405. 
1372 Ibid., p. 360. 
1373 See chapter 2, p. 42. 
1374 See chapter 2, pp. 42-44. 
1375 Such as the Aereo software which was “designed solely to avoid the letter of the copyright 
statute”: American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., Et Al. v Aereo, Inc., Fka Bamboom Labs, Inc.2nd 
Circ. 13-461 (2013) Judge Chin Dissent Aereo at 29. See discussion in chapter 2, p. 44.  
1376 Hutchison C. J., Interpretation and the Internet (2010) 28 John Marshall Journal of 
Computer and Information Law, pp. 251-272, pp. 259-260. 
1377 Kerr O. S., The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal, 
pp. 357-405, p. 359. 
1378 See chapter 2, p. 48. 
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not allow the law to achieve the intended outcome – by way of remedying a particular 
mischief. However, tensions also arose when taking the internal perspective. For 
example, when metaphors are not recognised as metaphors,1379 the original conceptions 
could unknowingly transfer the meaning of the previous concept and be perceived as 
the only purpose of a given regulation.1380 This is particularly relevant in the use of 
skeumorphs because of the connotations that carry when using past concepts for 
understanding new technology. Due to the pace of technological development, using old 
concepts as a bridge from the old to the new can be incompatible with allowing copyright 
to fulfil its purpose in the digital age.1381 
In order to apply this analysis to the research question, the method was set out in three 
stages. Firstly, a historical consideration of the development of the regulation was 
required in order to understand the intended purpose of the law. Secondly, the wording 
of the statutory law was considered as to whether it takes on an internal or external 
perspective. Thirdly, the relevant case law was then analysed, in order to determine the 
meaning of the law as interpreted and applied by the Courts. This method was applied 
to copyright infringement by way of copying, followed by copyright infringement by way 
of communication to the public. The main conclusions from this investigated will now be 
reviewed in order to draw the final and over-arching conclusions from the analysis.  
 
The Framework For Constructing Digital Perspectives Applied 
to Copyright Infringement by Way of Copying Online 
In applying the Framework to copyright infringement by way of copying it was considered 
that the development of the current statutory law involved a great deal of debate.1382 The 
analysis revealed three main criticisms. Firstly, that certain areas of the CDPA 1988 were 
introduced without foresight or particular expertise in the understanding of computer 
technology1383 or copyright law.1384 Secondly, a key aim was to simplify the legislation; 
this led to much of the new law being a re-statement of the old law1385 leaving copyright 
																																								 																				
1379 For example use of the word ‘incidental storage’ as discussed in chapter 3, see p. 86.  
1380 Larsson S., Metaphors, Law and Digital Phenomena: The Swedish Pirate Bay Court Case 
(2013) 21(4) International Journal of Law, Information and Technology, pp. 354-380, p. 367. 
1381 See chapter 2, p. 54. 
1382 See speech by Tony Blair on the Report Stage in PD HC 6th Ser. Vol 138 Cols 37-43. 
1383 Hansard, Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Bill, HL Deb 05 June 1985 vol 464 
cc823-9, Viscount Colville of Culross at 824: admitted to having limited computer knowledge. 
1384 Ibid., Lord McIntosh at 825. 
1385 Groves P., Copyright and Designs Law: A Question of Balance (London: Graham and 
Trotman Ltd; 1991) p. 4. 
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in the 21st Century dating back to 1956. Finally, due to the lengthy negotiations between 
stakeholders and the nature of the political and practical challenges1386 the law became 
very long and complex.1387 
In the second part of the analysis the wording of the legislation was analysed which 
highlighted ambiguities and inconsistencies within the law.1388 For example, it was found 
that the intended meaning of the law did not always apply easily to the development of 
new technologies and behaviours in the modern landscape.1389 In applying the 
Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives, the analysis revealed that the intention 
was to draft the law from an external perspective, however, both the external and internal 
perspectives were found in the wording of the legislation.1390 This demonstrated an 
inconsistency in the application of the law and a departure from the original intended 
meaning of the legislation.  
The third part of the analysis considered the relevant case law and focused on two key 
areas of copying online; storage by any technical means and transient or incidental 
copying.1391 In relation to storage it was found that both judges and counsel used both 
the internal and external perspectives in their interpretation and application of copyright 
law.1392 In particular, the external perspective was used to understand the technical 
function of the network or process in question.1393 On the other hand, a metaphorical 
approach was often taken to map the law onto the circumstances of the case applying 
the law to old offline concepts to justify how it should apply to the new technology.1394 
This created confusion in the application of the law by starting out with a very technically 
accurate approach and then attempting to understand the use of that technology by 
using a metaphorical approach.  
																																								 																				
1386 Hansard, 1442 Lord Cameron of Lochbroom Legislative Drafting, HL Deb 11 November 
1987 Vol 489 cc1417-49. 
1387 Merkin R., Richards Butler on Copyright, Designs and Patents: The New Law (London: 
Longman; 1989) pp. 1-2. 
1388 See chapter 3, p. 78. 
1389 For example, section 17(3) CDPA 1988 was a restatement of the previous Copyright law 
protecting the technology relevant at the time; making a facsimile copy. See chapter 3, p. 82.  
1390 See chapter 3, pp. 88-89. 
1391 See chapter 4. 
1392 See chapter 4, p. 125. 
1393 For example, in IBCOS Computers Ltd. and Another v Barclays Mercantile Highland 
Finance [1994] F.S.R. 275 Justice Jacob considered the technical function of the internet, at 
285. 
1394 For example, in the case of Ocular Sciences Ltd and Another v Aspect Vision Care Ltd 
[2013] UKSC 18 the Supreme Court considered that viewing or reading a physical book is not 
an act of infringement in order to understand how the law applied to viewing material online; as 
per Lord Sumption at 1. 
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The case law analysis demonstrated that the law was applied broadly and encompassed 
activity such as display of the work on a screen.1395 Moreover, it was deemed irrelevant 
if the display only lasted a few seconds and did not amount to substantial part because, 
from a technological perspective, a transient copy would be made in the device used to 
create the display.1396 Therefore, if the display of a copyright work on a screen can 
amount to copyright infringement, this creates the possibility that users of the internet 
could be liable simply by viewing any copyright work online. This demonstrates how a 
literal reading of the law creates an absurdity, as it would clearly be outside 
Following this analysis, the thesis then turned to consider one of the most significant 
ways in which copyright regulation has been applied online; infringement by way of 
communication to the public. As Depreeu stated: “The importance to the right of 
communication to the public can hardly be underestimated.”1397 
 
The Framework of Constructing Digital Perspectives Applied to 
Copyright Infringement by Way of Communication to the Public 
Online  
 
The historical analysis of the development of the right to communication revealed that 
the original intention of the right was to allow copyright holders to control television and 
radio broadcasts.1398 However, the scope of the right expanded dramatically over the 
course of its relatively short development through international, European and UK 
legislation.  
The statutory analysis revealed that there was no clear definition of the boundaries or 
meaning of communication to the public. This has enabled the law to expand and easily 
encompass different types of activity,1399 and it is largely unclear as to where the 
boundaries of communication to the public end.1400 In 1999 Russell Fame argued that 
																																								 																				
1395 Christopher Paul Gilham v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 2293. 
1396 Ibid., as per Lord Justice Stanley Burton at 27. 
1397 Depreeu S., The Variable Scope of The Exclusive Economic Rights in Copyright (The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law; 2014) p. 245. 
1398 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (London: 
Butterworths Law; 2011) 17.3. 
1399 Gillen M., File-Sharing and Individual Civil Liability in the United Kingdom: A Question of 
Substantial Abuse? (2006) 17(1) Entertainment Law Review, pp. 7-14, p. 11. 
1400 Ibid., p. 167. 
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“the internet is a relatively unregulated medium for communication.”1401 However, as 
appears to be the case with reproduction, the development of the right to communication, 
would also suggest that it is possible that once a copyright work is available online it falls 
within the scope of infringement. This is demonstrated in the arguments that follow.  
In relation to the Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives, at the stage of the 
Berne Convention there was a suggestion of an internal perspective as the guidance 
discussed the need for the work to be received by the eyes or ears of a person.1402 
However, it appeared that the scope of the right has extended so far that the making 
available of the work is enough to constitute communication and therefore only the 
potential to access the material is needed, no eyes or ears necessarily need to receive 
it.1403 
Thereafter, the analysis demonstrated that the statutory law took on an external 
perspective due to the use of technology-related-terms within the drafting.1404 
Furthermore, the internal perspective was explicitly not included; for example, when 
Australia clarified that the right did not cover display.1405 This perspective appeared to 
be a consequence of the fact that the law developed from an offline regulation. The 
regulation surrounding communication to the public clearly highlighted the tensions that 
arise when attempting to apply laws created for specific analogue purposes onto activity 
conducted online.  
As demonstrated, much of the statutory law in relation to communication to the public 
was deliberately broad and vague, with the intention that further clarification be defined 
through the Courts.1406 Thereafter the case law analysis investigated how the statutory 
law was applied to online activity. The key findings are now summarised taking into 
account recent cases that have been published following the study.  
																																								 																				
1401 Frame R., The Protection and Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights on the Internet: 
The Way Forward for the Music Industry (1999) 4 Intellectual Property Quarterly, pp. 443-470, 
p. 443. 
1402 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Guide to the Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris 1971 (WIPO: Geneva; 1978) p. 68. 
1403 Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale (ALAI), Report and Opinion on the Making 
Available and Communication to the Public in the Internet Environment - Focus on Linking 
Techniques on the Internet, point (i), available at 
http://www.alai.org/en/assets/files/resolutions/making-available-right-report-opinion.pdf  
1404 For example by use of the words ‘electronic transmission’ in section 20 CDPA 1988. 
1405 Summary of Minutes of Main Committee II in Records of the Diplomatic Conference on 
Certain Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Questions (Geneva: WIPO; 1996) para 307. See 
discussion in chapter 5, pp. 48-50. 
1406 Hansard, HL, Debates of the CDPA 1988 Bill 5th ser., col.268 (2 November 1988). 
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Communication to the Public Case Law Analysis: 
Conclusions and Recent Developments  
	
This part of the thesis first considered communication theory, which suggested that the 
internet was considered a mass medium for communication that has transformed the 
scope of communication as a concept.1407 This clarified the context within which the case 
law took place and demonstrated the tensions arising from attempting to control 
communication to the public in a system that was designed to enable communication.1408 
In addition, this understanding of the internet promotes an internal and purposive 
perspective, however, this contrasts with the drafting of the law from an external 
perspective, as demonstrated above. This tension became abundantly clear in the case 
law analysis.  
The case law analysis first compared the UK case law relating to communication to the 
public, before and after the 2003 Regulations1409 that amended section 20 of the CDPA 
1988 from a broadcasting right to a right of communication to the public. The analysis 
revealed four key findings. Firstly, that since the 2003 Regulations1410 there has been an 
increase in the use of this section.1411 Secondly, before the Regulations the disputes took 
place between copyright holding companies, however, subsequently the majority of 
disputes took place between copyright holding companies and individuals.1412 Thirdly, 
the copyright works subject to dispute has increased in scope, and overall the most 
successful cases were brought by copyright holding companies.1413 
The analysis then turned to the CJEU’s interpretation of communication to the public, 
before considering how the meanings where applied by UK judges. In particular 
considering what the Courts have determined by ‘communication,’ ‘electronic 
transmission’ and ‘the public.’ The analysis revealed that there was no definition of 
communication as such, but that it always involved electronic transmission. However, 
electronic transmission was also not defined and the case law demonstrated that it was 
applied broadly. For example, in the case of Football Association Premier League1414 the 
																																								 																				
1407 McQuail D., McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory (London: Sage Publications Ltd; 2011) 
p. 139. 
1408 See chapter 6, p. 158.  
1409 Copyright and Related Rights Regulations SI 2003/2498. 
1410 Ibid. 
1411 See chapter 6, p. 163.  
1412 Ibid., p. 163. 
1413 Ibid., p. 164. 
1414 Football Association Premier League Limited, NetMed Hellas SA, Multichoice Hellas SA v 
QC Leisure (a trading name), David Richardson, AV Station Plc, Malcolm Chamberlain, Michael 
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Judge explained that communication to the public covers any such transmission or 
retransmission by wire or wireless means, including broadcasting.1415 
Taking an external perspective in order to encompass online activity within the meaning 
of communication lead to difficulties in the specific functioning of the technology. For 
example, as Larusson argued that the word ‘transmission’ leads to uncertainty because 
uploaders do not ‘transmit’ material in the proper sense of the word when they upload 
material onto the hard drive of a computer and store it in shared folders.1416 
It was clear that whilst the understanding of the internet as a medium of communication 
promotes an internal perspective, the drafting of the law was done so from an external 
perspective. This tension was clearly highlighted in the application of the law. Whilst the 
judges often took considerable time to explain and understand the technical function of 
the online activity in their reasoning, ultimately the decision was taken from an internal 
perspective – that a copyright work was accessed by the user without authorisation.1417 
This demonstrated the judges being unable to take a purely literal interpretation of the 
law, and instead, leaning towards a more purposive approach. In particular, it was seen 
that the judges sought to remedy the mischief they believed the law intended to address. 
In the case of England And Wales Cricket Board1418 a mobile phone application (app), 
which used screen capture technology to record and share 8 second clips of sports 
events, was considered to be copyright infringement.1419 This case demonstrates two 
key findings of the case law analysis.  
Firstly, due to taking the external perspective and focusing specifically on the technology 
Justice Arnold was forced to address each version of the app. He considers in particular 
versions 8.2,1420 8.3,1421 8.3.2 and 8.4,1422 and versions 8.5 to 8.5.4.1423 This recognises 
one of the drawbacks of taking a purely external approach which focuses too closely on 
																																								 																				
Madden, Sanjay Raval, David Greenslade, S.R. Leisure Limited, Phillip George Charles 
Houghton, Derek Owen [2008] EWHC 1411 (Ch). 
1415 Ibid., Mr Justice Kitchin at 285. 
1416 Larusson H. K., Uncertainty in the Scope of Copyright: The Case of Illegal File-Sharing in 
the UK (2009) 31(3) European Intellectual Property Review, pp. 124-134, p.125. 
1417 See for example discussion on Navitaire Inc v EasyJet Airline Company Limited, Bullet 
Proof Technologies Inc. [2003] EWHC 3487 (Ch) in chapter 4. 
1418 England And Wales Cricket Board Ltd and Anor v Tixdaq Ltd and Anor [2016] EWHC 575 
(Ch) as per Arnold J. 
1419 Ibid., Arnold J para 29. 
1420 Ibid., Arnold J para 130-132. 
1421 Ibid., Arnold J, para 133-135. 
1422 Ibid., Arnold J, para 152-156. 
1423 Ibid., Arnold J, para 159-166. 
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the specific nature of the technology. The result of this was that many cases had similar 
circumstances, that differed only slightly on technicality.  
Secondly, Justice Arnold considered that films and broadcasts were signal rights and not 
content rights.1424 He explained in an previous article that we need to distinguish between 
these two types of rights: “Thus we need to distinguish between a literary work (content) 
and the paper it is printed on (signal) between a musical work (content) and the sound 
recording which embodies it (signal); between an audiovisual work (content) and the 
celluloid which fixes it (signal); and between a dramatic work (content) and the broadcast 
which diffuses it (signal).”1425 Arnold suggested that indeed recognising these different 
types of rights in films and broadcasts could bring clarity to the system: “The solution…is 
to have a content right for any audiovisual work captured or capable of being captured 
in a film, and a signal right for the film itself as at present. It is suggested that this would 
not only be Berne-compliant, but also rather more clearly so than the current system.”1426 
Sky successfully argued that the broadcast of their work had been infringed.1427 Crystal 
and Charalambous argued that this was “a significant victory for rights holders”1428 as it 
clarified that key moments of sporting events constituted a substantial part of the 
broadcast.1429 
This was highlighted in the analysis by drawing attention to the problem of regulating 
different types of copyright materials online. From the perspective of the Framework, 
taking the internal or external perspective significantly affects the ability to distinguish 
between categories of works online. As such, from the external perspective it could be 
argued that all types of work online, or on a computer, are technically all data files. The 
file could contain a film or a song, but this is irrelevant from an external perspective. On 
the other hand, from the internal perspective the works are distinguished by their 
cognitive understanding, or consumption experience of the listener, reader or viewer, 
therefore categorisation of works is relevant.  
The thesis highlighted this tension, for example the CJEU held that a graphic user 
interface of a computer program could be protected by copyright, but a television 
																																								 																				
1424 Ibid., Arnold J para 58. 
1425 Arnold R., Content Copyrights and Signal Copyrights: The Case for a Rational Scheme of 
Protection (2011) 1(3) Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property, pp. 272-279, p. 272. 
1426 Ibid., p. 276. 
1427 England And Wales Cricket Board Ltd and Anor v Tixdaq Ltd and Anor [2016] EWHC 575 
(Ch) as per Arnold J. 
1428 Crystal A. and Charalambous J., Copyright test Match - High Court Provides Guidance on 
Substantiality and Fair Dealing in Relation to Sports Clips (2016) Entertainment Law Review, 
pp. 214-217, p. 217. 
1429 Ibid., p. 217. 
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broadcasting of the graphic user interface did not constitute communication to the public 
of that work.1430 This was justified on the basis that the television viewers received the 
graphic user interface solely in a passive manner, without the possibility of 
intervening.1431  
Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria argued that the difference between a graphic interface and 
a television broadcast was that the user could not interact with a television broadcast.1432 
This is an internal perspective because it takes into consideration how the user interacts 
with or understands the work. However, as has been demonstrated, the law is drafted 
from an external perspective. 
Taking an external perspective on the categorisation of copyright works online is also 
challenged by technological developments that result in the overlap of types of work. For 
example, Smart Television technology allows for television broadcasts to be interactive. 
For example, a viewer can select different cameras to watch or interact with the 
broadcast through the internet or social media, on the television itself.1433 This directly 
contradicts Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria’s argument above. As such, it is argued that 
attempting to regulate online activity from an external perspective and defining 
categories of works online, the law may become further confused and unclear.  
However, the most recent EU case relating to communication to the public, held in 
September 2016, moved the emphasis back to the user. In the case of GS Media1434 the 
Advocate General opined that in order to establish an act of communication, the 
intervention of the ‘hyperlinker’ must be vital or indispensable in order to benefit from or 
enjoy works.1435  
The CJEU agreed that the user makes an act of communication when it intervenes, in 
full knowledge of the consequences of its action, to give access to a protected work to 
its customers, and does so, in particular, where, in the absence of that intervention, its 
customers would not, in principle, be able to enjoy the broadcast work.1436 Moreover, the 
																																								 																				
1430 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace - Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury Case 
C-393/09 at 57. 
1431 Ibid., at 57. 
1432 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (London: 
Butterworths Law; 2011) 17.16. 
1433 Foged T., Danish licences for Europe (2015) 37(1) European Intellectual Property Review, 
p. 15-24, p. 15. 
1434 GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, Playboy Enterprises International Inc., Britt 
Geertruida Dekker Case C‑160/157 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, 7 April 2016. 
1435 Ibid., Advocate General Wathelet at para 57. 
1436 GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, Playboy Enterprises International Inc., Britt 
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CJEU went on to presume that when a person posts a link, they carry out the necessary 
checks to ensure the work is not illegally published.1437 Significantly, any element of 
knowledge was also stressed: “it is to be determined whether those links are provided 
… by a person who did not know or could not reasonably have known the illegal nature 
of the publication of those works.”1438 
This, therefore, suggests that communication to the public is a deliberate conduct by the 
user. Considering the mind-set of the user reflects the internal perspective. However, 
this latest case from the CJEU contradicts the previous cases such as Svensson1439 
where the Court disregarded the user and focused on the technological process. Overall, 
the case law analysis in chapter 6 demonstrated the inconsistency in the development 
of the law in this area. As a result of the vague and broad concept of communication the 
public, particularly as applied online, copyright holders have benefited from a rapid 
extension in their rights: “Communication rights…the ramifications of their extension to 
the Internet reality, and the amount of power they bestow upon rights-holders, are 
unparalleled by anything the analogue past has ever seen.”1440 
So far this chapter has reviewed the main conclusions discovered throughout the thesis. 
In light of these arguments, the following section considers how the two acts of 
infringement, copying and communication to the public, are distinguished by the 
Framework of Constructing Digital Perspectives.  
 
Copying and Communication to the Public Are the Same Thing 
Online  
 
In reviewing the key findings from the investigation undertaken in this thesis it becomes 
apparent that many of the same issues arose in the application of copyright infringement 
online relating to both copying and communication to the public. It was also apparent 
that in many of the cases, the claimants brought claims for both copying and 
																																								 																				
1437 Ibid., 51. 
1438 Ibid., 55. 
1439 Nils Svensson, Sten Sjögren, Madelaine Sahlman, Pia Gadd v Retriever Sverige AB [2014] 
C-466/12. 
1440 Efroni Z., Access Right: The Future of Digital Copyright Law (New York: Oxford University 
Press; 2011) p. 284 
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communication to the public.1441 It has been recognised that the nature of the drafting of 
the law, allowed for the simultaneous application of both rights.1442 
Further, due to taking the external perspective in the development of the law and the 
focusing on the technological detail in the ways in which copyright works were used 
online, the distinction between copying and communication to the public is blurred. This 
is because of the technological developments in the way that copyright works are used 
online. As Depreeu stated: “In a digital online environment…a reproduction and a 
communication to the public in the copyright sense no longer necessarily correspond to 
distinct exploitation forms.”1443 
He goes on to recognise the overlap between the reproduction right and the right to 
communication to the public.1444 This is because when a communication to the public is 
made by way of a transmission, a copy is always inherently made in the transmission 
device, in the receiving device, and quite possibly in servers and systems in between. It 
has been recognised that “in the digital world, even the most routine access to 
information invariably involves making a copy.”1445 Therefore where there is 
communication to the public, there is reproduction. As Spoor concluded: “Every single 
copy, however transient it may be, during the transmission or in the end-users’ 
computer’s working memory is a reproduction.”1446 
Equally, when copyright infringement by way of reproduction online occurs, the work is 
therefore available to be enjoyed by the public. Therefore, this would also constitute 
communication to the public. Efroni explained that “in the course of streaming media 
process, two types of temporary reproduction usually takes place. First RAM buffer 
																																								 																				
1441 For example in cases: Football Association Premier League Limited, NetMed Hellas SA, 
Multichoice Hellas SA v QC Leisure (a trading name), David Richardson, AV Station Plc, 
Malcolm Chamberlain, Michael Madden, Sanjay Raval, David Greenslade, S.R. Leisure Limited, 
Phillip George Charles Houghton, Derek Owen [2008] EWHC 1411 (Ch); Alan Grisbrook v MGN 
Limited, Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Limited, Syndication International Limited 
[2009] EWHC 2520 (Ch); ITV Broadcasting Limited, ITV 2 Limited, ITV Digital Channels Limited, 
Channel 5 Broadcasting Limited, ITV Studios Limited v Tvcatchup Limited v The Secretary of 
State for Business Innovation and Skills [2011] EWHC 2977 (Pat). 
1442 Depreeu S., The Variable Scope of The Exclusive Economic Rights in Copyright (The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law; 2014) p. 483. 
1443 Ibid., p. 262. 
1444 Ibid., p. 483. 
1445 National Research Council US, Committee on Intellectual Property Rights and the Emerging 
Information Infrastructure, The Digital Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the Digital Age (2000) 
1446 Spoor J. H., The Copyright Approach to Copying on the Internet: (Over) Stretching the 
Reproduction Right? In Hugenholtz P. B and Dommering E. J. (Edts) The Future of Copyright in 
a Digital Environment: Proceedings of the Royal Academy Colloquium Organized by the Royal 
Netherlands Academy of Sciences and the Institute for Information Law (Amsterdam: Kluwer 
Law; 1996) pp. 67-80, p. 78. 
219	
	
internal reproductions occur in the computer of the end user. Additionally, external 
reproductions occur on network servers…reproduction occurs automatically and they 
are imperceptible to end users, who are often completely unaware of those intermediate 
technical steps.”1447 
As the case law demonstrated, the work need not actually be consumed. There appears 
to be no requirement that any transmission actually takes place as the restricted act only 
requires that members of the public ‘may’ access the work.1448 In other words: “The 
independence is lacking in the case of exploitation in a digital environment. In order to 
make a work available, the work needs to be stored, and in order to enjoy the work it 
needs to be copied and made perceptible to the end user.”1449 Depreeu described this 
overlap as a cause for concern, as it creates legal uncertainty and further complicates 
copyright regulation.1450 This also demonstrates how copyright regulation has 
transgressed from its original intentions. The thesis discussed the historical context and 
development of both copying and communication to the public, which were distinctly 
different. However, in applying these legal principles online, the two have merged.1451 
Therefore, it can be inferred that either one, or both, of these regulations no longer serves 
its purpose.  
The Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives has further highlighted the tensions 
created in applying copyright infringement online. In particular, in the development of the 
law relating to copying and communication to the public. Ultimately, it was demonstrated 
that both the internal and external perspectives could be found in the interpretation and 
application of the law to the internet. This has illuminated contradictions, uncertainties 
and complexities in the law as well as demonstrating that copyright law does not always 
fulfil its intended purpose when applied to activity online.  
 
 
																																								 																				
1447 Efroni Z., Access Right: The Future of Digital Copyright Law (New York: Oxford University 
Press; 2011) p. 210. 
1448 Caddick, N., Davies G. and Harbottle G., Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell; 2005) para 7. 
1449 Depreeu S., The Variable Scope of The Exclusive Economic Rights in Copyright (The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law; 2014) p. 485. 
1450 Ibid., p. 484. 
1451 Efroni Z., Access Right: The Future of Digital Copyright Law (New York: Oxford University 
Press; 2011) p. 248: arguing that “the advent of digital transmission seriously confused the 
distinctions between the fixed and unfixed, the private and the public.” 
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Looking to the Future 
 
This section discusses how the Frameworks for Constructing Digital Perspectives could 
be utilised by the Legislator and the Courts, and how that could resolve the difficulties of 
applying copyright law to the internet.  
This thesis has argued that the human element in the story of copyright and new 
technologies should not be forgotten. As quoted at the very beginning of this thesis, Tim 
Berners-Lee reminded us that even though the internet is enabled through technology, 
it is really a system of connecting people.1452 The importance of this was recognised in 
the analysis of online technology in light of communication theory. In chapter 6 it was 
demonstrated that the internet is considered a mass communication medium,1453 built 
with the goal to link information and people together.1454 In contrast, copyright law seeks 
to regulate and restrict the sharing of information over the internet.1455 Consequently, the 
fundamental principles of the internet, as a facilitator of communication, and copyright, 
as a restriction on communication, are conflicting and competing.  
 
In much the same way, a judge’s interpretation of the statutory law can be either literal 
or purposive. These two approaches are competing and depending on the chosen 
interpretation, create a different outcome in the decision made. The literal and purposive 
approaches are aligned, in this thesis, with the internal and external perspectives of the 
internet; to form the Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives.1456 Through the 
internal and external perspectives, this study highlighted the tensions between the 
cognitive understanding in the human experience with new technologies on the one 
hand, and the application of copyright law online on the other.  
 
The internal and external perspectives demonstrate that the human experience of new 
technology differs from the technological processes of online activity. As a result, the 
internet provides two possible set of facts to which copyright law can be applied. This 
																																								 																				
1452 Tim Berners-Lee On Speech on 14 September 2008, at the Newseum in Washington, D.C. 
(USA), at the announcement of the World Wide Web Foundation (14 September 2008, 
Washington, DC, USA) available: http://webfoundation.org/about/community/transcript-of-tim-
berners-lee-video/  
1453 McQuail D., McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory (London: Sage Publications Ltd; 2011) 
p. 41.  
1454 Berners-Lee T., Weaving the Web: The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World 
Wide Web (New York: Harper Business; 2000). 
1455 See Wagner R. P., Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies 
of Control (2003) 103(4) Columbia Law Review, pp. 995-1034. 
1456 See chapter 2. 
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creates a problem for judges in their interpretation and application of copyright law to 
online activity. It was seen that taking the technological perspective, which is aligned 
with the literal rule in statutory interpretation, the judges interpret the law literally and 
apply it to the technical function of the technology. However, it was clear from the 
judgements, particularly in relation to communication to the public, that this often created 
an absurdity in the law, for example in the Meltwater1457 case this lead to the assumption 
that internet browsing could constitute copyright infringement. As a result, the judges 
tended to – but not always - lean towards a more purposive approach, taking an internal 
perspective, in order to allow the law to fulfil its intended function. This was done, for 
example, by utilising the mischief rule approach whereby the judges considered whether 
or not the online activity should be illegal and interpreted the law as seeking to remedy 
that behaviour.  
 
Therefore, a key problem that this thesis highlights is that this leaves internet users, 
technology developers, copyright holders and lawyers with uncertain boundaries on what 
is or is not illegal. Ben Allgrove, esteemed IP Partner at law firm Baker & McKenzie LLP, 
who has acted as representation in major copyright infringement cases such as 
Meltwater,1458 recently revealed that as a lawyer advising clients he simply suggests 
“give it a go, because no-one really knows.”1459 Evidently, this is not a favourable position 
for lawyers or clients to be in and occurs as a result of the uncertainty in the law, 
particularly due to the inconsistent application of the legislation.  
 
The unique factor in this issue, as the internal and external perspectives illuminate, is 
that the consideration of the human element is lacking from the discourse in the 
application of copyright law to the internet. Excluding the notion of the human element in 
law-making, the application of the law and new technology creates technologically 
specific law that results in absurdities. As mentioned, this leads to uncertainty as judges 
sometimes apply the literal meaning of the law to the external facts and other times move 
																																								 																				
1457	The Newspaper Licensing Agency Limited, MGN Limited, Associated Newspapers Limited, 
Express Newspapers Limited, Guardian News and Media Limited, Telegraph Media Group 
Limited, Independent Print Limited v Meltwater Holding BV, Meltwater News UK Limited, Public 
Relations Consultants Association Limited [2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch); [2011] EWCA Civ 890. 
1458 Ibid. 
1459 Ben Allgrove, speaking at the British Literary and Copyright Association (BLCA) meeting titled 
“The Temporary Copies Exception and The Three Step Test Post Filmspeler” 13th July 2017: 
http://www.blaca.org/meetings.html  
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towards a more purposive approach, relating to the internal perspective, which results in 
a different decision. 
In light of this, it is proposed that in order for copyright to achieve its goal in the digital 
age it must be construed within its original intention. That is to say that the goal of 
copyright is to balance the rights of the creator with those of the public interest, in order 
that the creator be remunerated for his work and the public may access that work.1460 To 
achieve this goal copyright regulation, therefore, restricts the use of copyright works with 
limitations in scope and copyright exceptions. In dealing with copyright infringement 
online, this thesis addressed the two key ways in which copyright can be infringed on 
the internet; reproduction and communication to the public.  
Viewed in line with the mischief rule, and from the context and background of the 
development of the law, it can be seen that the reproduction right was intended to 
regulate the act of copying of a work.1461 It can also be seen that the communication to 
the public right was developed as a remedy for the unauthorised sharing of digital 
copyright material online.1462 Accordingly, the following section suggests that these 
statutory provisions be interpreted in line with their intention. In order to achieve this, it 
is suggested that the reproduction right be applied to offline copying from an external 
perspective and the communication to the public right be applied to online activity from 
an internal perspective. This recommendation is explained in more detail in the following 
section.  
	
A Proposal for Copyright Regulation through the 
Framework for Constructing Digital Perspectives  
 
This thesis has highlighted that the judges have been seen to take both an internal and 
external perspective when applying copyright law to the internet, which has in turn 
created uncertainty and inconsistencies in the law. In order to address this problem, this 
section will now consider how the internal and external perspectives can be utilised to 
establish certainty and consistency in copyright regulation.  
 
																																								 																				
1460 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (London: 
Butterworths Law; 2011) 1.9. 
1461 Litman J., Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age (1996) 75 Or. L. Rev. pp.19-48, p 
35. 
1462 Gillen M., File-Sharing and Individual Civil Liability in the United Kingdom: A Question of 
Substantial Abuse? (2006) 17(1) Entertainment Law Review, pp. 7-14, p. 11. 
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In his article setting out the internal and external perspectives Kerr suggested that a 
particular perspective could be identified within a particular context and thereafter be 
chosen and applied in those circumstances.1463 However, as has been demonstrated 
throughout this thesis, in relation to copyright infringement, both perspectives were used 
in the development and application of the law. Thus, there is no clear choice of 
perspective evident for the application of copyright law to the internet overall.  
 
In contrast to Kerr’s application of the internal and external perspectives, Frischmann 
argued that the Courts should resist adopting a particular choice of perspective. Instead, 
he suggested that both perspectives of the facts should be considered, otherwise Courts 
may only appreciate “a partial view of the underlying facts.”1464 Hutchinson agreed that 
judges should be wary of taking a single perspective and should consider both the 
internal and the external perspective in the context of the facts to determine if there are 
important differences that need to be accommodated for.1465 
 
This thesis has clearly demonstrated the Courts’ lack of awareness of the concepts of 
the internal and external perspectives per se, although both approaches were seen to 
be taken, and therefore it is appreciated that these suggestions are sensible prima facia. 
However, it is submitted that, whilst it might seem helpful to alert the Court to both 
perspectives this does not provide a solution to the problem of perspective. Ultimately, 
in order to come to a decision, the Court would have to make a choice. Therefore, simply 
suggesting that the Courts consider both perspectives does not provide a solution.  
 
For that reason, taking into consideration the key findings of this thesis, a practical 
solution is suggested. It is proposed that when applying copyright regulation to online 
activity the internal perspective should be taken and applied to communication to the 
public only. Judges should do this by utilising the purposive approach of the mischief 
rule which allows the interpretation of the law to remedy the behaviour intended to be 
prohibited.  
 
																																								 																				
1463 Kerr O. S., The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal, 
pp. 357-405, p. 390. 
1464 Frischmann B. M., The Prospect of Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace (2004) 35 Loyola 
University Chicago Law Journal, pp. 205-234, p. 207.  
1465 Hutchison C. J., Interpretation and the Internet (2010) 28 John Marshall Journal of 
Computer and Information Law, pp. 251-272, p. 268. 
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In contrast, copyright infringement by way of reproduction should be considered from the 
external perspective and be applied to offline activity only. Judges should do this using 
the literal rule of interpretation, as is historical prevailing in this context.   
 
As demonstrated above, when applying reproduction and communication to the public 
online in the way that they are currently interpreted, there is a clear overlap. However, 
the suggested approach of separating these sections to apply reproduction offline and 
communication to the public online, resolves this redundancy in the law.  
 
Furthermore, this approach takes these offences back to their original purposes. 
Copyright infringement by way of copying was never designed to encompass internet 
technology.1466 However, communication to the public quickly adapted to encompass 
online activity and remedy unauthorised sharing of copyright protected material on the 
internet.  
 
In addition, choosing an internal perspective for online communication to the public with 
a purposive approach, and an external perspective for offline reproduction with a literal 
approach provides consistency in the law. This means that lawyers, users and copyright 
holders will more easily be able to predict the boundaries of the law and act accordingly.  
 
Taking the internal perspective in the application of communication to the public would 
also reduce the number of cases considering the specific technological differences in the 
facts of the case. As highlighted in the study, the external and literal approach to 
communication to the public resulted in many similar cases being heard before the 
Courts and required the judges to consider each technical element in detail, despite 
eventually using a purposive approach in the end. Therefore, this suggestion would 
relieve the judges from this challenge and allow the law to encompass all relevant 
versions of technology that achieves an unauthorised use of copyright material. As 
Olswang suggested, continuing to distinguish between acts of infringement by way of 
the technological process online is ineffective because technology offers a range of 
means to reach the same end.1467 Therefore, this approach provides a mechanism by 
which the intended outcome, by way of the end user experience, can be regulated as 
opposed to making new law every time a new technology is developed. Thereby also 
																																								 																				
1466 Litman J., Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age (1996) 75 Or. L. Rev. pp.19-48, p 
19. 
1467 Olswang S., Accessright: an evolutionary path for copyright into the digital era? (1995) 
European Intellectual Property Review, pp. 215-218, p. 216. 
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overcoming the challenge of the law becoming obsolete in the face of technological 
development.  
 
Moreover, due to the internal perspective, this would clarify the law in relation to access, 
a point of contention that arose frequently in the investigation.1468 The idea of regulating 
copyright online through an access-based approach has been suggested by other 
academics such as Efroni in his study The Future of Digital Copyright Law: “the present 
study endeavours to investigate precisely this fairly underdeveloped idea – that of an 
access-based copyright regulation…examines the idea of literally premising copyright 
regulation on the concept of access to digital information and the implications of such a 
system.”1469 Whist Efroni’s study did not consider the internal and external perspectives 
explicitly, the proposed access right was clearly defined from the internal perspective: 
“The concept of access implies, inter alia, cognitive processing occurring inside the 
recipient’s mind once exposure to the message signals takes place.1470…Human-access 
to information is an internal, cognitive occurrence that is to a significant degree 
involuntary.”1471 
 
On this understanding of the meaning of access, Efroni’s study proposed a conceptual 
copyright that limited the user’s ability to experience or apprehend a work;1472 as opposed 
to making a technical copy of it. Access online could be considered as the ability to 
experience or apprehend a work – in other words, to view, read or listen to it via the 
internet.1473 This aligns with the internal perspective as it incorporates the human 
experience of the interaction with the copyright work online, disregarding the 
technological means beyond the use of the internet as a tool for access.  
 
It may seem radical, on the face of it, to suggest that copyright should regulate the 
consumption of a work in this way. However, the analysis in this thesis has demonstrated 
several times that the Courts are already apply the law so that it restricts access to 
copyright work. Additionally, as previously noted, Lessig argued that this is the future of 
copyright regulation: “Copyright law has got to give up its obsession with 'the copy.' The 
																																								 																				
1468 Koelman K. J., A Hard Nut to Crack: The Protection of Technological Measures (2000) 6 
European Intellectual Property Review, pp. 272-288, p. 274: “the trend seems to be for 
copyright to slowly move in the direction of granting an exclusive right to access.” 
1469 Efroni Z., Access Right: The Future of Digital Copyright Law (New York: Oxford University 
Press; 2011) p. xxi. 
1470 Ibid., p. 128. 
1471 Ibid., p. 128. 
1472 Ibid., p. 145. 
1473 Besek J. M., Anti-Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report from the Kernochan Centre 
for Law, Media and the Arts (2004) 27 Columbia Journal of law and Arts, p. 385. 
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law should not regulate 'copies' or 'modern reproductions' on their own. It should instead 
regulate uses--like public distributions of copies of copyrighted work--that connect 
directly to the economic incentive copyright law was intended to foster.”1474 
 
This idea was also approached by Fitzgerald who argued that the concept of copyright 
should develop beyond its current technical boundaries to consider the human element 
and human consumption by way of access: “We should be moving beyond the limited 
conceptual framework of copyright to a legal framework that looks more closely at the 
relationships any individual or entity has with information, knowledge, culture or 
creativity…open up the politics and economy of the rights to access, reuse and 
communicate information, knowledge, culture or creativity.”1475 
 
As the UK prepares to leave the European Union, an opportunity presents itself to the 
legislator to draft a new copyright act. If a new copyright act was drafted in line with this 
suggested proposal it would involve the following:  
 
1. Copyright infringement is regulated differently online and offline. As 
demonstrated in this thesis, the nature of the internet results in unique 
circumstances. The application of offline copyright regulation using metaphorical 
understanding creates inconsistency and uncertainty in the law. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to regulate online use of copyright material differently to that of offline 
use of copyright material.  
 
2. Offline copyright infringement is regulated by way of the restricted act of 
reproduction. This is in line with the historical context and intention of copyright 
law to regulate the copying of copyright protected works. This legislation should 
be drafted and interpreted from an external perspective, focusing on the physical 
elements involved in the copying. In addition, judges should interpret and apply 
the law in line with the literal rule. This enables the law to be clear, certain and 
consistent. The literal rule and external perspective is appropriate in this context 
as there are only one possible set of facts in offline copyright infringement.  
 
																																								 																				
1474 Lessig L., Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy (New York: 
Penguin Press; 2008) p. 268. 
1475 Fitzgerald B., Copyright 2010: The Future of Copyright (2008) 30(2) European Intellectual 
Property Review, pp.43-49, p. 48-49. 
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3. Online copyright infringement is regulated by way of the restricted act of 
communication to the public. The purpose of communication to the public is to 
regulate the unauthorised access of copyright works on the internet. The 
legislation should be drafted and interpreted from an internal perspective, 
focusing on the experience of the user or infringer. In addition, judges should 
interpret and apply the law with a purposive approach in line with the mischief 
rule. They should consider the mischief that the law seeks to remedy. This 
reduces the need for detailed technological analysis, and brings clarity to the 
boundaries of the law. What is regulated is what the user is doing, not how they 
achieve that from a technical perspective. As a result, the law is clearer, more 
certain and consistent.  
 
This proposal could be a possible direction for the future of copyright regulation in the 
digital age. As Justice Arnold advocates: “there are systemic problems in the design of 
the 1988 Act whose effects have become worse over time1476…it is plain that we need a 
new Copyright Act.”1477 
 
Conclusion  
	
This thesis has investigated copyright infringement on the internet by considering in 
particular, reproduction and communication to the public online. The internal and 
external perspectives were developed into the Framework for Constructing Digital 
Perspectives and utilised as the lens through which this analysis was undertaken.  
The Framework was applied to the statutory law and case law in order to determine the 
meaning of the law as applied to online activity and in particular, when the internal and 
external perspectives were used.  
Approaching online copyright infringement from this original standpoint revealed many 
inconsistencies and uncertainty in the application of copyright infringement to online 
activity. Considering the cognitive understanding of the human experience with new 
technologies shed a new light on the mapping of copyright law onto the internet.  
																																								 																				
1476 Arnold R., The Need for a New Copyright Act: A Case Study in Law Reform, The Herchel 
Smith Intellectual Property Lecture (2014) 5(2) Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property, pp. 
110-131, p.125. 
1477 Ibid., 126. 
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In light of these findings, it is proposed that the future of copyright regulation could benefit 
from adjusting the way that infringement by way of reproduction and communication to 
the public is applied. It is suggested that offline copyright infringement should be 
regulated from an external perspective and taking a literal reading of the law. In contrast, 
online copyright infringement should be regulated from an internal perspective and taking 
a more purposive interpretation of the law, in particular considering the mischief rule.  
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